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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
WHAT WE

HAVE LEARNED

SINCE THE BIG THOMPSON FLOOD

Eve Gruntfest
University of Colorado-Colorado Springs

Introduction
The Big Thompson Canyon

The Big Thompson Canyon is one of the most scenic in the Rocky
Mountain region. U.S. Route 34 runs through the canyon, adjacent to the
river in many spots, and it is the main link between the Colorado plains and
Rocky Mountain National Park. In June 1976, just before the flood, the fulltime canyon population was estimated to be 600 and part-time residents
numbered approximately twice that. Also, an undetermined number of
tourists were present, attracted by trout fishing, Rocky Mountain National
Park, stream-side motels, and campgrounds (Gruntfest, 1977).
Three major communities reside in the 25-mile canyon that runs west from
Loveland, Colorado:
1) Cedar Cove, which lies just above the Narrows;
2) Drake, the largest town, located at the confluence of the North Fork
and the Main Fork of the Big Thompson; and
3) Glen Comfort, a smaller town on the North Fork of the Big Thompson.
The Flood

On July 31, 1976, the Big Thompson Canyon was filled with residents and
visitors. It was the Saturday of the weekend commemorating Colorado's
Centennial and the last holiday weekend before the start of the school year.
That night a flash flood ravaged the canyon, causing the worst natural
disaster, in terms of documented lives lost, in Colorado state history. The
death toll of a 1921 flood in Pueblo may have been larger; however,
estimates of lives lost in that flood range from 100 to 350.
Heavy rain fell over a 70-square-mile area in the central portion of the Big
Thompson watershed between 6:30 and 11:00 p.m. The most intense rainfall,
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between 12 and 14 inches, fell on slopes in the western end of the canyon.
The flood washed out all stream and rain gages, so accurate measurements
were not possible. Yet, the impact of the flood could have been worse. The
North Fork peak streamflow occurred approximately 40 minutes later than
the Main Fork peak. If the two peaks had coincided, the peak streamflow
would have been even greater than the 31,200 cubic feet per second recorded
at the mouth of the canyon.
At least 139 people died in the flood, and eighty-eight people were
injured. Seven people were listed as missing. The flood destroyed 316
homes, 45 mobile homes, and 52 businesses. Seventy-three mobile homes
suffered major damage.
The Symposium Idea

After the Big Thompson flood, everyone concerned with natural hazards
resolved that a disaster of this magnitude should never happen again. This
resolve was particularly strong in Boulder, Colorado, where officials realized
that they faced a worse catastrophe if a Big Thompson-like storm materialized
over the Boulder Creek drainage area. Downtown Loveland is four miles
from the mouth of the Big Thompson Canyon and was basically unaffected
by the Big Thompson flood. Downtown Boulder, however, lies directly at the
mouth of Boulder Canyon.
Flash flood hazard awareness following the Big Thompson flood was
high, especially since this flood occurred only four years after 237 lives were
lost in Rapid City, South Dakota. These two events re-focused official
attention on flash floods, particularly in the western United States.
Ten Years After

In the decade following the Big Thompson Canyon flood, many scientific,
technological, and educational advances took place. The idea for the first
symposium grew out of our interest in evaluating the notion of "disaster as
opportunity." In what ways had we learned from the Big Thompson
catastrophe? Were we more or less vulnerable and in what ways? These
questions had many facets. After a major disaster, communities and
governments pay scientific and policy attention to the seriousness of natural
disasters. We had a catastrophic flash flood in Colorado in 1976-what
difference has it made?
The 1986 meeting, held in Boulder and sponsored by the National Science
Foundation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, brought together 125 professionals with
diverse perspectives to identify the areas of progress and lack of progress.
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The participants crossed many disciplinary boundaries and included
forecasters, hydrologists, sociologists, geomorphologists, local civil defense
officials, water engineers, members of the insurance industry, lawyers, and
geographers.
The symposium provided a rare opportunity to look back and assess the
strengths and weaknesses of post-disaster research and policy actions. The
post-audit provided a real event and time period focus for reflection on the
commonly held premise that disasters are opportunities for change to reduce
losses in the future. In 1986, after we spent a day-and-a-half discussing
advancements and disappointments, we met to make research and policy
suggestions.
Findings from the Tenth Anniversary Symposium

The discussion sessions following two days of the symposium led to the
five specific recommendations. (More detail is available in the 1986
proceedings volume.) First, the need for transferring available flash flood
hazard mitigation information was identified as greater than the need for the
acquisition of new data. Second, the definition of "publics" for public
awareness needed to be broadened. Third, better techniques for estimating
costs, benefits, and losses were required so that accurate evaluations of
mitigation strategies could be made. Fourth, the public and private sectors
must work in a coordinated fashion to resolve important issues such as "how
safe is safe enough" with regard to dam projects. And, fmally, the distinctions
between flash floods and slow-rise floods must be recognized and clarified
(Gruntfest, 1987).
Twenty Years After

In 1996, 10 years after the first symposium and 20 years after the flood,
the initial question of vulnerability remained. Vulnerability to flash floods
was increasing by virtue of the vast increases in population in the southwestern U.S. Debris flows, mudslides, and alluvial fan flooding were all causing
more damages as more people moved into hazardous areas. Flash flood
deaths have not declined. A major policy dilemma continues to be how to get
people to abandon their cars and climb to safety in flash floods. The public
underestimation of the power of flowing water prevails.
The 1996 symposium's mission followed our earlier meeting as a post
audit to the flood and evaluation of lessons learned. As a group we again
represented a wide range of disciplines, including meteorology, paleohydrology, psychology, emergency management, geography, and floodplain
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management. We also included a large representation from the press and
residents from Big Thompson Canyon.
As in 1986, professionals took the time to critically examine and learn
from past events and to talk with people from different areas of expertise.
Papers presented offered lessons learned from experiences in Larimer
County, the Front Range, and other parts of the world, including West
Virginia, California, England, Mexico, and Italy.
Nationally, we have not had a major flash flood, in terms of loss of life,
since the Shady Side, Ohio, disaster on June 14, 1990, when 26 people died.
However, on a global scale, at the close of the 20th century the loss of lives
from flooding continues. During the first seven months of 1996 alone, flash
floods killed over 1,000 people around the world, many hundreds in flooding
in southeast China.

The State of the Flash Flood Hazard in 1996
Vulnerability is Increasing

There is nothing unique about the Big Thompson Canyon in terms of its
vulnerability to a severe flash flood. There are several other Front Range
canyons just as vulnerable to similar or worse catastrophes. Vulnerability is
increasing as population swells. The best detection system will not save lives
unless the messages are delivered in a timely fashion and the people at risk
know what to do-and do it promptly. We have been lucky that the Big
Thompson flood was the last flood to kill more than 100 people in the U. S. ,
but it is not due to our wise land-use decisions.
There are increased possibilities for compounding the impacts of natural
disasters by the co-location of hazardous materials in floodplains. For
example 20,000-gallon propane tanks were found in the Missouri River
floodplain during the 1993 floods in the Midwest (Gruntfest and Pollack,
1994). The hazardous materials question as well as the issue of dam safety
must be addressed. Our catastrophe potential increases as infrastructure
continues to age.
People still die in their cars crossing flooded roads because they still don't
want to get out of their vehicles. How can we convince people that they are
better wet than dead? Unfortunately, the media and our own public awareness
documents and videotapes reinforce the notion of relative safety through
images of people being dramatically rescued from their cars while flood
waters rush around them.
Even when roads are closed, people drive around barriers. In the
Susquehanna River floods in New York in January 1996, 30 people received
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tickets after the police posted signs indicating that the road was closed. The
police actually had to stand in the water in waders and give people tickets for
crossing the flooded, barricaded road!
Importance of Low Tech Measures
and Environmental Cues

During the 1993 Mississippi/Missouri River floods, in spite of advanced
hydrological and meteorological models, we were quite dependent on lowtech adjustments such as sandbags and local knowledge. Data from the
sophisticated hydrologic models from the National Weather Service, private
meteorologists, and the Corps of Engineers were all constantly available and
the local people kept tabs on them. But, there were still numerous difficulties
with timeliness.
People needed to know what the impacts of the five inches of rain
currently falling in Kansas City would be at downstream Hermann, Missouri,
later in the day. Or, what if an upstream levee did not hold? The most
accurate information for the person who needed to know whether or not he
or she would be able to cross the Missouri to get to work was provided by
local knowledge and a very low tech measurement device: a measurement
stick in the river that was checked by people sitting on a bench by the river
or by word of mouth passed along by the road department employee who
stopped at the cafe for a cup of coffee.
While the Mississippi flooding experience was radically different from the
Big Thompson flood in terms of lead time, the crucial roles of environmental
cues, common sense, and local knowledge are as important in our high tech
environment as they were 50 years ago.
For the thousands of people who enjoy the beauties of flash flood-prone
canyons, common sense remains essential. They must interpret the environmental cues of a river getting louder, getting closer to the bank, and the rain
falling harder than usual, and then abandon their cars and climb to safety.
New Scientific Collaborations

Flash flood information is available also from some unusual partnerships.
Remote sensing efforts at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), combined with the work of geographers at Dartmouth College, keep
an up-to-the-minute archive of global flood events on the World Wide Web
(http://www.dartmouth.edu/artsci/geog/floods/index.html).This archive has
unlimited potential for keeping up with events for educational purposes and
providing lessons from flood experiences elsewhere. Before this website was
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developed, students had much more difficulty keeping up with disasters
around the world. Updated daily, the floods are graphically available through
remote sensing and text is drawn from all the major news services around the
world. The Dartmouth effort reduces the tendency toward nationalistic
myopia that affects many people in the U.S. who rely mostly on newspapers
that focus on events within our borders, rather than on those in the rest of the
world.
From the vantage point of paleohydrology, a discipline that was just
beginning in 1986, it is suggested that the recurrence interval of the Big
Thompson flood is 10,000 years. This means it was an event so rare that
planning for the next one is impractical. Yet, there is still strong debate over
the likelihood of another rainstorm of greater than 12 inches in the Colorado
high country. How can we best communicate to populations at risk without
confusing them?
More Public Awareness

One year after the Big Thompson flood, signs were placed at the entrances
of Front Range canyons in Colorado with the purpose of giving people
information on appropriate actions to take during the next major rainstorm
that causes serious flooding. The signs are based on events in the Big
Thompson Canyon on the night of July 31, where many people died trying
to out-drive the flood. Other places have adopted the sign idea. The Arizona
Flood Plain Managers and the National Weather Service have each developed
videotapes aimed at reducing the number of people who drive through
flooding roads, and consequently, the number of casualties.
Findings from 1996 Symposium

Twenty years ago the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation
were leaders in flood control-mostly through dam construction and levee
building. In 1996, they were lead actors in the flood detection realm, deeply
involved in detection and warning systems for flash flood mitigation below
dams and in floodplains.
The National Weather Service was the only group making weather
predictions in 1976. By 1986 private meteorologists were offering services to
communities, corporations, and television stations. By 1996 the complementarity of public and private services seems nearly seamless, especially
when users surf the Internet. Problems of flood forecasting are so complex
that numerous actors can be involved and not duplicate their efforts. Also,
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vendors played an active role at the 1996 Symposium, which would have been
nearly unimaginable in 1976 and 1986.
There are thousands of Web sites instantly available. The National
Weather Service reserves the legal obligation for forecasts, although oth
professionals and nonprofessionals now have many more options· for
obtaining weather information.
The Association of State Floodplain Managers, the Association of State
Dam Safety officials, Automated Local Emergency in Real Time (ALERT)
user groups, and numerous growing professional emergency management
organizations are the essential creative groups committed to flash flood
hazard mitigation. The partnerships between the ALERT users in many states
and flood control districts and government agencies are flourishing, with
excellent potential for improving the likelihood that timely warnings are
received. ALERT systems are also being used for air pollution monitoring,
fire weather forecasts, and water supply decision making.
Since the Big Thompson flood, the need for detection and warning
systems has been identified and acted upon. Twenty years ago, there were no
automated stream and rain gage networks. Now, there are thousands, and
they are not only accessible from central base stations at fire departments or
emergency management offices, but those of us with modems and computers
can keep abreast at home. Finally, in many cases, detection is being
combined with the crucial elements of response. The reduced expense of
personal computers and the increased speed of data transfer have radically
altered the availability of data on real time river basin and rainfall.
For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, which includes Phoenix,
residents and flood control engineers have access to real time stream and
rain-gage data 24 hours a day (http://www.maricopa.govlflood/fcd.html).
Individuals along many rivers in California can access Web sites that monitor
stream gages to determine whether or not to evacuate (http://wwwdrw.
water.ca.gov). Real-time radar access is also readily available. These sites
were well visited during 1995, 1996, and 1997 floods and increased use can
be expected as more people join the Web.
Local emergency managers report that the Web data serves a vital public
education purpose and significantly reduces phone traffic at emergency
operations centers. In addition, NOAA's Forecast Systems Laboratory has
developed a prototype where real time weather information is fully integrated
in a geographical information system (http://www-ad.fsl.noaa.gov/pddb/
emwdp/emwdp.html). So far it is only available in Boulder, Colorado, but
has great promise for applications elsewhere.
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Introduction to the 1996 Proceedings Papers
As with all proceedings, the papers in this volume represent a moment in
time -20 years after a disastrous flood. It is interesting to compare the
moments in time-to see how our professional perspectives have changed
since 1976.
The presentations from the 1996 symposium differ significantly from the
1986 contributions. The differences can be summarized in categories that are
discussed briefly here and can be more clearly seen through the proceedings
papers themselves.
1. The optimism that technological innovations would reduce or eliminate
the need for traditional stream or rain gages has faded. The hope
prevalent through the 1980s has been replaced by a more realistic
recognition that technological innovations must be complemented by
"old fashioned" rain and stream gages and that ground truthing is still
essential
2. Paleohydrologic techniques are more frequently being applied to
decisions about dam safety. Ten years ago conventional hydrology was
beginning to see a challenge from paleohydrologists. However, there
are improvements in methodology and an increased number of applied
case studies including, the work by Robert Jarrett of the U.S.
Geological Survey and Mike Grimm of the Fort Collins Stormwater
Utility. Reduced federal funding for all types of projects has accelerated the use of the new technique, which will ultimately reduce the
safety requirements for large dams because paleohydrologists argue
that traditional methods set unreasonably high expectations of flood
flows. This debate continues with significance for flash flood forecasting and dam safety requirements.
3. The 1996 symposium was unusual in several respects: First, it brought
together a wide variety of people united by one disaster that occurred
20 years ago. It was striking how many careers and lives were deeply
affected by that one event in Colorado. And, because the meeting is
a special event-taking place every 10 years and providing a unique
composition of participants-we experienced some very moving
moments.
In particular there was a fascinating interaction between the people of the
Big Thompson Canyon and John Rold, who served with the Colorado
Geological Survey as state geologist for many years before and after the
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flood. John tried very hard to explain why he made the recommendations for
returning the road to its present site. Even 20 years after the event, the
poignancy of the interaction indicated that the residents and the geologist
remembered the moment as if was yesterday. Both spoke from their hearts
regarding the disaster· and the land use decisions that followed.
Howard Gunnarson from the Bureau of Reclamation listened intensely as
Theresa Vasquez reported on flash floods in Mexico, including the story of
the flooding the same year as the Big Thompson flood (1976) that killed
2,000 people. He remarked that the Bureau must take into account how their
dams and policies concerning their dams impact our neighbors to the South.
Daunting Questions

Tragically, on July l3, 1996, the day of the symposium field trip, three
people were killed in a flash flood on Buffalo Creek in Colorado. The
vegetation on the headwater area of Buffalo Creek about 140 miles southwest
of the Big Thompson Canyon had been destroyed by a fire two weeks earlier.
The lack of vegetation intensified the impacts of the heavy rain. Several
homes were washed away in the small drainage and there were no official
flash flood warnings in effect before the flood.
It wasn't until dawn on August I, 1976, that the world realized that one
thunderstorm killed 140 people and destroyed so much property. The next
time more than 12 inches of rain falls at the top of a watershed in Colorado,
New Mexico, Arizona, West Virginia, or elsewhere, will there be a timely
official forecast? Will the campers, motel owners, homeowners, and
motorists heed the warnings and do the right thing by climbing to higher
ground?
And, as we near the end of the 20th century, 20 years after the Big
Thompson disaster, will the knowledge of the extraordinary amount of
rainfall, the number of people killed, the extent of the destruction be known
only the next day as it was on August 1, 1976?
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BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES
IN MITIGATION
Richard W. Krimm
Acting Associate Director for Mitigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

One thing the Big Thompson flood demonstrated to our nation is that we
as a society-at the local, state, and federal levels-need to work to reduce
the risks we face from flooding and other types of disasters. Many of our
communities face a risk similar to that experienced in the Big Thompson
Canyon. And, unless we work together to implement mitigation measures to
reduce or eliminate the risks we face, the Big Thompson flood will be
repeated elsewhere.
This argument seems to make perfect sense. Yet, while the concept of
mitigation seems simple enough, in the real world it has always been a tough
sell. The reasons for this can be grouped into four major categories: 1) a poor
understanding of what mitigation is and how it can benefit people, 2) a lack
of resources at the federal and state levels, 3) the need to quantify the savings
associated with implementing cost-effective mitigation opportunities, and 4)
the resistance by U.S. citizens to restrictions on the use of their land.

Understanding Mitigation
First of all, most people's knowledge and understanding of mitigation is
limited at best. If we asked people what "mitigation" means, we would find
that most Americans don't even understand the word, let alone how
mitigation can benefit them and their communities.
The problem is particularly vexing because mitigation is not a difficult
concept to grasp. As Morrie Goodman, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's (FEMA) Director of Strategic Communications, said, "It's
investing in a guardrail at the top of a mountain so you don't need to call an
ambulance to the bottom." Mitigation involves protecting individuals,
families, and communities from disaster. It's as simple as that, but still the
problem persists.
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Much of the difficulty, I believe, lies in the timing of when most
mitigation activity commonly occurs. Mitigation requires planning, and as
such, does not take place quickly after a disaster. Consequently, these
activities are not as exciting or visible as disaster response and recovery.
When the disaster is news, attention is focused on saving lives and
showing images of damages. Little or no attention is given to why some
homes and buildings survived the event due to strong building codes or the
investment in other mitigation measures. Only weeks and months later, when
the flood or earthquake has been overtaken by more current events, does
mitigation get any attention. And by then, it's often too late to grab people's
attention and communicate the mitigation message.
It's also a problem related to the short-term focus that many Americans
have, and the inherent difficulty in getting people to recognize the long-term
risks they face. For example, I often have difficulty planning for next week,
let alone the next 50 years. The same is true for people living in high-hazard
areas. Many of those who live in the floodplain or along an earthquake fault
tend to downplay the risks they face unless such an event is fresh in their
minds. As a result, most people prefer to buy a new television or car rather
than invest in mitigation measures that mayor may not be needed for years.
To combat these problems and get people to start thinking more about
protecting themselves, FEMA Director James L. Witt has moved aggressively to increase people's knowledge about mitigation and provide incentives
to help them protect themselves. He never gives a speech or testifies before
Congress without discussing the advantages of mitigation. After seeking input
from local, state, and federal officials nationwide, FEMA recently published
the National Mitigation Strategy, which clarifies and outlines where we as a
nation are headed in reducing risk. Weare invigorating our efforts to work
with the private sector, private nonprofit groups, and the news media to
spread the word about mitigation and seek their assistance in working with
local communities. Mr. Witt even has spoken with the president and members
of his Cabinet to identify ways federal agencies can more comprehensively
promote hazard mitigation.
But while this has produced real results, we as a community need to more
clearly explain mitigation, or perhaps even develop a new term that is more
easily understood by the average American. We also need to redouble our
efforts to evaluate the costs and benefits of mitigation measures, and
communicate their effectiveness in quantifiable terms.
This last area is one that can be of great help to the emergency management community. At this time, there continues to be little research targeted
toward evaluating the true costs of disasters as well as the cost-effectiveness
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of mitigation measures. This information is critical to any effort to market
mitigation to people and their elected officials. It would also provide the
federal, state, and local governments with the ammunition they need to
convince people that a little mitigation before a disaster is much more cost
effective than cleaning up the mess after a disaster occurs.

Limited Resources
Now to the second constraint to implementing hazard mitigation: an
extremely limited pool of resources. Ever-shrinking budgets and competing
priorities describe the rules of the game we now play at FEMA, and the
situation isn't much better at state and local levels. We have entered an era
of diminishing government, and the cause of mitigation hasn't been spared
the cut of the budget ax.
The pie is getting smaller, and FEMA's ability to fund experimentation
and basic research into mitigation is diminishing. As a result, it is more
important than ever that we end up with tangible benefits after spending the
dollars we still have.
This type of budgetary environment requires us to rethink what we are
doing with our limited resources to ensure we are getting our dollar's worth.
As a result, we need to focus on achieving practical results with our research
dollars. Instead of concentrating on basic research, the time has come to take
all the technical data and research already out there and turn it into something
useful for engineers, city planners, construction companies, and public
officials. The research conununity needs to focus its efforts on how to reduce
the costs of disasters and provide data that can be used to fight special interest
groups who prefer to ignore mitigation. Although the scientific community
must change its focus, it is the only way we can produce the results necessary
to maintain mitigation funding in the future.

Costs and Benefits
Implementing mitigation is also difficult due to the lack of macroeconomic research quantifying the cost-effectiveness and benefits of
mitigating natural and human-caused hazards. For a long time, hazard
mitigation has been supported by its proponents in almost entirely abstract
terms. By necessity, we've been using arguments like "It reduces human
suffering when disasters occur" and "moving people out of harm's way
reduces the costs of disasters." Yet, despite these claims, data supporting the
costs and benefits of mitigation in high-risk areas has been lacking, especially
on macro-economic and regional levels. As a result, it has been virtually
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impossible for us to demonstrate the value of mitigation, and this, in tum, has
hindered our ability to convince elected officials to use more of their scarce
resources to mitigate the hazards they face.
With all the support and resources at their disposal, the participants at this
meeting are in one of the best positions to pursue this type of research. By
identifying the overall costs of disasters and the comparative savings that can
be realized through proven mitigation activities, information could be
obtained that would provide us with a valuable tool to reduce disaster losses
over the long term.

Private Property and Land Use
Finally, efforts to mitigate risks have been hampered by people's
resistance to restrictions on the use of their land or property. Most people in
the U.S. believe the Constitution grants the right to everyone to use their land
as they deem proper. As a result, they often resent the government restricting
the use of their property through land-use measures. Yet, after a disaster
occurs, they expect the government-local, state, and federal-to take care
of them and replace their damaged or destroyed possessions, as if it is their
right by virtue of paying their taxes.
Many government organizations adopt this same attitude. Local government councils often fight sound floodplain management practices and
mitigation measures, while land developers influence their decisions through
patronage and favors. At the state level, officials often avoid making the
tough decisions that would restrict their constituent's land-use decisions. Even
at the national level of government, this attitude persists-many of those
members of Congress who speak eloquently about reducing the costs of
disasters through mitigation are the first to threaten amending the National
Flood Insurance Program legislation to take care of a constituent that wants
to build in the floodplain without meeting the requirements for federal flood
insurance coverage.
The impact of political pressure on land and property-use cannot be
understated. In a recent report of the Association of State Floodplain
Managers, I was discouraged to see how many states still have weak
floodplain management programs and that funding for these programs has
decreased over the last three years, in large part due to political pressures
over land use. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has relegated their state
floodplain manager to an obscure post in the Commerce Department, while
complaining that they are not receiving enough disaster relief money from the
federal government. And the attorney general in Texas has said that local
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coinmunities do not have to enforce floodplain ordinances, giving them
freedom over land-use decisions.
In 1973, when Gilbert White testified before Congress on the need for the
Flood Disaster Protection Act, he summed up very well the need for wise use
of the floodplain when he said:
Continued land-use management that takes account of what so far seems to
have been reasonable levels from experience on inland floods, is not to bring
economic disaster to the communities affected. It is rather to avert disaster of
a far greater sort to the nation as a whole.
To the extent that communities have not engaged in land use, one must
recognize that there has been a trade-off, and continues to be a trade-off,
between the short-term benefits that are gained by a private developer and
landowner and the long-term costs of the federal government in bailing out
those people who subsequently occupy the property and then come to the
federal government for relief, or for costly protection work.

When I think that Gilbert White made that statement over 23 years ago,
I find it discouraging that we are still fighting many of the same battles over
land-use that we fought over two decades ago.
It all may sound a bit depressing, but all hope is not lost, nor is mitigation
destined to fade into the backdrop. Despite all the difficulties we now face in
implementing mitigation, the fight is not over, and progress is still being
made. States like Florida are making great strides in mitigation. Both the
National Emergency Management Association and the Association of State
Floodplain Managers are actively exploring how to further incorporate
mitigation into their day-to-day activities and their professions. Mitigation
success stories are increasing in number. And the actions we have been
taking to protect critical facilities, buyout properties in the floodplain, elevate
people's homes, and guide development decisions are beginning to payoff.
But most importantly, I also see a political window of opportunity opening
for mitigation. For the first time, we have a FEMA director with credibility
in the emergency management community, who touts mitigation at every
opportunity. We have a president who is fully supportive of our efforts to
further the cause of mitigation and has said publicly, "the time has come to
mount a nationwide effort focused on reducing the impact of disasters as well
as reducing their economic consequences. As we continue to reach a balanced
budget, reduce the deficit, and protect the vital interests of our citizens, the
value of mitigation programs is clear."
We also have the disasters of the last 10 or so years, which have raised
many people's awareness of the hazards they face. This has led many elected
officials to rethink their actions and look into better protecting their
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communities and their constituents. These efforts have already started to yield
tremendous gains-for example, after the Midwest Floods of 1993, over
8,000 homes in Missouri and Illinois were purchased and people were moved
out of the floodplain, permanently removing them from that risk. This type
of action would not have been possible without an acceptance of mitigation
principles and the support and participation of officials at the federal, state,
and local levels.
Now, our job is to expand this political window of opportunity. And I
believe you can playa critical role in making this ~appen. Initiate research
to quantify the costs and benefits of hazard mitigation, so that we can have
the additional ammunition we need to convince hesitant officials of what they
need to do to protect their communities. And by focusing on applied instead
of basic research, you can also ensure that those officials who are more
accepting of mitigation have the tools and supporting information they need
to better explain the need to absorb the costs of mitigating the hazards they
face.
There are still a great number of obstacles in the way of creating a more
disaster-resistant society. But despite all our problems, the time is right to
move forward on mitigation. Through better research and the application of
that research by various levels of government, we can accomplish a great
deal. And if we can muster a willingness to capitalize on today's political
environment to better educate elected officials and the public, we can make
great progress in achieving our goals to reduce the costs of disasters.
Big Thompson should serve as a lesson for us all. We must take
responsibility for our actions. We need to plan in order to protect our
communities from disasters. It's up to all of us. But most importantly, it's
critical at the local level to get involved.

THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
AND DAM SAFETY
Howard Gunnarson
Bureau of Reclamation
Commissioner's Program Analysis Office
Denver, Colorado

Introduction
This paper briefly touches on some of the changes that have taken place
in the Bureau of Reclamation since the disasters of 1976 and addresses flood
mitigation activities, or preparedness activities as we call them, that have
been implemented throughout the Bureau of Reclamation.

Recent History
The Bureau of Reclamation has gone through major changes over the last
20 years. Our mission used to emphasize construction and maintenance of
water resource projects for reclamation of the arid and semiarid lands of the
west. Reclamation controls 472 dams and dikes throughout the 17 western
states plus associated reservoirs, power plants, irrigation projects, and
municipal and industrial (M&I) facilities. Our mission today centers around
management of water and related resources in an environmentally and
economically sound manner in the interest of the American public. We are
no longer primarily a dam building agency.

The Big Thompson
One of the projects built by Reclamation between 1938 and 1959 was the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT Project) for hydroelectric power
production and supplemental irrigation. The project is operated by Reclamation and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District. The Big
Thompson flood of 1976 impacted several features of this project.
Olympus Dam forms Estes Lake and is located at the head end of the Big
Thompson River Canyon. The dam experienced some erosion damage during
the flood from a tributary stream just downstream from the dam, but was in
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no threat of failure. Flows through the town of Estes Park were stored in the
reservoir during the flood and releases from the dam into the Big Thompson
River were cut off.
Another feature damaged was the Big Thompson siphon, a 9-foot
diameter, 220-foot-Iong pipe located at the mouth of the canyon. It was
destroyed during the flood, carried 600 yards downstream, and smashed into
a house. Other project features such as the Big-Thompson Diversion Dam,
located downstream in the canyon, sustained damage to lessor degrees. Total
damage to Reclamation facilities in 1976 dollars was slightly more than $1
million.

The Teton Dam
There was another Reclamation project, under construction in 1976, that
turned into a disaster just five weeks before the Big-Thompson flood. That
event had major impacts on the Bureau of Reclamation; in fact, it turned our
agency upside down, figuratively speaking. That disaster was the failure of
Teton Dam in Southeast, Idaho, on Saturday morning, June 5, 1976. The
resultant flood killed 11 people in the downstream valley. This was the first
and only dam failure of a Reclamation designed and constructed dam.
Construction was nearing completion on the 305-foot-high dam, and the
reservoir was filling for the first time when the failure occurred. About
250,000 acre-feet, or 80 billion gallons of water, were rapidly released
downstream. Peak flow was in excess of two million cubic feet per second in
the downstream valley.
The timing of the flood caused from Teton Dam failure was similar to
most flash floods, as there was very little information available early in the
event to indicate what was about to take place. The event time-line went from
observing seepage downstream from the dam two nights before to seepage
appearing on the lower face of the dam at 8:30 a.m. Saturday morning, loss
of two dozers in the erosion hole higher on the dam's face at about 11 :20
a.m., and breach of the dam crest at 11 :55 a.m. Warning of the pending dam
failure was given to the Fremont and Madison County Sheriffs' dispatchers
at about 10:43 a.m., or a little over an hour before the breach of the dam
crest. It was remarkable that only 11 lives were lost.
Numerous internal and external reviews and investigations followed
concerning how Reclamation designed, constructed, and operated dams.
Hundreds of recommendations were made and adopted over the next couple
of years that substantially changed the agency. The following are a few of the
changes made in the late '70s and early '80s:
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• Congressional authorization for Reclamation to repair and modify its
deficient dams for dam safety purposes (1978 and revised in 1984),
• Reclamation Dam Safety Office established,
• Established a much stronger Emergency Management program
(including Emergency Preparedness Plans, which are now called
Emergency Action Plans, inundation maps, and Standing Operating
Procedures for dams), (Note: the purposes of the two programs that
Reclamation calls the Dam Safety and the Emergency Management
Programs are very similar; to minimize downstream loss of life during
a serious event. Safety of Dams is more geared to finding and
correcting a deficiency at a dam while Emergency Management
emphasizes preparedness actions to take during the operational life of
the dam to ensure the safety of the public.)
• Requirements for instrumentation at dams were greatly changed,
• More elaborate controls were implemented in the design and construction of dams,
• Independent consultant reviews of dam designs were initiated,
• More public involvement was required during the design and construction of dams,
• Dam safety and dam operators training courses were established,
• Memos of Understanding were signed with each of 17 western States
to share information related to Reclamation dams, and
• Research was initiated to evaluate the risk and probability of dam
failure.

Ongoing Program Changes
Continuing changes took place in the Safety of Dams and Emergency
Management Programs over the years. An example was that during the late
1980s, the emphasis on structural modification at dams for Safety of Dams
deficiencies broadened to include nonstructural corrective actions such as
early warning systems. With all five components of an early warning system
in place, Reclamation's capability to provide timely warning to local
authorities of life-threatening operational releases or dam failure is enhanced,
which in turn facilitates a safe evacuation of the impacted population. The
early warning system designed and installed at Olympus Dam and its
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upstream drainage basin is discussed in a separate paper by Dave Fisher and
Patricia Hagan.
Last year Reclamation developed and is currently implementing, on an
agency-wide basis, new policy and directives on emergency management.
The new policy essentially says that Reclamation is to take reasonable and
prudent actions to ensure the safety of the public and to protect environmental
resources potentially affected by incidents at our facilities. Ensuring the
safety of the public means that Reclamation will continue to take the
following actions as required in the new Emergency Management Directives:
• Ensure that adequate Emergency Action Plans (EAP) are developed
for Reclamation high- and significant-hazard dams and that they are
regularly reviewed and updated in a timely manner. New requirements
say that the EAPs contain initiating conditions and emergency response
levels.
• Develop and conduct an emergency exercise program to evaluate
emergency response capabilities at each of Reclamation IS high- and
significant-hazard dams jointly with local jurisdictions.
• Ensure that all appropriate Reclamation and operating entity personnel
acquire professional emergency management training.
• Ensure that appropriate technical information, such as inundation
maps, are dcvclopcd and made available for use by the downstream
local jurisdictions in their dam-specific warning and evacuation plans.
• Offer technical assistance to emergency management officials during
their plan revisions or development.
• Coordinate annually with appropriate federal, state, and local
emergency management officials to: 1) support their emergency
management efforts, 2) ensure that the local dam-specific warning and
evacuation plan response procedures are properly linked to the
corresponding notification procedures in Reclamation IS EAPs, 3)
encourage the scheduling of and the participation in joint exercises
involving Reclamation dams, and 4) where no local plan exists,
encourage the affected jurisdictions to develop their own "damspecific" warning and evacuation plan to properly respond to incidents
at Reclamation dams.
• Maintain a redundant means for timely communication with emergency management officials.
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.Last year we also produced a double volume document to assist in the
implementation of the emergency management directives called the Emergency Planning and Exercise Guidelines. These volumes contain suggested
instructions on how to accomplish the required activities, prototypes of an
Emergency Action Plan and a dam-specific warning and evacuation plan, and
other planning tools.
Another current activity given a high priority is the digitizing of all our
inundation maps, including processes used to produce the maps. The
processes currently being used or under development include: 1) scanning
inundation areas from previously prepared maps and layering that information
onto digitized raster graphic (DRG) quad sheets using a Geographic
Information System (GIS), 2) using river modeling software to create the
maps on a PC computer, and 3) using GIS-based software, called Dambreak
Interface and developed by our Mid Pacific Regional Office in Sacramento,
California, to produce the inundation maps. The software originally produced
by the National Weather Service called DAMBRK is an integral part of each
of these processes. All of our inundation maps will be produced in digital
format on CD-ROM for use on GIS and emergency information systems
(EIS).

FLOOD W ARNING/PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS
OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Kenneth Zwickl

u.s. Army Corps of Engineers

Introduction
In my position with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, I monitor and
coordinate the Corps Civil Works activities in flood warning/preparedness
(FW/P). This paper explains how the Corps gets involved in FW/P systems,
the Corps flood damage reduction process, and other Corps programs. It also
discusses the progress the Corps has made in recognizing and promoting
FW/P sys~ems as flood damage reduction measures.

Flood Damage Reduction Planning Process
The Corps of Engineers has a process that must be followed in order to
plan, design, and construct a flood damage reduction project. The first step
in this process is the reconnaissance study, which is 100 % federally funded.
The purpose of the study is to identify the flooding problem and the
possibility for a viable project. Normally, the Corps examines one or two
alternative solutions to the flood problem-enough to show that there is
federal interest in resolving the problem.
Following the reconnaissance phase, a feasibility study is performed. The
cost of this study is shared with a local sponsor, with 50 % federal funds and
50% nonfederal funds. The feasibility study examines a wide variety of
alternative solutions and combinations of solutions and identifies the best plan
for reducing future flood damages. A benefit/cost (B/C) analysis is performed, and the recommended plan must have a B/C ratio of greater than
1.0. It is important to note that the feasibility study can be skipped if the
reconnaissance study identified a FW /P system as the only feasible solution.
When this occurs, the Corps moves directly into detailed design and
construction.
The design and construction phase of the Corps process is simply the
development of detailed plans and specifications for and then construction of
the project. Currently, this phase of the process is funded with 75 % federal
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dollars and 25% nonfederal. The Water Resources Development Act of 1996
would change cost-sharing for structural projects to 50%-50%. However,
nonstructural projects such as FW /P systems would not be affected by this
change. The House of Representatives has suggested that the cost-sharing
formula be 65%/35% for both structural and nonstructural projects, and the
Senate has not made any suggestions on changing the cost-sharing percentages.

Flood Plain Management Services and Planning
Assistance to States Programs
Two other programs of the Corps of Engineers that involve FW/P systems
are the Flood Plain Management Services Program (FPMS) and the Planning
Assistance to States Program. The Flood Plain Management Services
Program was authorized to allow the Corps to provide technical assistance
and planning guidance to states and local governments for flood-related
activities, such as flood warning, flood-proofing, flood hazard identification,
and others. The FPMS program is 100% federally funded to conduct studies
for state, local, and tribal governments. Many of the requests for assistance
involve only information-type studies. However, if a study results in a plan
for reduction of flood damages, the requesting agency must provide 100% of
the funding for construction, operation, and maintenance of the plan.
The Planning Assistance to States (PAS) Program was authorized to allow
the Corps to provide technical assistance and planning guidance to states and
local governments on water-related activities. This is much broader authority
than that provided under FPMS in that the Corps can perform studies on
water supply and distribution, water quality, and many environmental
concerns not directly related to flooding. The program shares cost at a ratio
of 50% federal, 50% nonfederal for studies, and like the FPMS Program, the
cost for construction, operation, and maintenance is 100 % nonfederal funds.
The Corps can develop a flood warning/preparedness system to include
inundation mapping, number and location of gauges and other equipment,
technical assistance in calibrating flood prediction software, and planning
guidance for development of response plans. Under the Corps' flood damage
reduction program, the Corps has completed 34 FW/P systems and has 35
systems under study or construction. Eighty-two studies have been completed, three studies are underway using the FPMS authority, and 18 studies
have been completed and two are underway using the PAS Program.
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Twenty Years of Progress
A theme of this symposium is "20 years of progress," and the Corps has
made good progress over the last 20 years in the FW IP arena. In the early
1970s, Congress mandated that we include a totally nonstructural plan in our
feasibility studies for flood damage reduction. While this did not result in a
flood of nonstructural construction projects, it did increase Corps awareness
of these alternative solutions. Through the 1970s and early 1980s, the Corps
learned more-expanding its expertise in nonstructural measures, including
FW IP systems-and constructed a number of nonstructural projects.
In the early 1980s, one brave Corps District and one very persistent local
sponsor gave FW/P activities a big boost within the Corps. The Passaic River
Basin had a very complex flood problem that was going to require many
years of study and construction to solve. The sponsor insisted on interim help
for the flooding. The New York District proposed an interim FW/P system
that made it through the Corps review process and was implemented, opening
the door for the Corps to get more involved in FW/P activities.
In a few short years, the Corps changed the planning guidance to highlight
FW IP systems as viable flood damage reduction measures, as stand-alone
systems, components of a larger project, or as interim measures. We
developed a comprehensive and very popular one-week training course which
has been held at the Hydrologic Engineering Center for the last nine years.
In the last few years, the Corps Engineering Division has insisted that a
FW IP component be included in every project, whenever feasible. As a
result, more and more FW IP projects were being proposed and implemented.
The Corps needs to continue building on its past successes, and continue
to stress Flood Warning/Preparedness in its project planning process to
provide for future flood damage reduction and public safety.

PART Two

DAM SAFETY
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OLYMPUS DAM
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
David B. Fisher
Bureau of Reclamation

Background
Olympus Dam is located on the Big Thompson River two and one-half
miles east of Estes Park, Colorado. The dam was constructed between 1947
and 1949 and is a composite structure consisting of a zoned earth embankment and a concrete gravity spillway section. The dam has a total crest length
of 1,951 feet, which includes a 1,631-foot-Iong embankment section and a
320-foot-Iong concrete section. The embankment has a structural height of 70
feet, with a crest elevation of 7,481 feet. A 3-foot-high parapet wall and curb
were constructed on the upstream side of the 30-foot-wide crest.
The concrete section of the dam, which is located at the right abutment,
contains both a spillway and an outlet works. The spillway is an ogee crest
with a crest elevation of 7,460 feet. Releases are controlled by five 20-foot
by 17-foot radial gales with a discharge capacity of 21,200 ft3/ S at a
maximum water surface of 7,475.
Lake Estes, which is formed by Olympus Dam, was designed as an
afterbay for the Estes Powerplant. Lake Estes must maintain an operating
level between elevations 7469.5 and 7475.0 for power production. At the
maximum water surface elevation, 7475.0, the reservoir is approximately one
mile long, has a surface area of 185 acres, and impounds 3,068 acre-feet of
storage.
There are no irrigation releases made directly into the Big Thompson
River. The releases for power generation into Olympus Siphon are ultimately
restored in Carter and Horsetooth Reservoirs, which provide releases directly
to the irrigation districts.

Deficiencies
The hydrologic deficiency for Olympus Dam is related to the safe passage
of the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). The thunderstorm PMF is
characterized by a peak discharge of 83,900 ft3/s and a two-day volume of
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79,000 acre-feet. Floods exceeding approximately 12% of the PMF may
create debris flows (logs, structural debris, etc.) of sufficient quantity to plug
the spillway, causing overtopping and potential failure of Olympus Dam.

Previous Dam Safety Activities
During the dam safety study, several structural alternatives were studied
as possible corrective actions to mitigate the consequences of dam failure.
These alternatives included:
1) Construction of a side-channel spillway on the left abutment of the
dam.
2) Placement of a roller compacted concrete (RCC) cap on the crest and
upstream face of the embankment dam.
3) A combination of alternatives 1 and 2.
A variety of studies were done between 1982 and 1985, including:
1) Downstream hazard assessments for loss of life and economic
damages.
2) Studies on the potential for plugging the existing spillway with debris
during large flood events (a concern after the Lawn Lake Dam
failure).
3) Appraisal designs and cost estimates for various structural modifications to prevent failure of the dam caused by overtopping.

Rationale For Selection of EWS
There are several reasons for selecting the implementation of an Early
Warning System (EWS) as the preferred corrective action at Olympus Dam.
First, studies showed that by installing an adequate monitoring system in the
basin above Olympus Dam, the Bureau of Reclamation can provide a warning
to officials to evacuate the population that may be affected by flooding below
Olympus Dam. The EWS would effectively reduce or eliminate the potential
loss of life due to high releases from, or the failure of, Olympus Dam.
An EWS is several orders of magnitude less expensive than most of the
proposed structural alternatives. Further, the structural alternatives would not
be effective in reducing the potential for loss of life due to flooding
downstream. The structural alternatives would simply have passed the large
flood flows on downstream. The only structural alternative that would be
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equivalent to the EWS in its effectiveness in reducing the potential for loss
of life would be to raise the dam to store the entire flood. This alternative is
not politically feasible, since it would cause the inundation of the town of
Estes Park during the flood event, nor is it technically or economically
feasible.
Another reason for selecting a warning system as the preferred corrective
action alternative is the need to warn downstream populations of high releases
from the dam. The safe channel capacity below Olympus Dam is approximately 1,000 ft3/ S. At this level, the amusement park immediately downstream from the dam begins to be inundated. Releases of approximately 1,500
ft3/ S will begin to flood permanent residences in the Big Thompson Canyon.
Most of the structures in Big Thompson Canyon are inundated at flows of
5,000 fe/so This is less than one-fourth of the- present release capacity of
Olympus Dam spillway. Therefore, it is imperative that the downstream
population receive adequate warning of impending high releases from
Olympus Dam.

Early Warning System Description
The Early Warning System (EWS) hardware and software were installed
in the fall of 1993. The EWS hardware consists of eleven sites with multiple
sensors as follows: 10 tipping bucket rain gauges, nine stream gauges, two
weather stations, two reservoir level sensors, four temperature sensors, and
a repeater site. These sites transmit data via line-of-site VHF radio to the
repeater site that splits a microwave signal placed into the eastern Colorado
area office microwave system. The data are received at three independent
EWS base stations that are located at the eastern Colorado area office
(microwave), the Estes Power Plant (VHF), and the Reclamation-Western
Area Power Administration (W APA) Joint Operations Center (JOC)
(microwave and VHF).

Reservoir Elevation Information
The Olympus Dam reservoir elevation gauge is an important source ·of
information when making decisions concerning evacuation of the population
at risk (PAR) located downstream from the dam. However, there will not be
adequate time to carry out a successful evacuation during a severe thunderstorm event based on the rate of rise in the reservoir alone. Streamflow data
from the Big Thompson River gauge located just upstream from the dam will
provide accurate inflow data for flows up to the top of the flume (approximately 1,700 ft3/s). This information is available both on the EWS and from
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the Great Plains Region Hydromet System. Inflow data coupled with inflows
from the Estes power plant, outflows through the spillway, and div'ersions
through the Olympus siphon are required to calculate changes in storage at
the reservoir.

Streamflow Data
There are nine stream gauges in the Olympus drainage basin, one on
Black Canyon Creek, one on Fish Creek, four on the Big Thompson River
or tributaries, and three on Fall River or tributaries. The term "upper gauges"
refer to the stream gauges located at the Fall River at Endovalley picnic area,
the Big Thompson River at Moraine Park, and Glacier Creek at Sprague
Lake. The term "lower gauges" refers to the remaining sites. The travel time
for high flows from the upper gauges to the dam range from 1.6 to 2.8 hours.
The travel time for high flows from the lower gauges to the dam range from
0.3 to 1.1 hours. The travel times may vary depending on the magnitude of
the flows. The slope, distance, and travel times from each stream gauge site
to Olympus Dam are listed in Table 1.
The lower stream gauges are valuable for confirming runoff from a
rainfall or snowbelt event; however, in the case of a severe thunderstorm,
they may not provide adequate warning time by themselves. Warning based
on rainfall at the rain gauges may be required to obtain the necessary warning
time for a rapidly progressing thunderstorm event.
Streamflow monitoring will include summing flows on upstream stream
gauges by groups. When it becomes evident, based on data from the stream
gauges, that inflows to the reservoir are sufficient to force a spillway
discharge of 1,500 ft3/s, specific actions must be undertaken. As spillway
discharges increase, additional actions must be undertaken. The following
groups are recommended:
Group 1:

Combined flow at Big Thompson River at the Power Plant,
Black Canyon Creek, and Fish Creek.

Group 2:

Combined flow at Big Thompson River at East Portal Road,
Fall River at Cascade Dam, Black Canyon Creek, and Fish
Creek.

Group 3:

Combined flow at Big Thompson River at Moraine Park,
Glacier Creek at Sprague Lake, Fall River at Endovalley,
Chiquita Creek at Endovalley, Black Canyon Creek, and Fish
Creek.
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Since there is very little storage available in Lake Estes for flood
attenuation, the inflow shown on the stream gauges by groups (see above)
will closely approximate the required outflow from the dam. Care should be
taken not to add flows from stream gauges located on the same river (Le.,
Fall River at Cascade and Fall River at Endovalley).
The travel times from the stream gauge sites to Lake Estes were calculated
using information from two historic dam failures that occurred in the basin.
A Bureau of Reclamation memorandum dated July 5, 1951, reports that Lily
Lake Dam failed May 25, 1951, from overtopping of the embankment due
to wave action. The flood wave traveled the 5.5 miles to Lake Estes in about
one hour. The total elevation drop was 1,500 feet, which corresponds to an
average slope of 273 feet per mile. Cascade Dam failed July 15, 1982,
because of the piping failure of Lawn Lake Dam. The flood wave traveled the
6.0 miles to Lake Estes in 1.1 hours, as documented in the paper, The Lawn
Lake Failure, dated December 1982. The total elevation drop was 1,020 feet,
which corresponds to an average slope of 170 feet per mile.
Elevation-discharge rating tables were developed for each of the
previously nonrated stream gauge sites using surveyed cross-sections and
streambed profiles, and estimates of channel and overbank roughness. This
information was input into the PSEUDO computer model, a standard step
backwater model with logic similar to HEC-2. The Big Thompson River at
the power plant site has an existing U.S. Geological Survey rating through
a stage of 7.0 feet. The rating was extended for use during extreme inflow
events using results from the computer model. An important maintenance
item for the EWS is for the area office staff to provide streamflow measurements during a variety of flows to verify or adjust the synthesized ratings at
the stream gauge sites.
There are various outflows that affect the PAR that resides downstream
from Olympus Dam. Current operations require contacting various entities
at 750, 1,000, 1,100, and 1,500 ft3/s. Higher outflows would require
continued coordination with downstream officials. Outflows of 2,000 ft3/s
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would require evacuation of portions of the canyon, and outflows of 5,000
ft 3/s are expected to overtop Highway 34, restricting evacuation routes.
Because of this, the storm time at which outflows exceed these values were
used to develop the decision criteria discussed later in this document.

Rainfall Criteria
A HEC-l rainfall-runoff model was developed to obtain an estimate of the
runoff from rainfall depths using various basin infiltration scenarios. The
model also computed the impacts on the reservoir level from those inflows.
The model was developed using the subbasin delineation and runoff
parameters from the PMF study dated May 7, 1981. After an initial
calibration process, model runs were made for various rainfall events
centered at different locations in the drainage basin for dry and wet soil
conditions.
Establishing the rainfall criteria required determining the one-hour and
three-hour precipitation values, and comparing the time at which these values
occurred with the time that the reservoir outflows exceeded 2,000 ft 3 /s and
5,000 ft 3/s for each model run. A spillway release of 2,000 ft 3 /s impacts
many homes and bridges across the river, and a spillway release of 5,000
ft 3/s begins to overtop Highway 34 potentially blocking evacuation routes. An
estimate of the criteria was determined by establishing a precipitation value
that would keep the frequency of false alarms low, while still providing as
much warning time as possible. The 25-year, one-hour precipitation value
are ally reduced for 150 square miles is 1.2 inches, and the 25-year, threehour precipitation value is 1.7 inches. This rainfall depth has a 4% chance of
occurring in any given year, which implies a frequency of false alarms of
once every 25 years. The 100-year, one-hour precipitation value areally
reduced for 150 square miles is 1.5 inches, and the 100-year, three-hour
precipitation value is 2.2 inches. This rainfall depth has a 1 % chance of
occurring in any given year, which implies a frequency of false alarms on the
average of once every 100 years. The tradeoff in selection of rainfall decision
criteria is warning time versus frequency of false alarms.
A search of the historical precipitation data for Estes Park rain gauge
shows the maximum rainfall amounts were 0.70 inches in one hour, and 0.80
inches in three hours from 1978 to 1993. A search of the historical precipitation data for nearby gauges at similar elevations as the Estes Park rain gauge
shows the maximum rainfall amounts were 1.60 inches in one hour, and 3.00
inches in three hours. This event occurred on July 22, 1991, at the Allenspark Lodge rain gauge located at an elevation of 8,450 feet. This gauge has
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a period of record of 45 years. Its second greatest rainfall amounts were 1.40
inches in one hour, and 1.80 inches in three hours. The next highest amount
was at the Drake gauge, elevation 6,170 feet, which experienced 0.90 inches
in one hour, and 1. 90 inches in three hours from 1975 to 1993. Because the
100-year one-hour and three-hour rainfall amounts were only exceeded at one
gauge for the period of record, these criteria are assumed to have an
acceptable frequency of false alarm.
A series of rainfall events were modeled using the criteria of 1.5 inches
in one hour, or 2.2 inches in three hours. For all the routings, the starting
reservoir elevation was 7,474.0 feet (normal water surface elevation) with an
outflow release condition limited to 2,000 ft 3/s until the reservoir reaches
elevation 7,475 feet, and releases staged up to 22,000 ft 3/s at elevation
7,481.0 feet. The storm area was limited to the lower 66 mF near the dam.
Saturated and dry soil moisture assumptions were modeled, with the saturated
condition having no initial loss and a constant infiltration rate of 0.1 inches
per hour, and the dry condition having a 1.0 inch initial loss and a 0.3 inches
per hour constant infiltration rate. The warning time varies from 0.6 to 2.2
hours for all the storms modeled. It should be noted that the saturated basin
condition is very conservative, and would reflect either frozen ground or
heavy antecedent precipitation prior to the storm event. The more likely
scenario is the "Dry" condition. It should also be noted that the storm events
modeled are representative of the worst possible storm scenarios and are
not events that are likely to occur. Observing the stream gauges associated
with the rain gauges during an actual rainfall event will be important if the
rainfall amounts are resulting in runoff amounts that could cause damaging
spillway discharges to be required.
Rainfall events from three to eight inches distributed uniformly over the
entire 150 mF basin and for those depths occurring on each of the four
individual stream subbasins for relatively dry conditions were also modeled.
The storms were arranged with a depth-duration pattern as experienced at the
Glen Haven rain gauge during the Big Thompson River flood of August 31,
1976. The infiltration assumptions for this series of model runs were 1.0 inch
initial loss and a 0.3 inches per hour constant infiltration rate. The warning
time varies from 0.8 to 2.8 hours for all the storms modeled.
The rainfall decision criteria will require the rainfall threshold to be
exceeded at half or more of the EWS rain gauge sites. This requires the storm
area to be large enough to neglect highly localized storms that would not
affect operations at the dam. Any high flows caused by this type of storm
would be detected through the stream gauge network.
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Conclusions
The streamflow criteria require that as it becomes evident based on data
from the stream gauges that inflows to the reservoir are sufficient to force a
spillway discharge of 1,500 ft3/S, specific actions must be undertaken. As
spillway discharges increase, additional actions must be undertaken. All
actions specified in the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) and the
Emergency Action Plan (EAP) will also be undertaken.
The rainfall decision criteria will require the rainfall threshold to be
exceeded at half or more of the EWS rain gauge sites. This requires the storm
area to be large enough to neglect highly l?calized storms that would not
affect operations at the dam. Any high flows caused by this type of storm
would be detected through the stream gauge network.

DAMS, DEFECTS, AND TIME
Wayne J. Graham
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
Denver, Colorado

Abstract
Colorado has experienced approximately 100 dam failures since the
1800s. Information associated with dam failures throughout the United States
is analyzed to show trends and patterns. Many of the dams that have failed
have done so during their first few years of operation, indicating design or
construction defects. Some dams that survive their early years have still
failed. Have these failures been the result of original design defects or
deterioration? During the eight years from 1970 to 1977, approximately 260
people, an average of 32 people per year, died as a result of U.S. dam
failures. During the 18 years from 1978 to 1995 approximately 16 people, an
average of one person per year, died as a result of U.S. dam failures.
Possible reasons for this significant reduction in dam failure fatalities are
presented.

Introduction
The 1993-1994 update of the National Inventory of Dams determined that
there were 74,053 dams (generally more than 25 feet high or impounding
more than 50 acre-feet of water) located in the United States. More than
23,700 of these dams are classified as having a "significant" or "high"
hazard potential, indicating that failure of these dams could cause loss of life
and/or much economic loss. These dams are maintained and operated by
public agencies, utilities, private owners, and others.
Colorado has 1,674 dams (2.3% of the U.S. total) according to the 19931994 update. Many of the dams built in the U. S., including Colorado, were
built many years ago. Nationally, for dams where the age can be determined,
20% of the dams are more than 55 years old and 7 % are more than 85 years
old. As this inventory of dams continues to age, should more dam failures be
anticipated? Does aging contribute to increased likelihood of dam failure?
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Data from the world and the U.S. are evaluated to help answer these
questions.

u.s. Dam Failure History
History shows that loss of life due to dam failure has diminished with
time. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, there were a large number of dam
failures that caused considerable loss of life.
The largest U.S. loss of life from a dam break occurred in May 1889,
when the 72-foot-high South Fork Dam near Johnstown, Pennsylvania, failed.
A flood caused the 36-year-old dam to overtop. Warnings were meager, and
the widespread flooding that was already occurring in Johnstown before the
dam failure prevented evacuation of the community. In some dam failures,
buildings are damaged but not destroyed. In the case of this dam failure,
however, a large number of buildings in Johnstown were washed away. More
than 2,200 people lost their lives in this disaster (U.S. National Park Service,
1977).
Another significant dam failure in the U. S. occurred north of Los
Angeles, California, on March 12, 1928, a few minutes before midnight. The
two-year-old St. Francis Dam, a 188-foot high concrete gravity structure,
failed as a result of a foundation failure at one of the abutments. The death
toll from this dam failure was about 420 people (Outland, 1977).
Table 1 summarizes all dam failures in the United States that resulted in
fatalities during the period 1960-1995. This table expands previously
published information (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989; Brown and
Graham, 1988). During this 36-year period, about 320 people died as a result
of dam failure. There were about 260 fatalities during the 1970s. During the
1980s, when the number of dams in the U.S. was larger than ever before and
the average dam was continuing to age, there were only seven fatalities. In
the first half of the 1990s, there were 10 fatalities resulting from dam failure.
During the 36-year period from 1960 to 1995, dam failures caused an
average of nine fatalities per year in the United States. During the 16-year
period from 1980 to 1995, dam failures caused less than one fatality per year
in the United States. Some reasons for this reduction from losses in earlier
times include:
• Improved design standards and construction techniques.
• Higher failure rates of dams during their first few years after completion; fewer dams were constructed during this period.
• Removal or modification of dams that were more prone to failure.

DAMS, DEFECTS, AND TIME

42
•

Lack of conditions severe enough to cause failure.

In Table 1, "Warning Time" is defined as the amount of time between
initiation of the dam failure warnings and dam failure. Many of the entries in
this column are zero, indicating dam failure warnings were not issued prior
to failure. In many cases, some warning was begun after dani failure. The
quality and quantity of these delayed warnings varied greatly. "People at
Risk" is defined as the number of people in the dam failure floodplain at the
time of failure.
Economic losses also occur when dams fail. During the 36-year period
from 1960 to 1995, economic losses caused by dam failure were 1.6% of the
total economic losses caused by flooding in the United States. During the 16year period from 1980 to 1995, economic losses caused by dam failure were
0.2% (one-fifth of 1 %) of the total economic losses caused by flooding in the
U.S. Stated in another way, during this period total flood losses were about
500 times as much as the flood losses resulting from dam failure. (Note that
economic losses resulting from dam failure were only included for dam
failures that caused at least one fatality. Therefore, the percentages do not
include the impact of economic losses from dam failures that did not cause
fatalities) .
During the 10-year period ending in 1993, average annual flood damages
in the U.S. exceeded $3 billion (Interagency Floodplain Management Review
Committee, 1994). Assuming that $5 billion represents current annual flood
damages, dam failure economic losses would be $10 million per year based
on the 16-year historic relationship between dam failure losses and total flood
losses. This equals $133 per dam per year-strikingly less than common
perception. Assuming that this cost of failure must be borne by the entire
U. S. population of 250 million, this annual loss averages about four cents per
person. Many other societal costs far exceed this amount. For example,
compare the four cents per person cost with the amount people pay to insure
residences and vehicles from crime, accidents, and environmental abnormalities. The difference is substantial.

-

~.

"

>-----

n/a

0

n/a

500

n/a

People at
Risk

6

1 heart
failure

Loss
of
Life

- .,

26

138

","",

Table 1. Dam Failures in the United States Resulting in Fatalities
1960 through May 1996
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Lake "0"
Hills
6/9/72
10:45 p.m.

Buffalo Creek Logan County,
Coal Waste West Virginia

::::anyon Lake

Rapid City,
South Dakota

Overtopping during
catastrophic flood; 245
total deaths from all
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At What Age Do Dams Fail?
Information is available from numerous sources on dam failures. One of
the more comprehensive data bases is that developed by the International
Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD, 1995). ICOLD's statistical analysis
provides information that can help answer the question: "At what age do dams
fail?"
The ICOLD data base is primarily for dams that are at least 15 meters (48
feet) high. ICOLD prepared statistical data and conclusions using worldwide
data, excluding China.
ICOLD's conclusions included the following:
• The percentage of failures of large dams has been falling over the last four
decades; 2.2 % of dams built before 1950 failed, failures of dams built
since 1951 are less than 0.5%.
• Of the failed dams built before 1950, 80% were no older than 36 years,
and 50% were no older than 4 years.
• Most failures involved newly built dams, with 70% of failures occuring in
the first 10 years, and more especially in the first year after commissioning.
An earlier study, using worldwide data, developed the following
conclusions: "The most frequent failures have occurred during the first
complete filling of the reservoir, which usually takes place within five to
seven years after construction. It seems that after that age very few dams
have failed. It also seems that after the useful life of a dam (say 60 to 100
years), the percentage of accidents increases again. Thus, if the first fillings
of new dams are carefully controlled, ... and if all old dams are the object
of careful inspection and calculation, a great number of failures (possibly
more than 70%) can be avoided" (Serafim, 1991).
United States information from Table 1, used with the National Inventory
of Dams data, can also be used to gain further knowledge in this area. Table
2 shows the relationship of the percentage of older dams that have failed in
each decade since the 1960s to the percentage of older dams existing in the
inventory.
The dams that were about 50 years old or more included the following:
Swift, Lower Two Medicine, Mohegan Park, Sandy Run, Kelly Barnes, Nix
Lake, Lawn Lake, Cascade Lake, Kendall Lake, and Timberlake, a total of
10 dams. Only one of these, Lawn Lake, failed during normal weather
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Table 2. Failure of Older u.s. Dams That Resulted in
Loss of Life
Decade during
which dam failure took place:

Percentage of dams in
U.S. inventory over
50 years old:

Percentage of failures
during decade of dams
more than 50 years
old:

1960s

14

50

1970s

15

33

1980s

20

50

1990s

27

33

Average

23
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conditions, an indication that the dam had deteriorated to a point of failure.
All of the other dams failed either as a result of rainfall that caused the
reservoir to rise to higher than normal levels or overtopping. It can be
concluded that older dams have a higher rate of failure than newer dams that
have passed the initial test of being able to hold water. However, it can not
be concluded with the data available that the aging of the U.S. dam inventory
is adding to our risk. Most of the over-50-years-old dams that failed did so
during a major flood event. These older dams, built using less demanding
design floods, would be expected to have a higher failure rate than newer
dams that generally have been designed using more demanding standards.
Data is also available for the failure of dams in the United States (Hatem,
1985). This analysis indicated that during the period 1971 to 1980 there were
100 dam failures for which the age at the time of failure could be determined.
The failure of dams more than 50 years old accounted for 32 % of all dam
failures during this time. The number of dams in the U.S. during this time
that were more than 50 years old was about 15 % of the total number of dams.
Thus, dams that were more than 50 years old failed at a rate about double the
expected rate if failures were evenly distributed based on age.

Conclusion
The evidence suggests that older dams are more prone to failure than
newer dams that have passed the initial test of being able to hold water. The
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higher failure rate for older dams may be due to the less stringent design
standards that went into their construction. The evidence is weak in
supporting the belief that older dams are failing due to deterioration. One
reason for this is that as deterioration is discovered, and it is felt that the
dams integrity is being jeopardized, most prudent dam owners undertake
action to correct the problem.
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1996 WILLAMETTE AND
COLUMBIA RIvER FLOOD

Cynthia A. Henriksen
North Pacific Division, Corps of Engineers

The flash flooding that occurred in the Willamette River Basin in February
1996 was part of a larger regional flood that encompassed the entire
Columbia River Basin in the Pacific Northwest. Controlling the event
involved cooperation among many federal, state, and private agencies.
Although flood frequencies varied across the Willamette Basin, some
locations experienced flooding at a frequency as high as a 200-year event.
The North Pacific Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in
coordination with the National Weather Service River Forecast Center, used
SSARR (Streamflow Simulation and Reservoir Regulation) for inflow
forecasting in the Columbia River Basin. The Corps of Engineers opened
emergency operations centers in Portland, Oregon, and Seattle and Walla
Walla, Washington.
The primary storage reservoirs in the Pacific Northwest are both federally
and privately owned. The Corps of Engineers operates John Day Dam on the
lower Columbia River and the Dworshak storage project in Idaho. Flood
control storage projects in the Willamette Basin contain about 1.6 million
acre-feet of storage and include 13 dams. Eleven of the dams have storage
and two are strictly for re-regulation of power peaking from upstream
projects. The Bureau of Reclamation also operates a major storage project,
the Grand Coulee Dam on the mains tern Columbia River. Other major water
storage facilities that were used during the February 1996 flood include the
Hugh Keenleyside Dam in Canada, owned by BC Hydro and containing 7.1
million acre-feet of storage capacity in Arrow Lakes. Idaho Power Company
also owns a storage project, called Brownlee, on the Snake River. All of
these storage projects were instrumental in the flood control operation during
this event.
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Before the Flood
The flood of February 1996 in the Pacific Northwest was preceded by a
winter of above-normal precipitation throughout the basin. From November
1995 through January 1996, precipitation was 102 % to 182 % above normal
through the 262,000-square-mile basin above The Dalles, Oregon. In the
11 ,600-square-mile Willamette Basin, precipitation was 173 % above normal
for the winter. During the last week of January 1996, the Willamette Basin
experienced an unusual event-snow on the usually warm Willamette Valley
floor. Finally, during the weekend of February 3 and 4, the Willamette Basin
was bombarded with an ice storm that left ice on the saturated valley floor.
On Monday, February 5, the temperature warmed to about 60° F in a few
hours, causing a rapid snowmelt. Meanwhile, a weather pattern was setting
up to bring a belt of warm, moist clouds from Hawaii into the Pacific
Northwest.

Getting Ready
By Monday, February 5, the Corps of Engineers Reservoir Control
Center (RCC) examined the streamflow forecasts and expected a rise in the
stages at the Portland harbor. The ultimate goal of the Columbia and
Willamette River reservoir system is to protect the Portland Harbor from
flooding, where flood stage is 18 feet.
By Monday, February 5, the harbor stages were expected tu rise from
seven feet to as high as 14 feet by February 8. The appropriate reservoir
operation in this event is to draft the John Day reservoir to capture future
flood peaks. The RCC responded by drafting John Day nearly one foot to
elevation 264.0 feet. This was an evacuation of nearly 50,000 acre-feet. By
Tuesday, February 6, the weather pattern from Hawaii strengthened and the
harbor stages were expected to rise even higher than 14 feet. The Corps
requested that BC Hydro in Canada reduce outflow from the Treaty project
Arrow in Canada. BC Hydro cooperated and started daily reductions in
outflow. The outflow was immediately reduced from 92,000 to 70,000 cubic
feet per second (cfs). The reductions were agreed to continue at 15,000 cfs
per day until the outflow reached 15,000 cfs on Thursday, February 8. Also
on February 6, the John Day reservoir elevation was drafted even further to
elevation 262.5 feet.
By late in the day of February 6, precipitation was expected to be even
greater than originally forecast. At about midnight on February 6, the Corps
began a heavy draft of the John Day Reservoir to evacuate as much water as
possible without pushing the Portland Harbor above the 18-foot flood stage.
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The John Day Reservoir was drafted to elevation 260.7 feet by 6:00 a.m. on
February 7, forcing the harbor to its flooding level of 18 feet.
On Wednesday, February 7, the Corps of Engineers called upon 'many
regional entities to participate in the stage reduction operation. The Corps of
Engineers reduced outflow from the Dworshak project in Idaho from 10,000
cfs to 1,000 cfs. On Thursday, February 8, the Corps asked the Idaho Power
Company to reduce the outflow from Brownlee from 25,000 cfs to 15,000
cfs. Although they had not been asked to participate in a flood reduction
event in many years, they agreed to cooperate.
The Corps also called upon the Bureau of Reclamation to reduce outflow
from the Grand Coulee project in Washington on the mainstem of the
Columbia River. The flow was reduced from 135,000 cfs on Monday,
February 5, to as low as 50,000 cfs outflow on Thursday, February 8. This
reduction caused difficulty for the Bonneville Power Administration, which
markets power from the federal dams in the northwest. Because the reduction
in flow from Grand Coulee caused difficulty in meeting system load
requirements, the Corps quickly brought generation units back on line on the
Lower Snake River to compensate for the loss of flow at Grand Coulee.
Beginning Thursday, February 8, the Corps began to refill the John Day
Reservoir to capture as much of the flood peak from the Columbia River as
possible. The full elevation of John Day is 268.0 feet, and the water level
was at 260.7 feet, thus, refilling the reservoir would take from Thursday,
February 8, through midnight, February 9. The total storage equaled nearly
400,000 acre-feet and reduced flow by about 90,000 cfs into the Portland
Harbor while the reservoir filled.
The Willamette projects are primarily flood-control reservoirs that are
annually drafted to their minimum conservation pool by December and
remain at these minimum elevations through the end of January in order to
be available to contain winter flood events like the one that was occurring.
Although the projects had begun to fill slightly before the event, the total
amount of storage in the 11 projects was only 8 % of the total composite
capacity. Although there is much reservoir regulation on the Columbia River,
Willamette Project operations are simple. Once the control points downstream
of the Willamette Projects reach bankfull and are continuing up toward flood
stage, all the project outflows are reduced to zero or minimum outflow. The
Willamette projects remained at zero or minimum outflow until they filled
and were forced to pass inflow. The only project in the Willamette that filled
and was forced to pass inflow was the Foster project, a small re-regulation
project on the south fork of the Santiam River that only stores 55,000
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. acre-feet of water. The flooding that occurred in the Willamette basin was all
due to local runoff below the storage projects.
Downstream of Foster on the mainstem of the Santiam River is the
Jefferson gauge. At this site, the flood hydrograph was rising very fast and
indicating a 200-year event. Flooding became heavier in the north. During
a six-hour period on Thursday, February 7, the precipitation gauge at Foster
Dam registered two inches of rain during a six-hour period. In the southern
portion of the Willamette Basin, the flooding and rainfall was less than in the
North. South at Hills Creek Dam the maximum rain period was only 0.4 inch
on February 8.
After the flood was over, the Corps of Engineers estimated that the stage
and damage reductions due to Corps of Engineers reservoir operations were
significant. At the gage at Eugene, the Corps estimated that stage reduction
was nine feet, reducing potential damage by $195 million. Further downstream at the Oregon state capitol of Salem, the Corps estimated a stage
reduction 7 1/2 feet and damage reduction of $280 million. Within the state of
Oregon and at the highly developed Portland-Vancouver metropolitan area,
total damages were estimated to have been reduced by $1.14 billion.

Forecast Modeling
The North Pacific Division Corps of Engineers, in coordination with the
National Weather Service River Forecast Center, uses the Streamflow
Synthesis and Reservoir Regulation (SSARR) model, which is a hydrologic
routing model that is initiated at 4:00 a.m. every day. The first three days of
the forecast are in six-hour time steps, and the next two days are daily time
steps. The River Forecast Center (RFC) uses six hourly quantitative
precipitation forecasts (QPF) developed by the National Weather Service as
input to the inflow forecast portion of the model. The RFC also uses routing
parameters to simulate soil saturation in particular basins. Once the individual
basin inflows are developed, the Corps of Engineers then overlays reservoir
regulations at all the projects in the region to develop the best operational
scenario to achieve maximum flood reduction in the Portland Harbor.
Overall, forecasting was quite good. As the QPF was updated, the basin
inflow forecasts may have been resubmitted. There was a discontinuity when
the QPF was updated and the regulation resubmitted during evening or
nighttime hours, since the regulation could not be re-initialized to any time
other than 4:00 a.m. This was particularly troublesome on the lower
Columbia River, where many side streams flowing into the Bonneville and
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John Day reservoirs were experiencing record peak flows. The model could
not keep up with the activity during the day.
On the Willamette Basin, the forecasts were better. This is a smaller basin
and fairly well calibrated from the upper reaches in southern Oregon to the
Corps of Engineers last downstream control point in Salem, Oregon.
Beginning as early as Monday February 5, the SSARR forecasts were
predicting the peak on the Willamette Basin to arrive at the Portland Harbor
late February 8 or early February 9. Although the magnitude of the peak kept
growing as the QPF was updated, the timing did not vary. Ultimately the
peak of 28.6 feet occurred in the Portland Harbor at 6:00 a.m. on February
9 . The estimated flow from the Willamette River was about 450,000 cfs and
the flow from Bonneville Dam was 400,000 cfs. The total flow in Portland
Harbor was approximately 1,000,000 cfs.

Emergency Response
Emergency operations centers were opened by the Corps of Engineers in
Seattle, Walla Walla, and Portland. From February 7 through 9, the
emergency operations centers coordinated with the RCC twice each day to
share reservoir operations and flood-fighting information. The National
Weather Service participated in the briefings, updated the weather reports,
and projected flood warnings for the many unregulated streams in the region.
These briefings were made available to the public and the news media, but
were particularly helpful to emergency operations personnel, who had to
decide how and where to go for flood-fighting and evacuations. The
emergency operation center in the Portland District was open through
February 27.
Although the actual rain and flood event itself lasted only about five days,
there was continued activity following the flood. Emergency operations
centers assisted in clean-up events, and the Reservoir Control Center had to
safely evacuate all the flood waters that were stored throughout the region.
Throughout this stressful and dramatic event-before, during, and after-a
fine example of regional cooperation was displayed by all federal, state, and
private agencies.
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EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

A SURVEY OF THE CENTURY'S PROGRESS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PLANNING

Bascombe J. Wilson, MPA, CEM
Director, DERA Disaster Resource Center

Background
Today, new electronic systems and applications are being developed faster
than we can readily assimilate them into our personal and professional lives.
Increasingly, even experts in the fields of information management and
communications technology find it difficult to keep pace with new developments because of extreme complexity and narrowing specialization.
The nation and local communities are best served when emergency
managers and the elected leadership have a working knowledge of the ways
communications and information management systems inter-operate, and are
able to make informed decisions regarding cost-effective technical solutions
to local problems.
This study is intended to help bridge that gap by outlining for emergency
managers some of the history of emergency communications and emergency
management (the road behind us), a candid assessment of current systems
(where we are now), a projection of where technology is leading us (a
tentative guess at the road ahead), and a review of the lessons we've learned
along the way. Many of those lessons, as we all know, were learned through
loss of life, terrible suffering by many people, and devastating property loss.
We should not forget those lessons, even in the face of a bright and optimistic
future filled with dazzling technological wonders.
This paper began as a review of communications/information management/incident command trends developing over the last 20 years following
the tragic Big Thompson Canyon flood disaster. It soon became apparent,
however, that a 20-year perspective was not sufficient to provide a clear
understanding of the trends and developments shaping our current state of
emergency communications and incident command systems. As I looked
backwards a decade at a time, I began to develop a new appreciation for the
difficulties our predecessors had in integrating new technologies into their
organizational structures and in keeping up with rapid change.
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The past 100 years have been marked with technological developments
that revolutionized the structure of societies the world over, the world's
collective view of itself, and the relationships among peoples and nations
everywhere. Developments in communications and information management
have been at the core of this global metamorphosis, and appear to be one of
the central guiding forces shaping our own future.
Twenty years ago, Larimer County, Colorado, experienced a devastating
flash flood in the Big Thompson River Canyon between the towns of Drake
and Loveland. More than 140 people died, and 316 houses, 56 mobile
homes, and 52 businesses were destroyed. Large numbers of people died
attempting to warn and rescue others. Residents, tourists, campers, and
migrant workers were washed away without a trace. It will never be known
exactly how many people died that day. In one of the most beautiful areas of
North America, disaster struck unexpectedly and scarred forever the
landscape and the lives of its people. This work is dedicated with respect and
reverence to the memory of those whose lives were lost, to the courageous
rescue and recovery teams who worked diligently in the days following the
tragedy, and to the survivors who are still recovering.
This research project reviewed the process through which emergency
communications and information systems evolved over the past 100 years,
and attempted tentative conclusions about strategies that might be helpful for
future development of systems in the public interest. The following report is
a brief overview of the conclusions of the study.

Baseline Considerations
The Big Thompson tragedy shocked us, because most of us thought our
system of weather radars, forecasts, and warning systems could give us
adequate time to prepare and evacuate. We were wrong then, and today-20
years later-the weather and human-caused events can still surprise us with
situations evolving faster than our warning systems and the public can
respond.
Since that time, many of the communications devices we use have either
changed or recently come into use. For example, the National Weather Radio
System expanded to cover most of the nation, but most people still did not
buy receivers. The Federal Communications Commission considered
mandatory installation of receiver modules in all new television sets, but
manufacturers lobbied against this due to the cost-about $5.00 per unit.
Mobile Data Terminals (MOTs) were successfully tested in police and fire
vehicles to relieve the congestion on voice channels and improve speed and
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accuracy of information exchange. Personal Computers (PCs) have come into
almost universal use, and a large percentage of radio broadcast stations are
running on autopilot and are unattended. Also, the Incident Command System
has become widely (although not universally) adopted.
For decades, the Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES) has provided
a well-organized communications backup resource in most communities, and
is frequently exercised through Simulated Emergency Tests. At their own
expense, volunteer amateur radio operators provide the equipment and
expertise needed to rapidly restore or expand critical local and long-distance
communications during emergencies.
A national movement toward centralized Public Service Answering Points
(PSAPs) and a National Emergency Number (9-1-1) changed the way the
public called for help. Depending upon jurisdiction, the 9-1-1 center could
patch calls through to police and fire dispatchers, or dispatch could come
directly from the 9-1-1 center. Many states required telephone companies to
impose surcharges on all customers to pay for 9-1-1 service, which ran to
millions of dollars. For a long time, customers confused the number 9-1-1
with repair service at 6-1-1, or directory assistance at 4-1-1. One could,
however, always dial zero for an operator and get help.
Serious limitations exist with the PSAP/9-1-1 system, but to avoid eroding
public confidence in this concept, these are often not widely discussed.
Limitations include:
• The systems were designed for day-to-day e~ergencies, not disaster
response. Both the switching equipment and the human operators/
dispatchers become overloaded during major emergencies, and a form
of gridlock occurs during disasters. The public, however, has grown
to expect and demand a high level of service and responsiveness from
PSAPs, even during major disasters.
• The systems depend on the normal phone system. If callers can't get
dial tones, they can't reach 9-1-1. Emergency line load control
protocols sometimes deny dial tones to residential customers during
periods of high demand. Also, if phone lines or switching problems
exist between the PSAP and the police/fire dispatcher, it is not
possible to pass needed information to the dispatcher unless backup
radio systems are available. Increasingly, they are not.
• Often, faster response could be obtained by calling the fire or police
station directly, rather than going through the PSAP operator, who
then must patch the call to the appropriate dispatcher.
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• Without absolutely accurate, current maps, it is difficult for PSAP
operators to determine the correct fire or police jurisdiction to handle
the call. Additionally, adjacent communities have similar street and
subdivision names, and telephone prefix numbers do not always align
with political boundaries.
• Calls to 9-1-1 are often routed a thousand miles or more through
central switching centers. A disruption in long distance service could
interfere with or shut down local 9-1-1 service.
• Calls to 9-1-1 from a Private Branch Exchange (PBX) or an Offsite
Branch Exchange (OBX) do not necessarily display the correct address
on the PSAP console. Often, the dispatcher will see only the street
address of the PBX switching center, not that of the caller.
Home reception of satellite TV broadcasts on the C-Band became popular
in the late 1980s when dishes became price-competitive with cable TV.
Instead of two dozen channels, the satellite viewer could access 50 or more
channels. Since many of these C-Band broadcasts were intended as proprietary feeds to cable operators, and not as signals for public consumption,
encryption systems were developed to protect the signals. Again, hackers
broke the codes and illegal satellite "black boxes" appeared that could
descramble codes and allow the user to receive the signal for free. Also, at
least one hacker broke the uplink codes for a major C-Band satellite network
and superimposed his own programming over the satellite's normal channels
for an evening. He was later apprehended and convicted of several crimes
relating to the incident, but his success underscored the vulnerability of the
relatively unsophisticated C-Band satellite network.

A Quick Look at Today's Challenges
Public service and emergency communications are scattered across the
radio spectrum-there are so many specialized services that it is difficult to
define any meaningful boundaries. All of these services provide good day-today efficiency, but terrible operating conditions when mutual aid is needed
or normal operations are disrupted.
Today, urban areas are "trunking" their radio systems, usually on the 800
MHz band. That makes good economic sense, and allows more discreet
functions and a larger number of users to coexist on a given number of radio
channels. Despite this daily efficiency, such arrangements create an
unworkable system during disaster. When things go wrong, as they have
recently done during major disasters, police and fire units lose nearly all
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communications, and emergency operations centers are thrown into chaos.
Several fall-back schemes are being explored, but this is a major challenge
for the future.
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites allow very accurate location
and tracking. GPS receivers can be incorporated within portable two-way
radio equipment to send continuously updated location information to central
dispatch. Global communications out of disaster areas can be obtained by
using satellite receiver terminals in briefcase size units for voice, data, and
fax message exchange at moderate cost.
Adjacent jurisdictions do not always have compatible radio equipment.
Mutual aid efforts are seriously hampered when different agencies bring radio
equipment that cannot intercommunicate. For example, in the Denver metro
area alone, different agencies use Low Band VHF, High Band VHF, UHF,
and 800 MHz trunked systems. As long as the separate emergency operations
centers or mobile command posts can relay messages through the phone
system or over liaison radios, the system can work, but often without
efficiency.
The Emergency Broadcast System is being replaced with the Emergency
Alert System to take into account non-standard broadcasting media, such as
closed circuit music channels. The new system will attempt to deal with the
problem of unattended broadcast stations, but the costs to smaller local
stations of converting will be a major challenge to making the Emergency
Alert System universal and dependable.
Enhanced color Doppler radar, wind protiler systems, and expanded
networks of remote rain gauges are improving the ability of the National
Weather Service to track weather. Still, human observers, including trained
volunteer observers-particularly amateur radio SKYWARN teams-continue
to be critical to local storm tracking and warning. This is particularly true
regarding fast-developing phenomena such as tornadoes, severe hail,
microbursts, and flash flooding.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is making dramatic
improvements in the national weather radio alerting system through the use
of digital technology to pinpoint weather warnings to specific city blocks or
county sectors, which will likely coincide with the U.S. Postal Service's ninedigit zip code map.
Direct Broadcast Satellites on the Ku-Band provide direct signals for paid
subscribers through the use of 18" to 24" dish antennas. Access to well over
100 channels is common. Although federal regulations require that state and
local emergency operations centers have the ability to directly send public
warning messages over cable TV systems and local broadcast stations, there
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is no similar capability to reach the increasing number of households served
by direct satellite broadcast service.
For catstrophic situations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) maintains five Mobile Emergency Response Systems (MERS) at key
federal centers in the U. S. A MERS detachment can be moved by air or land
to any location to provide high-bandwidth satellite links for video teleconferencing, high speed data, and a mid-sized telephone Private Branch
Exchange (PBX), in addition to heat, water, air conditioning, and electrical
power generation for a command center.
The Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES) has been incorporated
into the emergency response plans of many communities in the U. S.
Unfortunately, over half of all communities do not have current, comprehensive emergency response plans, and many do not have plans for backup
communications. The Federal Communications Commission has reallocated
some radio spectrum from amateur/emergency use to commercial interests
because of a perceived lack of need. And, at least one Central American
country is considering the reallocation of radio frequencies used by amateurs
for emergency communcations through satellites currently in orbit to
commercial use. This conversion is important because, even if one country
takes such action, emergency communications throughout the entire
hemisphere may be jeopardized because of interference on satellite up-link
frequencies.

The Near Future-A Tentative Projection
Personal communications devices will continue to be developed, and many
will be able to access the telephone network, but may not necessarily operate
directly over it in their normal mode. For example, if the electric company
can find a way to send communications signals over their power lines, they
will be able to offer PCS service. Almost for certain, PCS will operate much
like a cellular system, although the handheld units will be smaller, lower
power, and cheaper to use.
Low Earth Orbiting satellites (LEOs) will provide seamless global
communications for portable and mobile terminals, without the need for
pointing antennas. The LEOs will act like cellular phone stations in the sky.
Serious concerns are that the LEO nets will usurp radio frequencies now
allocated to critical emergency services as well as determining who will
answer when someone dials zero for an operator (the operator could be in
Tokyo or Frankfurt, rather than the U.S.). Also, barring technological
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breakthrough, a 9-1-1 call through a LEO system will not be properly
. connected without the delays of manual call routing.
A proliferation of new X-l-l numbers to meet various public service and
commercial demands will further weaken the identity of 9-1-1 with the
public.
Many vehicles will be equipped with automatic telemetry systems and
distress alarms operating over satellite networks and tied into monitoring
stations, which can alert local emergency services to disabled vehicles, stolen
vehicles, and accidents.
The public's expectation for excellence in emergency service and response
is probably going to increase, while systems will become more complex and
expensive. Further, government and community response agencies cannot
anticipate every possible contingency and cannot afford the high cost of inplace backup systems for every critical telecommunications network.
Therefore, amateur radio will continue to be an essential resource during
major disasters. As such, emergency managers need to continue integrating
amateur capabilities into local plans, while training and exercising amateur
radio operators in their mission.
Civil government cannot ignore the threat of information warfare. Military
units of many nations, some unfriendly to the U.S., are specializing in highly
advanced methods not only for disruption of communications and computer
systems, but more significantly, the undetectable intrusion into a targeted
system for the purpose of manipulating data and planting false information.

Implications for Strategic Planning
1. The public must be kept informed and given realistic information
about system capabilities and limitations. Public awareness and
individual preparedness must remain a top priority.
2. Our commitment to quality of service cannot be allowed to erode. The
road ahead will be difficult and demanding, and we must give our
emergency managers the executive-level training they need to succeed.
Most of them will need a full-time technical expert on staff to assist
them in making good telecommunications decisions.
3. We will probably ignore the threat of information warfare until a
successful terrorist or enemy act does significant damage. We need to
find ways to harden our local emergency communications and
information management systems against information warfare attack.
4. System redundancy is expensive. It is more expensive not to have it.
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5. System recoverability is expensive. The public service mission will fail
if we do not have it.
6. Fall-back capabilities are hard to develop or retain. It is very hard to
keep people trained on the use of old, low-tech systems, but proficiency must be maintained until it is absolutely certain that new
systems will function under sustained stress and unanticipated failure.
7. Increasingly, public safety and quality of life will depend on sustained
telecommunications and electric power distribution. At the same time,
the increased complexity of such systems and rapidly growing demand
will make failures more likely to happen. Our only strategy as
emergency managers is to perform comprehensive risk analyses and
make plans for emergency restoration and recovery through reliable
backup resources.
8. As a nation, we must give high priority to maintaining and encouraging the volunteers who provide vital life-saving service in time of
disaster. Just as we must provide support and flexibility in interstate
licensing of emergency medical personnel and workers compensation
and professional training for volunteer firefighters, we must do
everything we can to strengthen the amateur radio community. That
means working locally to incorporate their organizations into local
response plans and making sure we adequately train our volunteer
operators and exercise their capabilities. Nationally, we need to work
with Congress and the Federal Communications Commission to
abSOlutely guarantee that valuable radio spectrum needed for vital
emergency communications is protected from reallocation to commercial interests with less importance to the welfare of the American
people. We need to protect this irreplaceable radio resource- both the
frequencies that our police, fire, medical crews, and response teams
use day to day, as well as the frequencies that amateur radio operators
need to support us when we call on them for help.

The views expressed in this paper represent the opinions of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of anyone else, including the symposium sponsors, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, or the DERA Disaster Resource Center, or anyone else
with whom the author is associated. This paper remains a work in progress, and the author
would appreciate comments, critiques, additional information, or other suggestions. Please
address them to Jay Wilson, DERA Disaster Resource Center, P.O. Box 280795, Denver,
CO 80225-0795.

COPING SELF-EFFICACY FOLLOWING
NATURAl.. AND HUMAN-CAUSED DISASTERS

Charles C. Benight
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs

This paper discusses research on the role of coping self-efficacy in
post-disaster psychological and physical responses in five separate samples,
including natural and human-caused disasters. Research on the mental health
impact of disasters has rapidly proliferated in the last several decades and has
demonstrated that serious psychological ramifications occur following a
disaster (Adams and Adams, 1984; Rubonis and Bickman, 1991). The
primary aim of these research projects was to evaluate the predictive power
of subjective appraisals of coping self-efficacy (CSE) for psychological
distress in recovering from a major disaster.
CSE is defined as a person's subjective appraisal of his/her ability to cope
with the environmental demands of a stressful situation. For example,
following a natural disaster such as a hurricane, victims are faced with
significant emotional, financial, and often physical demands related to getting
life "back to normal." A person's self-appraisal of how capable he or she feels
to successfully manage these demands is an example of CSE for post-hurricane recovery.
Enhanced levels of CSE have been related to better functioning in a
number of ways. For example, higher levels of CSE have been related to
improved coping with physical assault (Ozer and Bandura, 1990), dealing
with the psychological effects of abortion (Meuller and Major, 1989), better
immune function (Wiedenfeld et aI., 1990), lower catecholamine reactivity
during stress (Bandura, Taylor, Williams, Mefford, and Barchas, 1985), and
reduced blood pressure response during a stressful task (Bandura, Reese, and
Adams, 1982). A few studies have also shown that the better a person's
appraisal of CSE, the better he or she recovers from extreme environmental
experiences. Murphy (1987) found this when studying victims of the Mt.
Saint Helens eruption, and it was also the case for Israeli soldiers who had
faced military combat (Solomon et al., 1989). Thus, perceived coping
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efficacy has been shown to directly effect levels of psychological distress
following trauma, and may be critical for maintaining a sense of personal
control during recovery from a major disaster (Freedy et al., 1992).
The following discussion will describe five different disaster studies
where CSE was investigated as an important predictor variable of psychological distress. The disasters include Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Opal, and
the Oklahoma City Bombing. General healthy popUlations were studied in
each of the disasters and two ill populations (HIV + and Chronic Fatigue
Patients) were studied in Hurricane Andrew.

Hurricane Andrew
The first three studies were all completed following Hurricane Andrew,
which blasted South Florida on August 24, 1992, leaving a devastating toll
of 250,000 homeless, over $15 billion in damage, and unforgettable images
of destruction. The recovery phase from Hurricane Andrew was, and
probably still is, a challenge of often superhuman proportions. Removing
debris, securing electricity and water, and soliciting contractors for rebuilding
are just a few of the many problems victims of this disaster faced. The CSE
measure utilized for all of the hurricane studies was designed to reflect these
types of demands and asked participants to judge how capable they felt in
managing the various challenges (see Table 1). The first study focused on the
reactions of the general population of southern Dade county. The second
study looked at the reactions with a group of HIV-infected gay men, and the
third with a small sample of women diagnosed with Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome. Study methods for the three investigations were virtually the same
with minor differences related to the type of popUlation being studied. In
general, participants responded to an in-depth interview, filled-out questionnaires, and provided a blood and urine sample at time 1 (approximately 1-3
months post-hurricane); and, for the neighborhood group, filled-out
questionnaires at time 2 (approximately 7-9 months post-hurricane).
Subjects from the first study (N = 180, male=62 and female = 118) were
recruited from the general population in storm-ravaged neighborhoods. The
mean age of those who were sampled was 39 years, and 43 % were Caucasian, 34% were African American, 18% were Hispanic, and 4% were Asian
American. Results from this first study indicated that CSE was an important
predictor of psychological distress even after controlling for other factors
such as income, education, gender, age, damage, threat of death, and lost
resources. This study also showed that CSE beliefs two months after the
hurricane were related to distress eight months later. This relationship was
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. strong enough that it still remained even after including early psychological
distress levels.
The second and third studies attempted to determine the importance of
CSE in individuals who were facing the compounding stress of dealing with
hurricane recovery on top of coping with a serious disease. We recruited 36
HIV-positive, mildly symptomatic (non-AIDS) gay men between the ages of
18 and 50 who underwent the stress of Hurricane Andrew and were assessed
within six months of the storm. Mean age for these participants was 36.4
years (SD=9.6). Ninety-one percent had at least some college education.
Results suggested again that greater levels of CSE were related to less
emotional distress and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. In
addition, greater CSE was associated

Table 1. Coping Self-Efficacy Scale for Hurricane Recovery

1
I'm not at all
capable

Perceptions of Coping Self-efficacy
2
3
4
5
6
I'm moderately
capable

7
I'm totally
capable

To What Extent Are You Capable of. ...
1. Maintaining personal security-protecting yourself and your
property.
2. Maintaining financial security-Dbtaining financial resources either
through employment or assistance.
3. Maintaining housing and food-negotiating insurance claims or
FEMA claims, dealing with contractors or landlords, keeping food
fresh, etc.
4. Maintaining intimacy and calm within the family-feeling close and
avoiding conflict with loved ones.
5. Dealing with personal losses caused by the storm-loss of connections to loved ones, loss of treasured belongings, and so on.
6. Going back to normal routine-grocery shopping, banking,
schools, gas stations, work, and so on?
7. Dealing with the emotions you've experienced since the stormsuch as anger, anxiety or depression?
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with lower norepinephrine to cortisol ratios, suggesting that the better the
appraisal of coping capability, the better the physiological function.
The third study with Chronic Fatigue patients also confirmed this effect.
Sixteen CFS patients (80% female, average age of 39 years) were recruited
during the first four weeks following the storm. CSE added significantly to
the prediction of generalized psychological distress. Interestingly, given the
relationship of depression to CFS, CSE also added significantly to the
prediction of depression. Finally, CSE added significantly to the prediction
of symptom exacerbation and illness burden. Even after controlling for
current levels of psychological distress, elevated levels of CSE were
associated with reduced reports of physical impairment, psychosocial
impairment, and total impairment scores from the Sickness Impact Profile.
Collectively, these studies supported the idea that how one appraises his
or her coping capabilities following a natural disaster is important in how well
they are coping right after the storm, and in the case of the first study, how
well they are managing over time. Based on these initial investigations, two
additional studies have been completed in an attempt to replicate these
findings under different conditions (i.e., Hurricane Opal and the Oklahoma
City Bombing).

Hurricane Opal
Hurricane Opal hit the panhandle of Florida on October 4, 1995,
hammering coastal communities with winds reaching 144 mph. Although not
as strong as South Florida's Hurricane Andrew, Opal inflicted millions of
dollars in losses to many communities along the coast. We entered the field
on December 1, 1995. Sixty-six participants were recruited in and around the
community of Niceville. Average age of the participants was 55 years old,
48 % were male and 52 % female. This sample was predominantly Caucasian
and was well-educated, with approximately 86% reporting at least some
college. This sample was much different than the Hurricane Andrew sample,
where participants were much more diverse ethnically and socioeconomically.
It was of interest to us whether the CSE construct would still provide
important information on recovery in such a different group and following a
storm that was not as devastating. Results demonstrated very clearly that CSE
is related to psychological distress even after taking into account the
important control factors of gender, amount of social support , and loss of
resources.
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Oklahoma City
The last study was an investigation of whether CSE appraisals would be
valuable in determining psychological distress following a very different type
of disaster-the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City.
With this study, a new CSE measure was created to reflect the types of
demands that victims of this tragedy would be facing (see Table 2).
Twenty-seven victims were recruited two months after the bombing, found
through local businesses within a five-mile radius around the bombing site.
The mean age of this sample was 41 years, and, of these individuals, 48%
were men and 52 % were women. The mean income range reported for
sample one was between $40,000 and $45,000 per-year. Educationally, 7%
reported a high school education, 26 % some college, 37% college graduate,
and 30% graduate education. Ethnically, almost the entire sample was
Caucasian, with only 3 % African American and 3 % Native American. As
with Hurricane Andrew, participants responded to an interview, fIlled out a
series of questionnaires, and provided urine specimens. As with the other
four studies, perceptions of CSE were found to be highly predictive of
reported psychological distress.
Thus, in five different samples under a variety of traumatic situations,
perceptions of CSE have been found to be important in understanding the
psychological reactions of people as they attempt to "get things back to
normal." What implications do these findings have for the disaster response
community? And, more specifically, what do these results suggest for mental
health response teams attempting to intervene following a major traumatic
event?

Table 2: Coping Self-Efficacy Scale for a Terrorist Bombing
This assessment is designed to have you think about important issues related
to dealing with the bombing. For each of the situations described below, you
are asked to rate how confident you are that you can successfully deal with
them. Because people differ from each other in the way that they are dealing
with the crisis there is no single correct response. The following items refer
to specific behaviors. Please think about yourself currently, not as it was the
day of the bombing. Using the following scale, please rate how capable you
think you are to:
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6
1
4
5
3
2
I'm not at all
I'm moderately
Capable
Capable
1. Do my job skillfully.
2. Comfort children.
3. Maintain religious/spiritual beliefs.
4. Comfort friends.
5. Return to life as it was before.
6. Have conversations about the bombing.
7. Accept what happened.
8. Find some meaning in what happened.
9. Express my feelings about what happened.
10. Not bring my stress reactions home.
11. Be able to concentrate.
12. Not lose my temper.

7
I'm totally
Capable

The following items refer to thoughts related to the bombing. Please think
about yourself currently, not as it was the day of the bombing. Using the
following scale, please rate how capable you think you are in managing ....
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I'm not at all
I'm moderately
I'm totally
Capable
Capable
Capable
1. Thoughts of people dying.
2. Thoughts of babies dying.
3. Controlling distressing thoughts about the bombing.
4. Painful memories of the event (e.g., people screaming, people
in pain, etc.).
5. Thoughts about the pain of the families who lost loved ones.
6. Thoughts about my own vulnerability.
7. Thoughts about this happening again.
8. Thoughts about getting back at the individual(s) who did this.
9. Thoughts of personal injury.
10. Thinking optimistically.
11. Memories of the stench or odors emitting from the area.
The following items refer to visual images related to the bombing. Please
think about yourself currently, not as it was the day of the bombing. Using
the following scale, please rate how capable you think you are imagining ....
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I
2
3
4
5
7
6
I'm not at all
I'm moderately
I'm totally
Capable
Capable
Capable
1. Painful images of the event.
2. Distressing dreams.
3. Visual reminders of the bombing (e. g., T. V., Pictures, seeing
the building etc.).
4. Controlling images of the event that come into mind.
5. Images of the dead or injured people.
6. Images of distressed family members who lost loved ones.
7. Images of the children who died.

The following questions refer to emotions related to the bombing. Please
think about yourself currently, not as it was the day of the bombing. Using
the following scale, please rate how capable you think you are in managing ...
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I'm moderately
I'm totally
I'm not at all
Capable
Capable
Capable
1. Feelings of inadequacy.
2. Feeling of being on the edge of losing emotional control.
3. Worries about personal vulnerability.
4. Feelings of helplessness.
5. Restlessness.
6. Feelings of rage.
7. To not "lose it" emotionally.
8. My anger toward the person(s) responsible for the bombing.
9. Being strong emotionally.
10. Feelings of anxiety.
11. Sad feelings.
12. Depressive feelings.
13. Feelings of grief.

For the general disaster response community, these results suggest that a
variety of agencies (e.g., FEMA, insurance agencies) can have a direct effect
on emotional disaster recovery. The questions on the Hurricane Coping
Self-Efficacy Measure addressed efficacy perceptions related to rebuilding
one's home, maintaining financial security, maintaining personal security.
These issues are heavily influenced by agencies such as FEMA, the Red
Cross, the National Guard, and insurance companies. For example, insurance
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companies varied widely in how quickly they provided initial funds to begin
rebuilding following Hurricane Andrew. It was very clear in various
neighborhoods which households had received an insurance check and which
had not. Households with money were able to engage in active coping
strategies such as buying a generator for electricity, renting a trailer for
shelter, etc., and, once individuals are able to move forward in beginning the
rebuilding process, coping self-efficacy perceptions will most likely improve.
This type of situation, of course, refers to the middle and upper income
population.
Lower socio-economic groups, who often do not have insurance or are
dependent on a landlord for housing needs, require other assistance that
enables them to enact active coping behavior. For example, there were
repeated stories following Hurricane Andrew of apartment complexes
condemned by city and state inspectors. However, the only option for these
individuals was to move all of their belongings into a tent city. It may make
more sense to decentralize these types of housing alternatives into separate
communities, thereby retaining some sense of the original living situation,
again, realizing that the primary coping demand is to get things "back to
normal" as quickly as possible. Obviously, it is logistically complex to
accomplish; however, following Hurricane Andrew, the tent cities did not
draw a huge population. Alternative strategies are necessary.
In relation to mental health response, the current gold standard is Critical
Incident Stress Debriefing following a major disaster. However, recent
research is calling into question whether this is the most appropriate
intervention strategy (see Kenardy, Webster, and Carter, 1996). It may be
time to re-examine this intervention and see if other mental health techniques
might be utilized to improve our strategies. For example, cognitive behavioral therapy techniques such as goal-setting, cognitive restructuring,
modeling, and reward systems might be creatively utilized to maximize
individual appraisals of mastery. In the context of hurricane recovery,
interventions might help individuals "re-set" their typical daily expectations,
which are often unrealistic in the midst of the chaotic recovery demands, to
more realistic goals that would enhance rather than decrease perceptions of
coping self-efficacy. For example, daily goals may shift from getting to
work, shopping, and picking up children to obtaining ice and spending one
hour picking up debris.
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Summary
In five separate samples, our research has demonstrated a strong
relationship between how capable individuals feel in dealing with disaster
specific demands and how well they are able to adapt. The data suggest that
the greater your perceived coping efficacy, the lower psychological distress
levels and physical reactivity. Disaster response teams and mental health
intervention strategists might be able to utilize these data to improve
post-disaster response and lessen the psychological impact of these tragedies.
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CmJRCH WORLD SERVICE AND
LESSONS LEARNED FOR MITIGATION
Kristina J. Peterson and Richard L. Krajeski
Church World Service

Introduction
At the end of most TV editorials comes the phrase, "The views of the
speaker are not necessarily the views of this station." Similarly, this paper
contains our reflections on the activities of Church World Service Disaster
Response (CWS) as we have experienced them over the past 15 years, not
necessarily the views of CWS. We believe that CWS and its related groups
have been most effective in their work in disaster recovery.

Background
Church World Service (CWS), which was formed after the Second World
War as a cooperative effort to help restore and rebuild Europe, operates on
behalf of 51 religious bodies and organizations in the u.S. CWS has both
national and international programs as well as three program branches: 1)
refugees, 2) hunger\development, and 3) disaster response, which we will
address.

Basic Philosophy
The slogan for the Disaster Response office is "Prepared to Care," and its
efforts are based on the understanding that disaster response takes place in a
cycle that usually starts at the disaster impact and continues through the
preparation for the next disaster. Activities encompass six phases: response,
development, education, prevention, mitigation, and preparedness.
The CWS response is driven by a set of value statements that focus on:
• seeking to identify and aid the most vulnerable people in disaster-the
poor, elderly, children, physically challenged, ethnic minorities, and
women.
• providing advocacy for the disenfranchised and the environment, and
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• giving spiritual/psychological care and support for survivors, caregivers, and communities.
Other value assumptions of CWS and the groups with which it works include:
• empowering local peoples and communities (we believe that community is defined from the "inside"),
• enabling long-term recovery and sustainable development, and
• seeking in partnership with local people the establishment of basic
human rights.
CWS is committed to operating on an open and nonexclusionary basis.

Basic Operations
CWS is active outside the U.S. and provides financial and technical
assistance to local partner groups in the affected country. Within the U. S. ,
support is given by providing funding through the CWS member groups,
some material aid, and technical assistance and organizing support.
CWS has paid staff and about 35 disaster response consultants who
volunteer in the U. S., working for periods that range from three weeks to all
the time they have in order to help communities recover from disasters.
Consultants are sent into an area to:
• assess the situation and the needs of the affected areas;
• help identify those who are on the margin and often invisible;
• enable the organization of the affected areas, using the religious
community as the base for building grassroots coalitions; and
• provide training and consultation for long-term recovery and development.
Working through state interfaith groups and local religious groups, the
consultant helps build a formal and informal coalition that usually expands to
include many community groups. A typical interfaith organization may
include Christians, Jews, and Moslems (such as the group that came together
following the Oklahoma City bombing), together with service and neighborhood clubs, trade unions, and businesses. This organization will work to
physically repair and rebuild the community, and more and more often also
to address the pre-existing issues that turned an event into a disaster.
Consultants in the field try to sensitive to both the local cultures (we never
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assume that there is just one "culture") and the marginalized populations who
.may not be recognized and represented by local governments or other
institutions.
Marginalized groups are often reluctant to respond to formal government
systems or other entities that may try to help during a disaster. People are
often suspicious of individuals or agencies that hold over them the power of
income or services. In our work, we have found that people are much more
willing to trust a person from the religious community, even if that person is
a stranger; a representative from the religious community can be an advocate
without negatively impacting their day-to-day existence.
The recovery and mitigation work of CWS and the local religious
communities takes on a different form than that of a more formal group such
as the Red Cross or the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Recovery
and mitigation begin with the training of individuals in the vulnerable
community in leadership skills, thus helping to open the doors of the "formal"
structures to them. The local leadership can then work on the vulnerabilities
of the local population.
Although CWS and the religious communities are active in structural
recovery and mitigation (rebuilding and elevation-for example), our concern
also focuses on pre-existing nonstructural conditions. The barriers that
produce vulnerability are correctable, some more easily than others. These
barriers include, but are not limited to, housing, literacy, transportation,
language, water, toxic dumps, jobs, and poverty.
Following disasters, we hear the survivors, caregivers, and local
government saying that they want to get the community back to normal.
Normal seems to be a goal for most, but for vulnerable groups, normal may
mean a return to oppressive and substandard conditions. Some recovery and
mitigation policies actually worsen vulnerability. For example, a home that
had a leaky roof before the disaster needs to be replaced in total, but some
relief and recovery agencies will only grant repairs to restore the structure to
"pre-existing conditions," that is, the state of the home prior to the disaster.
In addition, mitigation for vulnerable populations must often include justice,
jobs, and land-use reform.
The religious community is generally more free to act than other recovery
and mitigation agencies and can focus on doing what is necessary for the
good of the survivors and their communities. The religious community only
needs to think about what is right, just, and ethical; therefore, it has the
freedom and flexibility to employ creative mitigation measures. It does not
always live up to this call and sometimes is as short-sighted as others. But
because it tends to be community based, representative, and inclusive, the
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religious community does have a freedom to act with and for the survivors
and their communities.
Some examples of creative mitigation on the part of local interfaith groups
follow:
• Following an earthquake, many survivors were evicted from their
rentals by a slum landlord. Rather than putting these folks back into
inadequate housing, money was sought from the public sector and used
by volunteer labor from the religious community to rehabilitate homes
that were safer, healthier, and at less risk of damage or collapse due
to earthquakes.
• After a major hurricane, the mayor of a southern town wanted to
dispose of toxins collected in the clean up by dumping them near a
very poor rural community, contaminating the community's water and
more than likely inundating homes with toxic fumes over a long time
period. Mitigation in this case involved stopping the illegal toxic
dumping and monitoring its safe disposal.
• In a buy-out program in southern Louisiana to remove residences from
floodplain areas, mitigation by the religious community meant putting
homes and trailors on elevated bases and strapping down roofs to
withstand strong winds.
• Following the Midwest floods and the frequent flooding in the
Appalachian region, mitigation involved getting affordable housing out
of the floodplain.
• After most recoveries that involve the interfaith community, new local
grassroots organizations are created that work for the protection of
women and children, support sustainable development, and empower
people, These grow almost spontaneously out of grassroots recovery
groups.

Lessons
We have learned the following from our work:
• People on the margin and the poor are experts at mitigation, although
they may have never heard the word. We from the outside must
remember that, for many people, "mitigation" is their daily bread for
surviVal. We must learn that the survival skills of these popUlation are
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very good, and we must find ways to enhance their skills and support
them.
•

They do not want to live that way. We still hear from "outsiders," that
is, certain professionals from other helping organizations, that "they
like to live that way," or that "they do not know any better or simply
don't care." Views like these are untrue and more often than not based
on intentional or unintentional racism, sexism, and classism. Those
who try to be sensitive to and respect local cultures and local enpowerment and those who try to be academically objective must beware that
their "hands-off-Iet-the-Iocals-do-it" attitude can be racist, sexist, and
classist, particularly if their lack of involvement perpetuates the status
quo.

• Mitigation is more than structural change-it is also about economic
and social justice.
• Local communities will often function through informal networks and
not through agencies and institutions.
• Religious beliefs are just as often powerful motivators for liberation
and creating just communities as they are for oppression and maintaining the status quo.
• Giving technical assistance (i.e., basic organizational skills, resource
identification) and support to local people after a disaster enables them
to recover and make nondisaster-related changes in their lives and
communities.
• Local folks are going to be there after we leave, with whatever we
leave behind. They need our help-not our garbage.

Kristina J. Peterson holds degrees in Urban Planning, Theology, and Ethics.
Her doctoral studies were in Peace Making.
Richard L. Krajeski holds degrees in Philosophy, and Theology, and his
doctoral studies were in Technological Transfer and Ethics.
They are disaster specialists for CWS and the major authors of three disaster
recovery manuals.
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NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE

AnvANCED CAPABILITIES
IN FLASH FLOOD FORECASTING

Lee W. Larson
Hydrologic Research Laboratory
National Weather Service, NOAA
Silver Spring, Maryland

Introduction
The modernization of the National Weather Service (NWS) includes three
major systems: the Doppler Weather Surveillance Radar (WSR-88D), the
Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (A WIPS), and the
Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS). These advanced technologies
are providing significant data and processing capabilities that are directly
applicable to the flash flood problem. In particular, the Weather Forecast
Office (WFO) Hydrologic Forecast System (WHFS) provides forecasters with
unparalleled access to real-time data and the capability to process and identify
potential flash flood situations. All of these technologies contribute to
improved capabilities of the NWS to provide early and useful flash flood
products to cooperators and the public.
On July 31, 1976, more than 12 inches of rain fell in the Big Thompson
Canyon in Colorado. The resulting flood left more than 140 people dead and
destroyed homes and businesses. There has been a significant effort within
the NWS over the last 20 years to improve our capabilities to respond to
these types of events.

Background
Following the Big Thompson flash flood, in an effort to provide the
WSFO with the tools necessary to effectively forecast these types of events,
the Forecast Systems Laboratory (FSL), with support from the NWS, began
the Program for Regional Observing and Forecast Services (PROFS), which
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was a proof of concept project for an NWS field office advanced work station
environment. The PROFS work stations added considerable functionality in
data handling, graphical display capability, and additional local model
generation capability. The NWS and FSL, as a risk-reduction activity, then
cooperated in the Denver AWIPS Risk Reduction and Requirements
Evaluation (DAR3E) in the mid-1980s. The DAR3E project was designed to
put a series of the PROF developed work stations in an operational Weather
Service Forecast Office (WSFO). PROFS and the early DAR3E implementations had limited functionality to address the hydrologic operations at the
WSFO. Over the next few years, through 1992, some limited success was
achieved in adding hydrologic displays and applications to the DAR3E system
and a later pre-A WIPS system. By mid-1993, the hydrologic application
development on the pre-A WIPS system and the WSFO hydrologic development effort was moved to the Office of Hydrology (OH).
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Weather Forecast Office
Hydrologic Forecast System
The WHFS features an integrated data management approach, employing
a relational database management system (RDBMS) for storing the large
volume of data necessary for hydrologic forecast operations. The WHFS
database incorporates many data elements ranging from modernized data sets,
such as NEXRAD precipitation estimates and GOES satellite imagery, to
more traditional hydrologic data sets provided by automated reporting stations
and cooperative observers.
The supporting River Forecast Center (RFC) is the primary source of
hydrologic guidance for the WFO, providing river stage forecasts on a daily
and event-oriented basis. RFC guidance is also provided in the form of
modernized flash flood guidance products that indicate current soil moisture
conditions and associated rainfall thresholds necessary to induce flood
activity.
A collection of tools is provided within WHFS to manage the WFO
hydrologic program through a series of graphical user interfaces. HydroBase,
one of these tools, provides a method of managing station data, allowing for
definition of various station attributes. Much of the data utilized by forecast
applications are also defined through HydroBase. Program management tools,
such as automated generation of monthly flood stage reports, are also part of
HydroBase.

WHFS Capabilities
During a typical hydrologic situation, the forecaster may employ many
aspects of the WHFS in combination to evaluate the current hydrologic
conditions, evaluate data, and issue products notifying the public of flood
situations.
The Stage and Display (HydroView) application provides the forecaster
with a method of monitoring and tracking the situation in real time. This
application provides a geographic depiction of the WFO County Warning
Area (CW A) with the ability to overlay an array of Hydrometeorological
data. Station icons may be overlaid in combination with hydrologic or
geopolitical boundaries such as rivers, river basins, county outlines, or major
towns and highways. River station icons are color coded to indicate the
proximity of the latest observation to action or flood stage. Precipitation
stations are color coded to represent a precipitation accumulation for a
selected time duration. This display is automatically refreshed at 15 minute
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Figure 2
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intervals, using the most recent observations and forecasts available. The
forecaster may also view a time series display of river stage and precipitation
observations for a period of up to 21 days. Forecast data is provided for a
five-day time period.
The Area Wide Hydrologic Prediction System (A WHPS) provides the
forecaster at the WFO with an analysis of a flash flood threat in the WFO
forecast area. AWHPS uses data from NEXRAD and gridded flash flood
guidance from the servicing RFC to provide a graphical depiction of: 1)
Critical Rainfall Probability (CRP), 2) one-hour rainfall projection, and 3) a
difference display.
The NEXRAD product that is used in the AWHPS system is the Hourly
Digital Precipitation (HDP), which provides a gridded accumulation of
precipitation for the previous hour each volume scan of the radar. The
modernized flash flood guidance from the RFC indicates, for each HRAP
grid, the amount of rainfall required in a particular duration to cause
over-bank flood of small streams. The common durations for the rainfall in
the flash flood guidance computations are 1, 3, and 6 hours.
Two CRPs are computed for each duration: the first is the CRP based on
the radar estimated rainfall, and the second is the CRP based on the radar
estimated rainfall plus the one-hour projection. The CRP gives a statistical
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Figure 3

Area Wide Hydrologic Prediction System

probability that the rainfall in a particular HRAP grid has exceeded the flash
flood guidance for that grid square. The difference fields are a graphical
depiction of the quantitative difference between the flash flood guidance and
the radar estimated rainfall for each duration. A second difference graphic
will depict the same information for the radar estimated plus one-hour
projected rainfall totals. Utilizing the CRP products, the forecaster will be
able to outline the potential flash flood area. At that point, the forecaster can
issue the appropriate public product, either a flash flood watch or a flash
flood warning.
The Site-Specific Hydrologic Prediction System (SSHPS) is a local hydrologic model provided to allow the WFO forecaster to supplement RFC river
forecast guidance by generating forecast river stages for fast response
headwater and river basins. River stage observations and precipitation
estimates are provided as input to a simplified rainfall runoff model, which
produces an estimate of streamflow rise due to runoff reaching the river
channel. Initial soil moisture conditions are accounted for through model state
variables provided by the RFC. Dependent upon the model definition, other
inputs such as snowmelt runoff and potential evapotranspiration may also be
considered. Model definitions for individual basins are calibrated by the
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Figure 4
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RFC, employing the NWS River Forecast System (NWSRFS) hydrologic
models as a baseline.
Gridded or point precipitation estimates may be used as model input, and
may be selected by the forecaster prior to the execution of the model. Each
of these forms of estimates' is ingested through a precipitation preprocessor
that calculates basin average precipitation values for an amount of time
specified by the model definition. Gridded estimates are utilized on a
best-available basis employing Stage III, Stage II, and Stage I NEXRAD
estimates. Future precipitation estimates may be incorporated through the
assimilation of gridded Quantitative Precipitation Forecasts (QPF) products
generated by the WFO, the RFC, or a national center. The forecaster
interacts with the SSHPS through a graphical user interface that allows for
interactive review and adjustment of model results and input.

Conclusions
WFO hydrologic forecast operations in the AWIPS era will differ
dramatically from those in the pre-modernized NWS. The advent of more
powerful computing technologies provides the opportunity to implement
sophisticated hydrologic modeling, analysis, and forecast tools in a manner
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suitable for dealing with the wide range of possible hydrologic conditions and
situations. Significant portions of the initial WHFS capability will be fielded
to WFOs beginning in the fall of 1996, with full hydrologic forecast
capability available shortly thereafter. This WHFS implementation will
provide the WFO forecaster with the tools necessary to meet the goals of the
NWS hydrologic services program, serve as the baseline for future enhancements, and dramatically enhance the WFO's ability to identify and respond
to short lived hydrologic events such as flash floods.
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COMPARISON OF DEFICIENCIES ASSOCIATED WITH
THE BIG THOMPSON FLASH FLOOD EVENT AND
RECENT FLOOD EVENTS IN THE EASTERN
UNITED STATES

Solomon G. Summer
NOAA/National Weather Service
Eastern Region
Bohemia, New York

Introduction
Since the 1976 Big Thompson flash flood, there has been significant
progress toward improving the National Weather Service (NWS) flood and
flash flood program. This is the result of new technology, a better understanding of the meso-scale hydrometeorological features that cause flash
flooding, and the significant attention focused on flood forecasts and
warnings as part of the NWS Modernization and Associated Restructuring
(MAR). Yet, despite these efforts, there still remain stubborn areas where
significant progress in overall warning capabilities has yet to be realized.
This paper provides a service perspective, comparing the deficiencies
associated with the Big Thompson Flash Flood with several flash floods that
occurred in the Eastern region of the U. S. from 1982 to 1995. A comparative
analysis of the deficiencies shows those areas where deficiencies have been
addressed and identifies others that are still problem areas. Based on this
analysis, general recommendations are offered for future improvements in
support of the NWS Flash Flood program.

Deficiencies
In the Big Thompson Canyon Flash Flood of 1976, several deficiencies
were identified in the NOAA Natural Disaster Survey Report for this event.
They include:
1) Sparsity of real-time rainfall/river data in the river basin,
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2) Unfamiliarity among staff of hydrologic operations,
3) Inadequate radar coverage for precipitation estimates,
4) Lack of site-specific information and conveyance of the urgency of the
event in warnings,
5) Insufficient warning dissemination-NOAA Weather Radio
6) Need for increased local awareness and preparedness activities, and
7) Difficulties in accurately forecasting excessive rainfall capable of
producing flash flooding.

Eastern Region Flood Events
Six recent floods that occurred in the eastern United States were selected
for analysis. The events all share the common features of being associated
with significant flood-related deaths and/or damage and also provide a crosssection of the types of flash flooding experienced in the East. They include:
events with tropical origins; those resulting from slow-moving or training of
thunderstorms; prolonged heavy rainfall events; terrain-enhanced rainfall; and
wintertime events as a result of both rainfall and melting snows.
The events chosen for analysis are:
1) June 1982 Southern New England floods;
2) November 1985 flood in central Appalachians;
3) May 1986 Little Pine Creek flash flood;
4) June 1990 Shadyside, Ohio, flash flood;
5) June 1995 Madison County, Virginia flash flood; and
6) January 1996 floods, Northeastern U.S.
The June 1982 Southern New England Floods
Synopsis: Prolonged and excessive rainfall that fell from June 4-6, 1982,
caused severe, and in some cases, record, flooding in southern New England.
The major damage occurred along small streams in coastal Connecticut and
Rhode Island, where 48-hour rainfall amounts exceeded 12 inches, with one
unofficial report of 17 inches. There were 12 deaths attributed to the flooding
in Connecticut, and three in Rhode Island. Damage estimates from this event
were $277 million in Connecticut and $3.3 million in Rhode Island. More
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~------------~----------

than 20 small dams were reported destroyed or partially breached. Five dams
failed along the Falls River alone in and around Essex, Connecticut.

Analysis. Flood potential statements preceding the event, based on general
forecasts for heavy precipitation, heightened the awareness to flooding.
However, the recognition of the magnitude of this event was not sufficiently
conveyed to the general public and disaster officials, except in a few cases
where direct telephone contact was made by the NWS. Lack of data from the
most seriously affected areas was a major factor in assessing the flood threat.
Adding to the problems were general inconsistencies in usage of hydrologic
products between offices with responsibilities in the area.
Widespread dissemination of warnings and forecasts were communicated
via conventional mass-media, the NOAA Weather Wire, and NOAA Weather
radio. No unusual problems were encountered. Aside from standard
communications, the Rhode Island Civil Defense office was alerted by
telephone, early in the event, as a result of the flood potential statement
released by the NWS. This allowed the state to mobilize for weekend disaster
operations. The Connecticut Office for Community Preparedness was not
directly notified before or during the event. Flood damage was mitigated
locally in the Connecticut town of Norwich as a result of a local self-help
warning system.
The November 1985 Appalachian Floods
Synopsis. Starting in the headwaters on November 4 and 5, 1985, and
continuing downstream for several days, record floods, some estimated to be
100-year to 500-year flood frequencies, occurred on several rivers in Virginia
and West Virginia. Record floods occurred in portions of the James and
Roanoke basins in Virginia, and in the upper Monongahela, upper Potomac,
and Greenbrier rivers in West Virginia. Fifty-six people lost their lives, and
total damages exceeded $1.3 billion.
These floods were caused by the combination of two separate storms. The
remnants of Tropical Storm Juan passed over the area during the first days
of November 1985, causing moderate to heavy rainfall. However, on
November 4, a strong low pressure system from the Gulf of Mexico
deepened as it slowly moved northward into West Virginia and eastern West
Virginia. Peak rainfall amounts of up to 18 inches and 14 inches were
reported for Montebello, Virginia, (the James basin) and Milan, West
Virginia (the Potomac basin), respectively.
Analysis. In this event, due to lack of real-time automated rainfall and river
data in the headwater areas and an underestimation of forecast rainfall, the
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urgency of the event was not initially portrayed. However, once the
magnitude was realized, subsequent releases portrayed the severe nature of
the flooding.
Despite the use of NOAA Weather Wire, NOAA Weather Radio, and
NA WAS, it was noted that "in this day of sophisticated telecommunication
technology, it was shocking to see the dependency on the telephone to alert
key officials and the news media of impending danger." The FEMA
Interagency Hazard Mitigation report stressed that many communities do not
have the tools to enforce basic floodplain management standards. They
reported, "public awareness of flood hazards seems to be limited to recent
memory and many were simply unprepared for the magnitude and dangers of
the November flood."
The May 1986 Little Pine Creek Flash Flood in Pennsylvania
Synopsis. On May 30, 1986, a stationary thunderstorm dropped up to eight
inches of rain in a little over two-and-a-half hours over a small portion of the
North Hills area in metropolitan Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The resultant flash
flood down the Little Pine Creek claimed nine lives. The basin area of Little
Pine Creek is just 6.1 square miles. All the deaths were car-related; victims
were traveling along a thoroughfare paralleling the creek.
Analysis. Rainfall associated with this event was highly localized. Automated
rainfall reports were available from the Integrated Flood Observing and
Warning System (lFLOWS) to the local Weather Service Forecast Office
(WSFO), but none of these were in the immediate area of the event. Only a
limited amount of radar rainfall estimates were available to the forecasters in
real time due to the proximity of the ground-clutter pattern. Vague reports of
flooding were received in the office, but attempts to pin down the degree of
flooding were unsuccessful. A flash flood warning was issued about one hour
after the extreme flooding began on Little Pine Creek, based on scattered
reports of flooding.
The flash flood warning received excellent dissemination over the
Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) , however, no radio stations interviewed
could recall broadcasting information contained in the special weather
statements about the possibility of flooding. The local NOAA Weather Radio
(NWR), which was not operational during much of the day, was restored to
low power by late in the afternoon. Eye witness accounts of the flash flood
indicated at least three of the nine-flood related deaths occurred when victims
climbed on top of their vehicles to evade flood waters rather than leaving
their vehicles for higher ground.
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The June 1990 Shadyside Ohio Flash Flood
Synopsis. On the evening of June 14, 1990, severe flash flooding occurred
on Wegee and Pipe creeks (approximately 12-square-mile drainages) near
Shadyside, Ohio. There had been no recent flash flooding on either of these
two creeks. Recollections of past flooding were mainly of the backwater
effects of the nearby Ohio River. Thus, public awareness of the possibility of
such a devastating flash flood was nonexistent.
Unofficial estimates of five inches of rain, up to four inches in one hour,
fell on the headwaters of these two small creeks. The resultant flash flood
occurred within an hour, cascading a 10- to 30-foot wall of water, according
to eyewitness accounts. The flash flood resulted in 26 fatalities.
Analysis. A flood watch was issued approximately two hours before the flash
flood at Shadyside and was based on an analysis of synoptic and mesoscale
conditions. The flood watch was given timely distribution by the local media
to the residents in Belmont County, and many people in the flood area
reported seeing the watch on television and hearing it on commercial radio.
NOAA Weather Radio was ineffective due to poor reception in the area.
A flash flood warning was not issued for this event. Neither radar data nor
observed rainfall reports prior to or during the flood indicated the magnitude
of the actual rainfall. Reports of flooding did not reach any NWS office until
several hours after the event, following reports of bodies and debris floating
on the Ohio River.
The NWS survey team summarized the Shadyside flood by stating that,
due to the small scale nature of the event and the rapidity at which it evolved,
it was beyond the detection and warning capability of current NWS field
technology and may even approach the limits of improved capabilities
expected in the near future.
The June 1995 Madison County, Virginia, Flash Flood
Synopsis. Severe flash flooding, and in some cases record river flooding,
occurred across portions of west-central Virginia during the week of June 25,
1995. The hardest hit area was centered over southern Madison County,
where as much as 20 inches of rain may have fallen. One report indicated that
as much as 10 inches of rain had fallen in two hours. The Rapidan River in
this event approached the 500-year flood recurrence. Despite the magnitude
of the event, only one death was reported in Madison County.
Analysis. The NWS staff was very proactive during this event. Strong
wording was used in their issuances. The June 27 midnight public forecaster,
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. prior to the significant flash flooding that occurred in Madison County,
conveyed the seriousness of the threat and virtually pinpointed the location
of the most devastating flooding through sound meteorological analysis,
backed up by the use of several data sources. The WSR-88D radar was key
to the location of maximum rainfall as well as providing useful information
from the VAD wind profile in showing the strengthening low-level flow.
IFLOWS automated rainfall data provided ground-truth rainfall amounts prior
to and during the flooding that helped calibrate the radar rainfall estimates.
The IFLOWS system was also used by local county and state officials in their
disaster assistance efforts. Skywarn reports from amateur radio operators
provided valuable additional rainfall reports.
Flash flood watches and warnings were issued for Madison County with
extensive lead time. The watch preceded the flooding by 14 hours. The
warning preceded the onset of flooding by two hours and the time of serious
flooding by five hours. Emphasizing the flood threat further, a flood potential
statement was issued that included a call-to-action statement for emergency
managers because significant flooding was possible. As the flash flooding
became more and more life-threatening, radio stations were called and asked
to activate EBS, and continuous contact was made with emergency service
personnel.
River flood warnings and follow-up statements were routinely issued for
the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers. There was excellent coordination
between the WSFO staff and the RFC staff in providing accurate river
forecasts. The Hydrometeorological Analysis and Support (HAS) function at
the RFC coordinated with the WSFO to input four inches of forecast rainfall
(QPF) into the hydrological models. This was translated into timely warnings
of major flooding on these river basins.

January 1996 Northeastern U.S. Flood
Synopsis. Although this flood can be more accurately described as a river
flood event, the elements that contributed to the flooding resulted in rapid
rises on major rivers more closely associated with flash flooding. The
Susquehanna River Basin Commission referred to this event as a basin-wide
flash flood over the entire Susquehanna watershed. The last time this
occurred on such a large scale was Hurricane Agnes in 1972, and not
surprisingly, the January 1996 floods in the Northeastern U.S. produced the
most extensive river flooding since Agnes.
One example of the devastation on the smaller streams was in Lycoming
County in west-central Pennsylvania, where six deaths were reported.
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Loyalsock Creek reached a record flood crest, exceeding Agnes by three feet,
and the six deaths were reported on another hard-hit stream, Lycoming
Creek. Particularly hard-hit was Old Lycoming Township at the lower part
of the Lycoming Creek basin, where trailers were washed away and homes
were heavily flooded.
The conditions causing this event were a nearly unprecedented January
snowmelt thaw (resulting from near-record to record snowpack), accompanied by heavy intense rains (two to four inches), and adding to the recipe for
disaster, significant ice jams on the rivers and streams. Total losses were 33
deaths and nearly $2 billion in damage. Many of the deaths occurred in
stranded autos.

Analysis. Most offices provided timely flood potential statements, watches,
and short-fused warnings. Quantitative precipitation forecasts (QPF) were
under-forecasted, and hydrologic models did not handle well the nearly
unprecedented rate of snowmelt runoff. As a consequence, initial river flood
warnings underestimated the magnitude of the event. However, when the
effects of the rapid rate of runoff were noted in area streams, updated
forecasts more accurately specified the magnitude as a major flood.
As a result of timely and accurate forecasts at Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, on the Susquehanna River, more than 100,000 residents were safely
evacuated. Emergency management response, particularly at the state and
county level, was favorable. At the local level, this was not evident in some
cases. Generally, the awareness level of the event, knowledge of NWS flood
forecast and warnings, and correct response measures were higher at the
county and state levels and deteriorated by the time information reached
smaller communities. There was some misinformation passed on by the new
media during this event that resulted in public confusion on what was actually
occurring on the rivers and streams.
The performance of the WSR-88D radars varied from office to office with
respect to the estimates of precipitation. The meteorological conditions
causing the heavy rain were primarily synoptic-scale, but exhibited some
tropical characteristics. Automated satellite-telemetered river and rainfall
gauges installed as part of the Susquehanna flood forecast initiative were also
valuable in providing real-time data to the NWS offices, including the RFC.

Comparative Analysis
Table 1 shows a comparative summary of the six flood events relative to
the deficiencies discussed in the Disaster Survey Report associated with the
Big Thompson flash flood event. For each event, if a deficiency has been
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fully addressed, it is rated "Yes." If it has not been addressed and is still a
problem area, it is rated "No." If a particular element has been partially
addressed, it is noted as "partial."
Table 1. Deficiencies Addressed
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

June, 1982

No

No

No

No

Partial

No

Partial

Nov.,1985

No

Partial

No

Partial

No

No

Partial

May, 1986

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

June, 1990

No

Partial

No

No

No

No

Partial

June, 1995

Partial

Yes

Yes

Yes

Partial

Yes

Yes

Jan., 1996

Partial

Yes

Partial

Partial

Yes

Partial

Partial

Events

NWS modernized operations began in the eastern region in 1994-95. For
the four events prior to modernization, only one element was fully addressed.
For the two events following the modernized operations, all of the deficiencies were at least partially addressed. Among the individual deficiencies, the
two clements that have shown the most progress are: Element 2-knowledge
of hydrologic operations; and Element 7-use of QPF in hydrologic forecast
operations. This is not surprising, since these areas have been emphasized in
eastern region operations since 1980. The one deficiency that was somewhat
surprising was Element I-the availability of real-time automated data. On
further reflection, however, this can be explained by the fact that, as a direct
result of the first four events, automated flood warning systems were either
newly implemented or expanded for the areas of concern.

Current and Future Operational Improvements
The most significant improvements in the NWS Flash Flood Warning
program are the result of NWS modernized operations and technologies.
Despite these improvements, problems still exist where deficiencies have only
been partially addressed.
The use of WSR-88D radars has been a key component in pinpointing
areas of excessive rainfall. Significant improvements have been made in
radar/rainfall estimates and areal coverage of precipitation with the advent of
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the WSR-88Ds in forecast operations. Nevertheless, considerable progress
still needs to be made in improving precipitation estimates through calibration
with gauge data and enhanced bias adjustment algorithms (i.e., tropical
rainfall).
There has been an increasing effort to familiarize NWS staff with
hydrologic operations and make hydrology an integral part of overall station
operations. This is mainly due to the emphasis in coupling hydrology with
meteorology and an integrated "team" approach in implementing the NWS
modernization and restructuring project.
High-resolution mesonet data has been on the increase in flash flood areas
due to the expansion of ALERT and IFLOWS networks. This is especially
true of rain gauge data. There is, however, an increasing concern over the
availability of river gauge data due to budget cuts imposed on the U.S.
Geological Survey, which has as part of its mission a directive to gauge the
nation's rivers, and for cooperative gauge data funded in part by state and
local agencies. Decreasing budgets for river gauging have not only led to
decreases in new gauge sites, but have in some instances led to gauge
closures at existing forecast locations. It is ironic that, with the increased
availability of mesonet data, the basic data used for providing information on
river flows is threatened. Overall, there are still many flash flood-prone areas
without mesonet data. Although the implementation of the WSR-88Ds may
reduce the need for extensive rainfall data, calibration of radar data with
gauge data will be essential to provide accurate point and areal estimates of
rain. This is particularly true in areas of significant terrain, where radar
coverage may be affected. The expansion of mesonets will require a
concerted effort toward a public-private partnership.
Improved rainfall forecasts can provide additional lead time for flash flood
warnings. Annual median lead-time verification statistics were calculated for
all eastern region flash floods from 1992 to 1995. In 1992 and 1993, median
lead-time for each of these years was zero minutes. Described another way,
the majority of events was preceded by zero lead-time. In 1994 and 1995,
WSR-88D radars were implemented at most sites. Improvements in flash
flood warning lead time resulted. The median lead time jumped to 6.25
minutes in 1994, and to 11.16 minutes in 1995. Although these results were
positive, further improvements in warning lead time are necessary to afford
greater protection of life and property. Incremental increases in flash flood
warning lead time can be made through improvements in our skill to forecast
excessive rainfall capable of producing flash floods.
Methods of applying probabilities to define the uncertainty associated with
QPF and its use in a flash flood decision system need to be further re-
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searched, leading to more objective techniques in determining the thresholds
for issuing flash flood watches. Flash flood warning decision systems can
take into account the individual characteristics of a river basin, the lead time
for successful evacuation, and the risk factors to people in the floodplain. It
could also factor in the time of year, which may influence the number of
people vulnerable to dangerous flooding.
One area that needs to be focused on is the delivery of products that
convey in more site-specific terms the magnitude and urgency of the flash
flood event. The NWS/Office of Hydrology (OH) is currently developing
WFO Hydrometeorology applications that will provide forecasters with tools
to run site-specific models for small streams and headwater areas. The Office
of Hydrology is also developing an "area-wide" hydrologic software model
to better define the flash flood potential and delineate areas where flash flood
guidance has been exceeded and flooding is possible. This model depends on
the use of the modernized flash flood guidance that is being implemented
nationwide. The modernized guidance is being developed for small watersheds and will provide data on a gridded basis (4 x 4 km.). This will enable
forecasters to compare high-resolution WSR-88D data with flash flood
guidance on small scales, comparable to those that produce local flash floods.
To maximize the effectiveness in using these models operationally will
require RFCs to deliver accurate and timely state variables as guidance to the
WFOs, and a well-trained WFO staff in effectively running the WFO
Hydromet System.
Product formats for flash flood warnings have not changed appreciably
over the last 20 years. However, efforts are now underway to employ
graphical representations, depicting flood inundation on small scales through
the use of geographic information system (GIS) technology. Increased use of
GIS display capabilities by local emergency management officials, and
eventually the general public, will usher in a new way of pinpointing areas
where flooding is expected.
While improvements in warning dissemination continue with improved
communications technology, its use in an overall flash flood program varies
from location to location. In the events cited, there were times when direct
telephone communication was vital, others where NOAA Weather Radio or
amateur radio communications were important, and occasions where only
directed local communications of a serious flood threat could have prevented
loss of life. Redundancy of communications is an important consideration, as
is a greater awareness and education of the affected user and communications
media in dealing with life-threatening flash flood situations, down to the local
level. One recent example of a new dissemination path that is being

100

DEFICIENCIES ASSOCIATED WITH FLASH FLOOD WARNINGS

implemented by the NWS is the Emergency Managers Weather Information
Network (EMWIN). EMWIN makes core NWS forecasts, warnings, and
other information available to emergency managers via a satellite uplink:.
Greater attention has been given to warning preparedness through the
implementation of dedicated warning coordination meteorologists (WCM) at
all modernized weather offices. The WCMs can play a major role in
improving preparedness and dissemination efforts as part of the total warning
program. However, more coordinated efforts are needed among WCMs,
intra- and interagency efforts directed at mitigating flooding, local emergency
officials, the news media, and the general pUblic.

Summary
Future improvements in the flash flood program will depend on an
integrated approach in dealing with all the elements involved in the warning
process. Efforts involved in addressing deficiencies must emphasize the total
flash flood warning program and involve contributions from all levels of
government, universities, and the private sector.
Today's team approach lends itself to a horizontal integration of programs
among federal, state, and local agencies, universities, the media, and the
private sector. To fully realize maximum benefits in the flash flood warning
program, the efforts of all these diverse entities in tackling the flash flood
warning problem must be better integrated and focused on the total warning
process.
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Introduction
Flash flooding is frcquently associated with heavy precipitation in a short
period of time. Much work has been done in defining the climatology of
precipitation on a time scale of 24 hours (e.g., Smith et al., 1994), but this
is longer than the time scale associated with flash flood-producing rains. In
individual flooding events, "bucket surveys" are often done in any container
that holds water to estimate precipitation. Unfortunately, quality control of
bucket surveys is problematic, since the question of whether a container was
empty at the beginning of a heavy precipitation event can rarely be answered
with confidence.
We describe an effort to define the climatology of heavy rains on time
scales of three hours or less, using the Hourly Precipitation Dataset (HPD),
archived at the National Center for Climatic Data (NCDC). The HPD
provides hourly observations of precipitation from around the United States
for more than 40 years (1948-1993). Data for approximately 5,000 sites are
found in the archive, although few of the site records cover the entire period.
The number of reporting stations grew from nearly 300 in the late 1940s
to approximately 2,800 in the early 1980s. The latter number represents a
station density approximately equivalent to a uniform network with stations
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spaced 50 km apart. Some stations report in hundredths of inches, while
others report in tenths of inches, and, although coverage is not uniform in
space or time, these data are by far the most complete and accurate set of
measurements of precipitation.
From a meteorological perspective, flash floods may be the most difficult
forecast hazard associated with thunderstorms. Identifying potential flash
flood situations is frequently difficult (Doswell et aI., 1996). An understanding of the climatology of heavy precipitation is essential for preparing flash
flood forecasts, particularly if probabilistic estimates are made. Since heavy
precipitation is a rare event at any single location, the experience level of
weather forecasters dealing with the problem is generally quite limited. Yet,
accurate forecasts of the threat are crucial for the protection of life and
property.

Nature of the HPD
The HPD consists of a series of records, with one record per station on
a given day. Each record contains the station identifying number, the date,
and a series of six digit values that indicate the hour in local standard time
and the precipitation in hundredths of an inch. Each record ends with the total
daily precipitation. As such, the HPD is well-suited for computing time series
of precipitation at individual stations and for measuring precipitation values,
particularly for hourly and total daily observations.
Time series data can reveal important information in certain cases. For
example, part of the warning problem with the July 19-20, 1977, Johnstown,
Pennsylvania, flash flood is indicated in the time series data. Most of the
more than eight inches of rain fell after the late evening news, which was
probably the last opportunity to warn the public.
On the other hand, many events are not sampled by the HPD. With the
flood that occurred on June 9, 1972, in Rapid City, South Dakota, two HPD
sites were within 30 km of an estimated 12" 13-hour rainfall; yet, neither site
recorded more than two inches of precipitation. In an even more extreme
case, no HPD sites recorded significant precipitation associated with the Big
Thompson River, Colorado, flood of July 31, 1976. Gauges at Drake and
Estes Park were not put into place until after the flood.
As with any large observational data set, quality control is a significant
concern. Some errors are easily detected and removed from the dataset, while
the accuracy of a number of other questionable observations is difficult to
determine. "Simple" errors include records in which the value in the
hundredths of an inch column is reproduced in the tens of inches column,
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reporting hourly accumulations of 10.01 inches and 20.02 inches. These
values are clearly unreasonably large and, due to a repetitive pattern, can be
identified and eliminated. Somewhat less obvious are extremely large reports
(e.g., 15.55 inches in an hour), but the extreme value still makes it possible
to eliminate them automatically. Another set of errors involves the recording
of hundredths of an inch values in the tenths of an inch column (e.g., 7.80
inches in one hour, followed by 6.50 inches with no precipitation on either
side of those two hours). These are problematic, as are other isolated
instances of large precipitation (;~4 inches/hour), because there is no objective
way to determine whether they are the result of "bad" data or extremely large
"good" data. Indeed, this is a fundamental problem in using any dataset about
any rare, extreme events.
We individually checked every hourly report of greater than 4.5 inches
(approximately 360 reports) with reports from meteorological and climatological journals, and found that only a few were likely to be good reports; the
rest fell into the kinds of errors mentioned above. The real difficulty comes
in attempting to hand check the much larger number of reports at smaller
values. The distinction between obviously bad and good data becomes
blurred, and the volume of work becomes prohibitive.

Observed Frequency of Hourly Precipitation
One of our purposes in investigating the frequency of heavy precipitation
is to estimate the number of times operational weather forecasters will have
to deal with this problem and to understand its implications for a national
forecast center. Hence, we confine ourselves to looking at the average
number of events in the contiguous United States and do not consider the lack
of spatial uniformity. We touch only on the highlights of the precipitation
record, focusing on hourly accumulations of an inch or more and, particularly, on the average number of events in July. Longer accumulation times
and larger amounts are referenced from the July hourly base values.
We organized data in liz-inch aggregates (e.g., I inch to 11lz inches, 11lz
inch to 2 inches, etc.) for ease of analysis and to increase the number of
samples at higher values. We found that the annual cycle of heavy precipitation peaks in July and is symmetric about that month (see Figure 1). In
January, the month in which heavy precipitation is least frequent, there are
about 7% of the number of events as in July. In total, on average, there are
approximately 2,400 reports of I inch to 11/z inches hourly rainfalls in the
HPD each year and 3,200 reports of 1 inch or greater. Twenty percent of all
observations occur in July and more than 50% occur in June through August.
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Figure 1: Annual cycle of average number of one inch in one hour
observations in the HPD for the entire United States.
The number of events decreases logarithmically as the precipitation value
increases (Figure 2). The fit to the curve for the July observations is
extremely good for accumulations of 1 inch to 4 inches. Comparison of the
number of reported events, given by the black squares in Figure 2, to the
logarithmic line gives us some confidence regarding the number of extreme
events in the HPD that are likely to be "bad." Later, this will provide a
powerful tool for estimating the "true" number of events that occur in the
United States in a year. While each month follows a similar logarithmic
decrease, the rate of decrease shows hints of a seasonal cycle. In the summer,
the number of events observed in a given liz-inch increment decreases to
approximately 7.5 % of the value one inch lower. In the winter, it decreases
to approximately 6.5%. While this is a relatively small change, it could be an
indication of the greater frequency of strong convection, and hence, high rain
rates, in the summer.
Although not shown, results for accumulation times of two and three
hours display few surprises when compared to the one-hour observations.
Eight thousand (11 ,400) reports of 1 inch (greater than 1 inch) rains in two
hours occur on average in the HPD and 17,400 (25,000) reports of 1 inch
(greater than 1 inch) rains in three hours occur on average in the HPD. The
logarithmic decay with increasing amount is slower, although the seasonality
is more pronounced. In summer, for the two-hour reporting time, observa
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Figure 2: Average number of heavy rainfall events in July in United
States reported in HPD. Events are aggregated in half-inch intervals,
with all events greater than six inches in the last category. Black
squares represent reports. Line is least squares fit to data from one to
four inches.

tions fall to 13 % for each one-inch increase, while the value is 10% in the
winter. For three hours, the rate decreases to 16% in summer and 12% in
winter. This is possibly due to the impact of larger-scale weather systems that
produce more sustained periods of heavy precipitation, leading to observations of more than one inch in two and three hours. The extreme precipitation
values (e.g., 3 inches or more) still result predominantly from convective
environments, which are most pronounced in the summer.

Estimating Frequency of Extreme Events
Although the HPD provides the most complete set of high temporal and
spatial resolution observations of precipitation, it is clearly inadequate for
capturing extreme events. Since extreme events create the greatest risk of a
major disaster, it is important to have some basis for climatological estimates
of risk. The logarithmic decline of the number of events with increasing
precipitation allows us to make estimates of the number of more extreme
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events. This is particularly important in understanding the likelihood of heavy
precipitation events at even higher spatial resolution. We assume that the
observations in the HPD are representative of the true climatological
frequency of extreme precipitation over the contigous United States.
As an example of the power of the dataset, let us make a "back-of-theenvelope" estimate of the "true" annual frequency of 6 inches/hour events in
the United States. From the decline to - 8 % per inch, we estimate that there
are approximately 0.0005 times as many 6 inches/hour events as 3 inches/
hour events. Since about 20 3" /hour events are observed each year, that
implies that approximately 0.01 6 inches/hour events will be observed per
year by the stations in the HPD.
The next important question involves the representativeness of the
observations. Precipitation, particularly that identified with convection, is
associated with extremely large spatial gradients. Smith et al. (1994) provide
examples of the poor spatial correlations between observational sites for
convective precipitation. As a starting point, we assumed that each rain gauge
represents an area of one square kilometer. Since the contiguous United
States has an area of approximately 7.5 x 106 km 2 , this means that the 3,000
gauges in the HPD cover only 4 x 10-4 of the total area in the United States.
This implies that, if we had an observational data set with 1 km horizontal
spacing, we would observe approximately 2,500 times as many events of any
kind as we currently observe with the HPD. Thus, there should be approximately 25 6 inches/hour events per year in the United States.
While no such extremely high spatial resolution rain gauge network exists,
the deployment of the WSR-88D radars in a national network provides an
opportunity to develop a radar-estimated precipitation climatology. This
promises estimates of the spatial and temporal correlations of precipitation on
a national scale. Assuming that improved precipitation estimation techiques
will be developed (e.g., Zrnic, 1996), it may also allow the best estimates to
date of extreme precipitation.

Implications
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the goals of this study was to
estimate the frequency at which operational forecasters have to deal with
heavy precipitation during their forecast shifts. To do this, we considered two
hypothetical forecasters. The first, Forecaster A, works his or her entire
career at a local National Weather Service Forecast Office, while the second,
Forecaster B, works one year at a national center, such as the Storm
Prediction Center.
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There are approximately 100 forecast offices in the U.S., and an
individual forecaster works 1/5 of the shifts in a typical office. Assuming
Forecaster A has a 20-year career, he or she will work about 4 % of the
annual national average of events during the course of his or her career.
Thus, for the estimated annual average of 256 inches/hour events, Forecaster
A will encounter one such event during his or her entire career.
Forecaster B, on the other hand, at a national center, works 1/5 of the
shifts and, thus, is on duty for 1/5 of the events every year. As a result,
Forecaster B will be on duty for five 6 inches/hour events each year or 100
times as many events as Forecaster A.
Thus, the relative levels of experience for both Forecasters A and B have
critical implications for their roles in successfully anticipating, forecasting,
and warning about flash floods. In the absence of quality guidance, a local
forecaster must get the biggest precipitation event in his or her career "right"
the first time, and many forecasters never get a second chance. However,
even though extreme precipitation events are rare at any single location, they
are relatively common from the national perspective. Thus, the national
center forecasters develop significant experience in dealing with rare, extreme
events in a relatively short time. As a result, the national centers have
primary guidance responsibility, identifying general regions of greatest
threat, while the local office has primary forecast and warning responsibility,
narrowing the area of threat in short-term forecasts and identifying the exact
location of extreme precipitation in warnings.

Discussion
The nature of flash flooding requires an understanding of the climatology
of extreme precipitation. The HPD represents the most complete description
of short time-scale precipitation measurements covering a significant time
period over the entire United States. However, as we have seen, it still misses
most of the truly large precipitation events that actually occur. The data allow
us to make reasonable estimates of the real frequency of heavy precipitation.
These estimates should be of value, both for emergency managers and for
weather forecasting concerns to allocate resources and plan for the inevitable
flash flood events. National network radar estimates of precipitation can be
used to refine the climatology presented here, although it will be years before
a significantly long period of radar observations exists to allow for reasonable
estimates.
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Introduction
The Big Thompson River flash flood disaster of July 31, 1976, was
notable from a weather forecasting system perspective because the event
occurred with no warning. Near the time of the Big Thompson flood, similar
failures of the forecasting and warning system occurred in the Rapid City,
South Dakota, flash flood of June 9, 1972, and the Johnstown, Pennsylvania,
flash flood of July 20, 1977. Faced with more than 400 deaths in these three
events, with no warnings issued, the National Weather Service (NWS)
developed a program to improve forecasting and warnings for fla&h floods.
A major component was the Flash Flood Forecasters' Course (FFFC) at the
NWS Training Center (NWSTC) in Kansas City, Missouri.
From the beginning, the FFFC was unique in that at least half of the
eight-day course was taught by invited personnel from outside the NWSTC.
Because of staff interests in the flash flood problem (e.g., Hoxit et al., 1978;
Maddox et al., 1978, 1979), particularly in the mountainous terrain of the
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West, research meteorologists from the Environmental Research Laboratories
(ERL) were invited to help teach the class. Since the first class in the fall of
1978, the course has met 78 times with approximately 24 students in each
session. It was held for the last time in the fall of 1996. During the nearly 20
years of the FFFC, about 1,900 members of the NWS staff participated as
students. In the fall of 1997, the FFFC will be replaced by a more general
hydrometeorological forecasting course. At this time, it seems appropriate to
look back at the ERL portion of the FFFC, which was unique in that research
meteorologists concerned with forecasting hazardous weather were involved
in training operational meteorologists.

The Early Years of the FFFC
ERL scientists from the Atmospheric Physics and Chemistry Laboratory
(APCL), C. Chappell, R. Hoxit, and R. Maddox, were asked to prepare
sessions on mesoscale analysis associated with heavy precipitation. The first
class was taught by Chappell and focused on detailed case studies of the Big
Thompson and Rapid City floods. Hoxit and Maddox taught the next classes.
All three came to the same conclusion: NWS forecasters of the late 1970s
knew too little about the basics of convection in the atmosphere to utilize the
kind of detailed information that the instructors were trying to convey in the
case studies. As a result, a major revision of the course materials was
undertaken, with an emphasis on the basics of convection. Maddox spearheaded this effort and produced a set of slides that proviueu the bulwark of
the course materials for a decade.
The primary foci of the revised course were on questions of how a
forecast should be made, why heavy precipitation is so hard to forecast, and
how convection "works." The need for detailed diagnosis of the fourdimensional state of the atmosphere and the interaction of human forecasters
with numerical weather prediction models were stressed. In particular, the
course emphasized that forecasters needed to anticipate the possibility of rare,
severe events occurring at any time if they were to respond with adequate
forecasts and warnings. Brief case studies were used to reinforce the notions
of the basics of convection and the forecast process.
Student participation was crucial to the success of the course and,
therefore, each class responded differently to the material that was presented.
There were three primary avenues by which students interacted with the
instructors and each other. The first was a pair of pretests, given before each
major section (convection and large-scale analysis), which served three
primary purposes:
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1) to give the student an idea of what he or she knew,
2) to indicate to the instructors areas that needed emphasis (in fact, it was
initial pretests that convinced instructors to change the primary focus
of the course), and
3) to measure growth in the expertise of the NWS staff.
The results of pretest performance from many years of classes were
summarized by Doswell and Maddox (1993). Regrettably, they found little
change in the answers given through the years, indicating that the base
know lege level of NWS forecasters had not improved during that time. It also
raised questions about the concept of distance learning and the way that
knowledgable forecasters transfer information to others at their office.
The second avenue for interaction was discussions in class. These came
about because of two primary kinds of activities. "Homework" analysis
exercises were given out the day before each day of the ERL course. Second,
many short exercises were included in the lesson plan to illustrate specific
points of the lectures.
Finally, at the end of each course, the classes were divided into teams of
three to five forecasters. The teams were given historic data from specific
cases and charged with forecasting where and how much heavy rain was
expected, if any. An important component of the exercise was to demonstrate
the importance of interacting with colleagues when making a forecast,
particularly of a rare, severe event.
During the 1980s, the material in the ERL portion of the FFFC remained
static. A first plan to update the material in the mid-1980s was discouraged,
because the FFFC was to be replaced by a hydrometeorological forecasting
course "soon." (As mentioned in the introduction, "soon" turned out to be
more than a decade!) Although several people taught a small number of
classes, the majority were taught by Maddox and C. Doswell, first of the
Weather Research Laboratory and later the National Severe Storms
Laboratory (NSSL). Although the basic materials stayed the same, each
instructor emphasized points of particular interest to them; thus, the nature
of each meeting depended upon the individual instructor as well as the
students. It was generally a positive aspect of the in-class learning process.

The Second Great Redesign (1992-1994)
By the early 1990s, some materials in the FFFC were becoming outdated
and the "replacement" course was not imminent. As a result, ERL instructors
C. Doswell and H. Brooks decided to undertake a second major revision of
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the course materials. The pretests, team exercises, and many of the examples
were updated, with additional emphasis on an ingredients- and process-based
approach to forecasting (Doswell et al., 1996). It was designed to help
forecasters focus on important details as the available data increases, stressing
the need for understanding the physical phenomenon in order to make a
successful forecast.
The number of case studies presented in the course increased dramatically,
although with less detail in each case. This was done to illustrate the wide
range of conditions under which heavy precipitation occurs. Because there
are numerous misconceptions about convective systems that produce heavy
precipitation, several of the case studies addressed those misunderstandings.
Second, the case studies illustrate the common factors found in all the events,
reinforcing the basic ingredients (moisture, instability, and lift) and processes
approach to forecasting heavy precipitation, and the variety of cases
demonstrated various ways that atmospheric processes bring the ingredients
together. Finally, the geographic diversity of the cases illustrated that heavy
precipitation can occur anywhere, with ingredients common to all regions,
and that it is a threat all forecasters must consider. Between the pretests, case
studies, and other exercises, cases from one U.S. territory, 11 U.S. states,
and three Canadian provinces were developed, providing scenarios that
ranged from Puerto Rico to Quebec, Alaska to Nevada. Cases were added as
new information became available.

The Third Great Redesign (1994-present)
As technology advanced to the point that remote access to trammg
materials became possible, we began putting the ERL FFFC on the World
Wide Web (WWW), primarily because flash flood forecasting problems are
not limited to the NWS-other agencies have substantial interest in the
problem. Further, it is important that meteorology students recognize the
difficulties associated with forecasting rare, severe events. Third, a larger
audience can be reached via the World Wide Web than through occasional
sessions in Kansas City. In fact, without advertising the still incomplete
course (located at http://www . nssl. uoknor. edu/projects/fffc/outline. html),
approximately half the number of people who have ever attended the classes
in Kansas City have at least looked at the outline of the course in the last
year. Clearly, it is possible to reach vastly more people with the World Wide
Web than through the classroom and to reach an audience that would not
even be eligible to come to the NWSTC. And, notably, many of the "hits"
on the outline have come from foreign countries.
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Second, the Internet version can be used as a refresher for students who
attended the course or have worked through the outline. This is important for
maintaining skills and, in some cases, reviewing technical details that might
not have been grasped in the first encounter.
We hope to someday develop a large library of cases that would be
available on the World Wide Web. In the limited time at the NWSTC, it is
impossible to work through many cases and, generally, some of the case
studies are skipped or skimmed over in the interests of time. It is possible,
with appropriate human and computer resources, to put a large number of
cases on to the Web with great detail, enabling forecasters to work through
the cases that will help them the most. In this medium, cases can be added
quickly so that something new is available all the time, helping forecasters
and students to find new challenges in working through the problems. Once
a forecaster has worked through an example, he or she will know the answer,
limiting the value of the individual resource.
Certainly, there are drawbacks to the World Wide Web as a training tool.
Some materials, such as homework analysis exercises, don't transfer well to
the electronic setting. Interaction between students and instructors is not as
rapid and extensive as it is in a classroom, and discussion among students is
next to impossible. One cannot tailor the course to anyone student's specific
needs, and considerable attention must be given to the maintenance and
upgrades of both the course materials and the hardware on which it resides.
Thus, the role of researchers as trainers becomes strained. In general, the
people who have taught the course have been full-time research meteorologists and, as a result, development and maintenance of training course
materials takes away from their research efforts. Since part of the intent was
to have current researchers training forecasters, a paradox develops. If the
Web instructors are to do an adequate job of training, they will need
assistance in putting materials together and on line, or they will not have the
time to do the research that is the basis for having them participate in
training!

Feedback to Research
Researchers often have had their research agendas set or changed by
issues that come up in the FFFC. As an example, precipitation efficiency (the
amount of rain that falls out of a storm divided by the amount of water vapor
entering the storm) is an important topic for estimating precipitation potential
of an environment. Recently, the broader question of moisture budgets of
thunderstorms was investigated, due to discussions in the FFFC, using a
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numerical model. The results of that investigation indicate that concentrating
on the reported observations of precipitation is misleading if the intent is to
forecast the amount of rain that will fall out of the storm. In fact, the sign of
the dependence on vertical wind shear is reversed when the more complete
budget is analyzed (Brooks and Stensrud, 1996). Also, a more comprehensive
and ambitious project to study heavy precipitation and flash flooding has been
initiated at NSSL recently.

Looking Back at the FFFC
Nearly 20 years have passed since the first meeting of the FFFC. Nearly
2,000 students taken the course. It is tempting to say that the instructors have
made a difference in the way that heavy precipitation is forecast in the U. S. ;
however, we have no information, other than rare anecdotes, that can confirm
or deny that statement. Essentially no monitoring of activities before or after
the class has ever been done. As a result, we have no way of knowing if any
of the participants changed their behavior after coming to the FFFC. It is
conceivable, although we hope not likely, that the participation of ERL staff
in the FFFC actually had a detrimental effect on forecaster performance.
However, it is heartening that no events with a death toll of the magnitude of
the big three events from the 1970s (Rapid City, Big Thompson, Johnstown)
have occurred since the FFFC began. Some events, such as the 1995 Rapidan
River flood in Virginia (Fritsch et aI., 1996) have had forecasts and warnings
with significant lead time. We would like to think that efforts such as the
FFFC have made a difference in those cases. Yet, we recognize that we
merely have been lucky and that another disaster could occur at any time
without adequate forecasts and warnings.
The ERL portion of the course will continue on the World Wide Web,
even after the FFFC ends. We hope that more forecasters, particularly early
in their careers, can be influenced through its existence and that somewhere
down the road a disaster can be averted.
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Introduction
Flood History

The Caliente Creek watershed lies at the southern end of the Sierra
Nevada Mountains in Central Kern County, California. The total area of the
watershed is approximately 435 square miles, and mountains within the
watershed range in elevation from about 4,500 feet to 8,000 feet above sea
level. Six major floods were reported and documented during the past 45
years that had estimated peak flow rates ranging from 600 cubic feet per
second (cfs) to about 23,000 cfs. Prior to the moderate flooding in January
and March of 1995, the last major flooding occurred on March 1, 1983,
when a peak flow of 12,800 cfs was estimated at the point where the creek
exits the Tehachapi Mountains and spreads out onto the San Joaquin Valley
floor near State Highway 58.
ALERT System

The current Caliente Creek ALERT flood warning system was constructed
and went on-line in September 1984, following the 1983 flood. This system,
designed by the California-Nevada River Forecast Center of the National
Weather Service (NWS), includes six precipitation gauges and one streamflow gauge. Precipitation gauge density is approximately one gauge per 72.S
square miles.
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Expected Service
The ALERT facility construction was funded through a cooperative
agreement between eight local agencies. Each of these entities had different
expectations and uses in mind for the information supplied by the ALERT
system.
The Arvin-Edison Water Storage District maintains the primary irrigation
canal servicing the southern end of the San Joaquin Valley. This canal
traverses the contours of the Caliente Creek alluvial fan. The canal is at direct
risk of severe damage and possible catastrophic breach due to large floods on
Caliente Creek. Based upon the flood warning, the canal is drawn down to
minimize the effects of severe flooding.
The Kern Delta Water District operates and maintains a secondary
irrigation canal system located on the Caliente Creek alluvial fan. Although
this canal is smaller than the Arvin-Edison canal, its location immediately east
of the town of Lamont creates a greater risk to life and property if a
catastrophic breach occurs. As with Arvin-Edison, Kern Delta lowers canal
levels based upon degree of expected flooding.
The Tehachapi-Cummings Water District, located in the southern third of
the watershed, uses the data collected by the ALERT system to help
determine its water supply estimates.
The Southern Pacific Railroad operates the only rail line connecting
northern and southern California. This major rail line crosses the Tehachapi
Mountains via a path cut by Caliente Creek and follows lhe <.:reek for several
miles. Southern Pacific requires accurate flood alarm information to guide
rail traffic through the mountains. Overestimations mean that millions of
dollars of rail traffic are needlessly stalled. Underestimation results in
millions of dollars of additional losses if trains are damaged during a large
flood event.
The Lamont Storm Water District was established by the state legislature
to provide a flood control funding mechanism for the unincorporated town of
Lamont. The district works with the county in preparing for a flood event.
The City of Arvin, located on the southeasterly edge of the Caliente Creek
alluvial fan, uses the information supplied by the flood alarm system to
initiate their flood-fighting response.
Kern County has primary flood-fighting responsibility within the
unincorporated areas affected by Caliente Creek. The Emergency Services
Office expects the ALERT system to provide three to five hours of sand bag
distribution time.
The Kern County Water Agency was created by the state legislature to act
as a wholesaler of state water project water and to develop regional water
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.supplies. The Caliente Creek ALERT system data assists them in determining
water supply needs and reservoir feasibility.
Reality Check

When the ALERT system was first brought on-line in September 1984,
it was anticipated that it would pay for itself the first year. The devastating
floods of 1983 were fresh and clear in the minds of residents and politicians.
Not only was the ALERT system not put to the test in 1984, but very little
rain fell for the next decade. During that time, watersheds dried up along
with the memories of Caliente Creek floods. Consequently, system priority
dropped as flood memories faded. In addition, the deep economic depression
that gripped the region fostered a succession of increasingly restricted county
budgets.
When Kern County first entered into the standard cooperative agreement
with the National Weather Service (NWS) for maintenance of the ALERT
system, the county Board of Supervisors directed that the maintenance cost
of the facilities be shared by the eight participating agencies, with the county
performing the actual maintenance. It is not clear why, but over time, for one
reason or another, each participant was forgiven their maintenance cost share,
leaving the full cost of maintenance up to the county. Unfortunately, during
this same period, maintenance costs began to rise. Budget pressure, shrinking
demand (no rain, no floods), and splitting system responsibilities all
conspired to reduce the maintenance effort. Maintenance became strictly
reactive. No calibration. No cleaning. If a unit failed, it was repaired when
a technician was available and was not given the highest priority.
1995 Floods

Finally, in January 1995, Caliente Creek produced its first significant
flood since 1983. However, imminent flooding was not recognized until flood
flows were sighted crossing the lower reaches of the floodplain, reducing the
estimated 12 hours (minimum) response time for the town of Lamont to less
than four hours. No warning time at all was provided to Southern Pacific
Railroad or Arvin-Edison.
A review of the ALERT system data disclosed that only one ALERT
system precipitation gauge indicated significant rainfall, and even that rainfall
was below the alarm threshold. Another gauge, which had transmitted only
minimal rainfall data, was later found to have had a brim full catch funnel
due to a plugged drain.

124

CALIENTE CREEK ALERT FLOOD WARNING SYSTEM AUDIT

The failure of the ALERT flood warning system in January 1995 to
provide an adequate warning could have resulted in significant avoidable
flood losses in the Lamont and Arvin areas if the flood event had been more
severe. After the January problems, county staff were not willing to depend
upon the ALERT system as a sole source for flood declaration and mobilization. Instead, staff kept closer contact with the NWS, followed weather
satellite imagery supplied by a private weather data provider, and continually
monitored the two ALERT gauges that appeared to have functioned in the
January event. The county's lack of confidence in the flood warning system
resulted in a significant increase of staff time, both during regular working
hours and in overtime, for the remainder of the 1995 flood season.

Independent Audit
There were lingering questions about the adequacy of the facilities in the
system (number and location), the maintenance of those facilities, and the
warning process that followed. These issues were tangible. It was the
unknown, the intangible, that concerned Kern County Floodplain Management. The question of whether or not Floodplain Management knew enough
about the ALERT system concept to even know what it didn't know, was the
issue.
Therefore, the department's expectations of an independent audit were
simple. Were the quantities and locations of the facilities adequate? What
should a minimum maintenance program be? How should an ALERT system
function? Did Kern County have the necessary skills to do the job?
The expectations of the process were simply stated. Floodplain Management needed a document that spelled out where the problems were and
suggested solutions. This document would then be used as a tool to first
revive the priorities of each department regarding the ALERT system and
then to forge a new cooperative agreement with the original funding agencies.

Caliente Creek ALERT System Audit
The primary objective of the audit was to determine if the ALERT System
was capable of reliably warning of floods. The project included: 1) a review
of the ALERT system and its requirements, 2) a review of ALERT system
operations, 3) a review of ALERT system maintenance procedures, and 4)
preparation of a final report with recommendations.
The existing ALERT system, installed in 1985, consisted of five
automated rain gauges, an automated weather station, a stream gauge, and a
computerized central station. Each automated station was equipped with a
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battery-operated radio transmitter to send reports to the central station. A
radio· repeater relayed signals from the monitoring station to the central
computer.
The rain gauges were the standard tipping-bucket type used in ALERT
systems; the buckets were sized to tip after 1 mm (0.04 inches) of rain had
been collected through the 12-inch diameter rain collection orifice. As the
bucket tipped and emptied its contents, a second bucket was positioned to
receive the next 1 mm of rain. When the second bucket tipped, the first
bucket returned to its original position to collect the next 1 mm increment.
Each tip turned on a battery operated radio transmitter to send the data to the
central computer. Rain gauges were located at Walker Basin, Back Canyon,
Tollgate Lookout, Tehachapi, and Orejano Canyon.
The weather station, located at Piute Peak, consisted of a tipping bucket
rain gauge and meteorological sensor suite that reported wind speed, wind
direction, temperature, relative humidity, and barometric pressure.
A single stream gauge was located on Caliente Creek approximately one
mile below the confluence of Tehachapi Creek and Caliente Creek. Stream
level was measured by a pressure transducer located in the stream bed, which
transmitted pressure readings to the central computer every 15 minutes.
Radio signals from the monitoring stations in the Caliente Creek
watershed were relayed to the central computer by a radio repeater located
near Breakenridge Camp. The central computer was located at the offices of
Kern County Communications Control 5, which maintained around-the-clock
operations.
Until 1995, the radio signals were also received at the local National
Weather Service (NWS) office. However, the National Weather Service
moved its local office to Hanford and no longer received these signals.
Although there is no definite timetable, the NWS plans to install the
necessary equipment to re-establish communications links with the Caliente
Creek ALERT System, and the data will be used to support NWS forecast
and warning operations.
The central computer at Control 5 consisted of a personal computer using
the National Weather Service's Hydromet software and the QNX Operating
System. The central computer radio receiver/decoder package received
signals relayed by the Breakenridge repeater, decoded the messages, checked
the data quality, and stored the resulting rain, weather, and stream information on the computer's hard disk.
The central computer continuously monitored the data to detect alarm
conditions such as high rainfall rates or high stream elevations. When
excessive rainfall or high water was detected, the computer sounded an
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alarm, notifying personnel at Control 5. Once alarm conditions were verified,
Control 5 personnel automatically initiated a Stage 1 Flood Response
according to the Caliente Creek Flood Response Plan.
Data from other ALERT gauges located in the area were also received by
the ALERT computer at Control 5, allowing Kern County officials to track
potential storms before they hit the Caliente Creek watershed. The ALERT
computer also allowed outside users to dial-in by telephone to access the raw
data and monitor developing conditions in the watershed. Engineering and
Survey Services (E&SS) personnel, the chief hydrological technical support
group for the Caliente Creek Flood Response Plan, was the principal outside
user. E&SS personnel used personal computers at their own offices or homes
to keep abreast of watershed conditions.

Site Review
Each field monitoring station, the central computer station at Control 5,
and the remote access terminal at Engineering and Survey Services were
visited and evaluated.
The rain gauge at Tehachapi (ALERT Station 1807, elevation 4,620 ft.)
is located in an open area protected on three sides by nearby low hills. The
fourth side opens on a shallow slope to the valley below. This location should
provide rainfall estimates that are fairly representative of the surrounding
areas. Although there were considerable bird droppings along the side of the
gauge, the gauge itself was in good condition. (Note: Accumulated bird
droppings are a common cause of plugged gauges.) The Tehachapi gauge was
battery operated and had no solar panel for recharging.
The rain gauge at the Tollgate Lookout Station (ALERT Station 1805,
elevation 5,460 ft.) is located at an abandoned mountaintop, forest fire
lookout station. This site is exposed to wind on all sides and is also exposed
to direct upslope winds on two sides. Because site elevation is 5,460 feet, the
site is subject to freezing temperatures and snow during colder winter storms,
and ALERT tipping bucket gauges are not intended to operate in snow and
freezing conditions. However, the gauge appeared to be in excellent physical
condition. The station operated on battery power only.
The rain gauge at Back Canyon (ALERT Station 1811, elevation 4,400
ft.) is located at a saddle point between two mountain peaks. The site is
exposed to wind as well as direct exposure to upslope winds from two sides.
The elevation of this site also yields freezing temperatures and snow in the
winter. The gauge appeared to be in excellent physical condition, and a solar
panel was present for battery charging.
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The rain gauge at Orejano Canyon (ALERT Station 1803, elevation 2,440
. ft.) is protected by low hills on all sides. Scattered trees near the gauge site
also help protect the gauge site. The physical condition of the gauging station
was good, although bird droppings were evident. A solar panel was present
for battery recharging.
Brush and hills protect the gauge site at Walker Basin (ALERT Station
1809, elevation 4,240 ft.) from wind on one side only. The remaining three
sides are highly exposed to wind from the west, south, and east. Snow and
freezing conditions are also possible at this site. The physical condition of the
gauging station was good. No evidence of bird droppings was present. The
station did not have a solar panel for battery recharging.
Brush and low hills relative to the gauge at Piute Peak (ALERT Station
1813, elevation 6,560 ft.) protect the gauge site well. In addition, the nearby
brush is a sufficient distance from the gauge and does not interfere with
gauge catch. The weather station included a tipping bucket rain gauge, a cup
anemometer to measure wind speed, a vane to measure wind direction, a
temperature sensor, a relative humidity sensor, and a barometric pressure
sensor. At elevation 6,560 ft., the Piute Peak tipping bucket rain gauge
experiences significant problems with snow and ice, although the physical
condition of the gauge is good. A solar panel recharges the battery.
Engineering and Survey Services staff reported that a new humidity sensor
is needed.
The Caliente Creek stream gauging station (ALERT Station 1800,
elevation 1, 180 ft.) is located approximately one mile downstream from the
confluence of Tehachapi Creek and Caliente Creek in a dense growth of
riparian brush and small trees. The stream bed is relatively stable and the
stream bank opposite the gauge is protected by gabions. Given streambed
conditions in and along Caliente Creek, this site is a relatively good location
for water measurements, although there is not an obvious hydraulic control
section nearby that could be used for rating curve development. The pressure
transducer is located in the streambed and subject to ongoing efforts to keep
the transducer from being covered with sediments. which can delay sensor
response times. This portion of the stream channel is in a deeply incised
narrow valley. Radio communications to the Breakemidge repeater site are
not reliable. The physical appearance of the gauge was good. A solar panel
was used to recharge the battery.
The central computer station is located at Kern County Communications
Control 5. The central station includes a receiving antenna, a radio receiver/decoder, a PC-compatible 386-class computer, a telephone modem
(1200 baud), a dot matrix printer, and a stand-by power supply. The central
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station computer equipment is located on a work desk in the main dispatch
area and is easily accessible. The equipment was clean and in good working
condition.
The remote access station was located at the Kern County Engineering and
Survey Services Department (E&SS). The station consists of a PC-compatible
486 class computer and a 14,400 baud modem. Dial-in access to the ALERT
central station is limited to 1200 baud due to the slow speed modem at
Control 5. Engineering and Survey Services personnel use the station to
monitor data collected by the ALERT central station at Control 5. The E&SS
staff made evaluations and decisions based on theoretical rating curves
developed for the Caliente Creek gauging location using HEC-2 and a library
of hydrologic modeling results from prior applications of HEC-l.

Findings
Rain Gauge Network
Perhaps the most notable finding for the Caliente Creek ALERT system
was that the rain gauge network was undersized. The Caliente Creek
watershed, which covered nearly 500 square miles in mountainous terrain,
was too large for six rain gauges to adequately represent rainfall for flood
warning. Annual rainfall ranging from 6 to 25 inches further indicated the
highly variable nature of rainfall in the basin.
Localized cloudbursts have also caused severe flooding. The existing
network of six gauges was even less capable of defining the volume of
rainfall entering the watershed for cloudburst conditions. The network was
just too sparse to identify local areas of heavy rainfall.
In addition, the effective size of the network was reduced due to the
location and type of gauges. Three of the sites were in locations that are
highly exposed to wind, affecting the rain gauge catch. Generally, rain gauge
catch is reduced by about 1 % per mile per hour of wind speed at the rain
gauge orifice. Winds in the range of 50 to 75 miles per hour or more are not
uncommon at unprotected locations and high elevations during severe winter
storms. Under these conditions, rain gauge measurements at Tollgate
Lookout, Back Canyon, and probably Walker Basin were not reliable.
An economic analysis of the Caliente Creek rain gauge network indicated
that a minimum network of 10 gauges would be needed to adequately
measure general rainfall events. Further, a network of 19 rain gauges would
be needed to cover cloudburst events. The analysis also indicated that even
a network of up to 24 rain gauges would be economically justified.
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Several of the gauge sites were at elevations higher than 4,000 feet.
Freezing conditions and snow create severe measurement problems for the
standard ALERT tipping bucket gauges. Frozen buckets cannot tip and/or
measure precipitation properly. Freezing rain can build up on the gauge walls
and orifice screens, making it unable to measure precipitation until the gauge
thaws or perhaps not at all if the precipitation sublimated before melting into
the tipping bucket. Similarly, snow can build up on the orifice screen at the
top of the gauge, freeze, and plug the gauge.
The Tehachapi, Tollgate Lookout, and Walker Basin gauges do not have
solar panels to recharge the data transmitter batteries, reducing the reliability
of these gauges and increasing the likelihood that one or more of them will
go out of service due to battery failure and further reduce the effective
network size.
All things considered, the Caliente Creek rain gauge network was
probably closer to three gauges than the original six, making reliable
assessments of developing watershed conditions even more difficult. It is
unlikely that Kern County's flood warning expectations have been met with
the existing rain gauge network. Furthermore, the mere existence of the flood
warning system in this state has bred a certain level of confidence and sense
of security in the community that is unwarranted given its inadequacies.
Stream Gauging

The single stream gauge on Caliente Creek is the bare minimum for a
watershed of this size. The gauge's effectiveness as a warning tool is limited
due to its location at the lower end of the watershed and the intermittent radio
communications from that site.
Maintenance and Gauge Calibration

Site inspections conducted during this audit revealed that the physical
elements of the gauge sites were well maintained. All of the gauges were in
good physical condition. The only noticeable physical problems noted were
nuisance bird droppings at two or three sites. However, the current
maintenance program is very limited. Until recently, maintenance personnel
responded only when a gauge went out of service; no routine or scheduled
preventative maintenance was performed. Now routine light maintenance is
carried out, including cleaning rain gauge screens, checking/replacing
batteries, and leveling the tipping bucket. Critical high level maintenance
functions such as gauge calibration or radio frequency alignment are not
performed.
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Central Computer Station
The flood warning system base station at Control 5 is a single computer
configuration. Now that the local NWS office has moved to Hanford and no
longer receives the radio signals from the flood warning system, a single
failure at the Control 5 base station could cause the entire flood warning
system to fail.
The National Weather Service Hydromet software package used on the
computer at Control 5 has limited remote access capabilities. This limits the
kinds of analysis, data displays, and reports that key remote users can
perform during flood emergencies. In addition, the 1200-baud modem at
Control 5 limits transmission speeds to less than 5-10% of those possible with
modems currently used by E&SS.
Remote Access Station at E&SS
The remote access station at E&SS consists of a PC, a 14.4k modem, with
a standard communications software package. Communications and analysis
capabilities are limited by software and hardware constraints at Control 5.

Recommendations
After a review of the audit, the following recommendations were offered:
• Expand to 10 gauges to meet minimum requirements for basin wide
general storms.
• Expand to 19 gauges to meet minimum requirements for cloud burst
events.
• Limit long-term expansion to 24 rain gauges.
• Move high exposure rain gauges to more representative sites.
• Add radio repeaters to improve radio communications.
• Add two or three addition stream gauges at upstream locations.
• Add another base station to increase system reliability and utility.
• Make E&SS responsible for system maintenance.
• Implement a program of routine preventative maintenance.
• Make flood warning system maintenance a budget line item to improve
visibility for this mission-critical service.
• Increase spare parts inventory.
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Summary
An audit of Kern County's Caliente Creek ALERT flood warning system
was performed. Each monitoring station in the system was visited and
evaluated. The base station operations at Control 5 and the remote access
station at Engineering & Survey Services were also reviewed.
The audit determined that the Caliente Creek ALERT flood warning
system was unlikely to meet the county's requirements for providing reliable
flood warning for downstream communities, including Arvin and Lamont.
The rain gauge network of six gauges was not sufficient to adequately
estimate the volume of rain falling on the Caliente Creek watershed for
reliable flood warning.
Recommendations included: increasing the number of monitoring stations
to meet minimum guidelines for flood warning systems, improving communications, and improving the system maintenance program. A detailed analysis
of the appropriate rain gauge network required for the Caliente Creek
watershed was performed. The analysis indicated that a minimum network of
lOrain gauges was needed for proper estimation of rainfall from general
basin-wide storms. A minimum network of 19 gauges was needed to properly
identify rainfall in cloud-burst situations. In addition, an economic analysis
of network size was also performed indicating that, based on potential
damages mitigated in downstream communities, the county could economically justify a network as large as 24 gauges.
Additional radio repeaters, spare parts, and a second computer base
station were recommended to improve system communications and reliability.
An improved maintenance program was recommended that included making
Engineering & Survey Services responsible for system operation and
maintenance with radio and electronics support from Kern County Communications. It was also proposed that the county make flood warning system
maintenance a budget line item as a mission critical function.
Capital cost estimates were provided for the minimum system upgrade to
10 rain gauges and the maximum system upgrade to 24 gauges. These
recommendations can serve as a multi-year master plan to upgrade the current
system.
The process of correction has begun. The department expects to take
several years before the system reliably meets the expectations of the
cooperative group that first funded its construction.
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EVOLUTION OF LOCAL
FLOOD WARNING SYSTEMS
AND EARLY NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
IN DENVER, COLORADO

Kevin G. Stewart
Urban Drainage and Flood Control District
Denver, Colorado

Introduction
An effective flood warning system design must include a flood threat
recognition system to detect and evaluate the threat as it develops and alert
local authorities concerning potential dangers. With the prediction/forecast
technical support in place, internal communications should be considered the
most important component of the flood warning system, but are often
identified as the weakest link when systems fail. By developing plans that
emphasize early notification procedures and communications, public safety
officials can take appropriate preparedness actions and involve additional
technical support personnel with warning decisions before flood damages or
deaths occur. The total flood warning system must also disseminate flood
warnings to the public. The success of the system will ultimately be judged
by the public's response to the warning, a realm over which local officials
have the least control.
This paper describes the flood warning system for Denver, Colorado, and
the surrounding region. The program's early notification procedures, custom
products, and supporting technology have evolved from 17 years of providing
flash flood predictions to emergency managers and public works agencies
within the Urban Drainage and Flood Control District (UDFCD). The
District (Figure 1) serves six county governments, including 30 cities and
towns, and operates one of the largest automated flood detection networks in
the United States. UDFCD also routinely conducts flash flood exercises and
training programs for those involved with preparing for and responding to
flood emergencies.
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Figure 1. General location map and flood detection network, Denver,
Colorado.

Background
During the late evening of July 31 and early morning hours of August 1,
1976, a disastrous flash flood cascaded out of the Big Thompson Canyon
between Estes Park and Loveland, Colorado, claiming 145 lives and causing
extensive property damage. Because this event occurred less than 50 km
north of the Denver/Boulder metropolitan area, the flood increased public
awareness of mountain flash flood dangers to an all-time high. For residents
of Boulder, Colorado, this near-miss was especially frightening because
Boulder Creek flows through the heart of the city and its canyon mouth is at
the city's western edge. Boulder Creek has long been considered Colorado's
most dangerous flash flood stream, with the highest potential for loss of life.
Very soon after the Big Thompson flood, the hazards research community
investigated the warning process used for Big Thompson, made projections
concerning the impact of a similar flood on Boulder Creek, and recommended the development of a local flood warning system with a meteorological support component tailored for Boulder. The District's Flash Flood
Prediction Program (F2P2) was created in 1979 in response to this research.
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This program uses a private meteorological service to provid~ early
. notifications to the Boulder Regional Communications Center and other 24hour emergency contact points concerning flash flood potentials. The F2P2
focuses specifically on flood problems and functions in close cooperation with
the National Weather Service (NWS) Weather Forecast Office in Denver.
The success of F2P2 is attributed to the direct involvement and commitment of many local government officials. Each year the UDFCD Board of
Directors, comprising 15 locally elected officials and two appointed
engineers, commits funds for continued meteorological support, acquisition
of real-time weather data, and equipment maintenance. UDFCD staff
coordinates with the various flood response agencies and volunteer organizations and routinely seeks input from those most closely involved with field
operations in an effort to continually improve services.

Flood Warning Plan Development
A written plan is a critical component of a local flood warning program.
UDFCD developed its first basin-specific flood warning plan in 1977. Since
then, this drainage basin planning approach has been used to develop a total
of seven plans, including the one for Boulder Creek. All UDFCD-supported
plans are reviewed, updated, and exercised annually. Problem area identification and decision aid development are important first steps in preparing an
effective flood warning plan. Special efforts are made to insure that accurate,
timely and understandable communications occur both before and during a
flood emergency. With special emphasis on communications, the opportunity
for a successful emergency response is greatly enhanced.
Flood warning plans address the three basic elements of early detection
and evaluation, warning dissemination, and response. Experience and
research have shown that reliable heavy precipitation forecasts and predictions of flood potential are necessary to prompt early preparedness actions by
public safety officials. Additional technical support personnel (engineers and
hydrologists) can also be called to an increased state-of-readiness based on
the early meteorological information, well before a public flood warning is
needed.
The response component is viewed from two perspectives: 1) the preemergency or proactive response of technical personnel and public safety
officials, and 2) the public response to the warning. Although flood warning
plans cannot completely address or control the public response, knowledge
of human behavior is considered when planning how to issue flood warnings
and to conduct emergency field operations.
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Flood Warning Dissemination Procedures
As stated previously, the F2P2 works in close cooperation with the NWS
and many local government agencies. It is important to understand that the
NWS and local governments are ultimately responsible for warning the
public, and UDFCD's role is to provide technical support to aid in that
decision. The electronic news media (local television and radio) are the
primary vehicles for warning the public, but other methods such as NOAA
Weather Radio, fixed-location public address/siren systems, cable television
audio interrupts, emergency vehicle loudspeakers, and door-to-door
notifications are also used.
Written agreements and internal operating guidelines define individual
responsibilities and prescribe how coordination should occur. For example,
the NWS has written procedures describing how forecasters will coordinate
with the F2P2 meteorologist. UDFCD input was obtained by the NWS in
developing their procedures. Similarly, procedures used by UDFCD were
developed from recommendations provided by the NWS and local government partners.
F2P2 message dissemination may be categorized in two ways; 1) early
internal notification of flash flood potential and 2) internal notification of
flash flood watches and warnings. The second category typically involves a
NWS decision to issue a public watch or warning statement. The F2P2
meteorologist is only responsible for contacting affected local authorities and
providing a more detailed interpretation. Therefore, F2P2 dissemination of
watches and warnings are still considered internal to the program.
With regard to flash flood watches and warnings (Le., Message 2 and
Message 3), two possibilities exist. The first case involves a decision by the
NWS to issue either a watch or warning. Coordination between F2P2 and
NWS meteorologists normally occurs before the information is released for
public broadcast. The F2P2 meteorologist responds by immediately notifying
affected emergency communications centers and passing along any additional
information or recommendations pertinent to local authorities (e.g.,
anticipated flood problems, specific geographic areas and streams affected,
estimated severity and probability of occurrence, predicted precipitation
amounts, available field observations, etc.). Once notified, each contact
relays the message according to their internal procedures. This action initiates
the mobilization of appropriate field resources and key personnel from
various response agencies. Each agency has their own emergency plan to
follow. The F2P2 meteorologist has the opportunity to concur or disagree
with the NWS decision, but must issue the appropriate message.
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The second case occurs when the F2P2 meteorologist decides to issue a
Message 2 or 3 (flash flood watch or warning equivalent) without NWS
concurrence. The same procedure described for the first case is followed and
coordination with the NWS is required. Strict technical criteria have been
established for when this type of action is warranted. In reality, it is very
unlikely that a unilateral F2P2 flood warning (Message 3) would ever be
issued; this has never happened. However, the flexibility to do so has been
requested by local emergency managers since they are ultimately responsible
for public warning decisions within their jurisdictions.
The internal alert (Message I) is by far the most common F2P2 message
disseminated and might best be classified as a flood potential advisory.
Rainfall amounts meeting M-I criteria would likely cause only minor flood
problems and represent a low to moderate threat to life and property. The
F2P2 meteorologist is solely responsible for the decision to issue Message Is.
The NWS is notified and may choose to issue their own public statement in
response. It is important to note that M-Is are not intended for public
dissemination, but are used to inform local authorities of the potential for
flood problems later in the day and to keep them advised regarding the status
of the threat. Between 20 and 30 M-Is are issued every year and special care
is taken to identify priority messages so that unnecessary communications do
not occur. This assures relatively frequent contact with local officials and
helps maintain high degrees of confidence in the program. When a communication problem occurs, the opportunity exists to immediately resolve the
problem in a manner that best serves the local government.
Internal communications and message dissemination procedures for a
single local or regional authority can be quite complex and inVOlve many
contacts, as illustrated in Figure 2. Clear, concise communication must be
used by technical personnel responsible for disseminating flood predictions
and other related information to local decision-makers. Technical jargon
should be avoided as much as possible. Key phrases like "red flag" or some
other appropriate "wake-up" message can be very effective at prompting the
desired emergency or pre-emergency response. Emergency management
professionals in the Denver area have provided valuable assistance over the
years by recommending changes addressing how and when F2P2 meteorologists communicate with emergency dispatchers. When the time comes, we
believe that our continued emphasis on communications will improve our
chances for a successful flood response.

138

EVOLUTION OF FwOD WARNINGS SYSTEMS IN DENVER

Figure 2. Urban Drainage and Flood Control District
Flash Flood Prediction Program (F2p2) Weather Message
Dissemination [Jefferson County, Colorado]
r - - Adams County

I--- Arapahoe County

I--- Boulder County

I--- Denver City and

County

*PMS

I--- Douglas County

I---

Jefferson County -

City of Arvada
I--- City of Lakewood
City of Wheat
Ridge

' - - City of Aurora

Emergency Management
Headquarters Supervisor
All Sheriffs Patrol Units
Arvada Police
Broomfield Police
Edgewater Police
Golden Police and Fire
Lakeside Police and Fire
Lakewood Police
Littleton Police and Fire
Morrison Police
Mountain View Police
Westminster Police & Fire
Wheat Ridge Police & Fire
Arvada Fire
Coal Creek Fire
Edgewater Fire
Elk Creek Fire
Evergreen Fire
Fairmount Fire
Genessee Fire
Golden Gate Fire
Idledale Fire
Indian Hills Fire
Inter-Canyon Fire
West Metro Fire
Lookout Mountain Fire
Mount Vernon Fire
North Fork Fire
Pleasant View Fire
Trumbull Fire
Rocky Flats
Consolidated Mutual Water Co.
Colorado State Patrol
CCIC Computer (Colorado DPS)

*Private Meteorological Service

NOTE:
The above represents a typical F2P2 message fan-out for the
Jefferson County Enhanced 911 Communications Center. Subsequent message
relays within Jefferson County are unknown.
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Conclusions
For flood warning programs to be effective in protecting lives and property,
a proper perspective must be maintained by those responsible for evaluating and
detecting threatening conditions. Communication barriers must be eliminated by
avoiding excessive use of technical terms and codes. Standardized messages are
needed to insure consistent information.
Judgments must be made by local officials on when and how to disseminate
public warnings. Decision-makers must be willing to risk false alarms by
recognizing that delayed warnings may cost lives. Specific responses can be
targeted to known problem areas if reliable predictions andconfmning reports are
conveyed to the appropriate officials in a timely manner.
Those involved with local flood warning operations must anticipate public
response and understand that people tend to seek confirmation before perceiving
personal danger. Therefore, actions like barricading flooded road crossings must
occur before a motorist or pedestrian makes the wrong choice. Police and other
public safety officials need to know the locations of hazardous stream crossings
and other problem areas. Floodplain residents must also be warned ani may need
to be evacuated. While meteorologists and hydrologists strive for"accurate" flood
predictions and increased lead times, equal or greater importance needs to be
placed on recognizing when initial actions should be taken to prepare for a
possible flood and where to target emergency field resources.
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Introduction
Institutional change within emergency management over the last decade
has been inexorable: moving at a rapid pace toward greater cooperation
among the various emergency services and engagement with other stakeholders and toward broadening mandates away from simply response. These
changes have been driven by the needs for improved effectiveness of service
delivery and improved efficiency by delivering these services at lower
costs-or at least by demonstrating that they are cost-effective. To a
significant extent, these changes reflect broader changes in the approach to
government, greater public scrutiny and expectations, greater self-criticism,
and the influence of trends overseas. The institutional evolution has also made
the emergency management system more open to change and learning. Major
emergencies and the political demands for action they stimulate also provide
opportunities for achieving change. However, to be sustainable, changes must
generally occur in the culture of the relevant organizations; that is, in the way
they habitually do things.
These changes have also affected the institutional arrangements governing
flood warnings in Australia. After a decade of uncertainty over responsibility
for warnings, during which there was no new investment in warning systems,
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a compromise was reached. The Australian government clarified and
reasserted the Bureau of Meteorology's primary role in flood warnings, after
which the Bureau committed itself to warning system upgrading. The states
agreed to contribute funds to this effort.
As part of the upgrading process, the Bureau sought increased involvement of various state-based agencies. An important initiative here was the
establishment of Flood Warning Consultative Committees (FWCCs) in each
state and territory in 1989 and 1990. These were set up by the Bureau to
guide the expansion of the Bureau's warning system with advice from
agencies with potential data inputs and from agencies representing users of
the service. In addition to the Bureau, members included representatives from
water authorities, emergency service organizations, and local government
who focussed on improving the accuracy and timeliness of forecasts by the
flood warning centres operated by the Bureau in each state.
Almost simultaneously, however, severe flooding in eastern Australia led
to a demand for re-evaluation of how warnings were issued, resulting in the
production of a "best-practice" warning guide (EMA, 1995) that also reflected
the evolutionary changes occurring in Australia's emergency management
institutions. This paper explores the process by which lasting changes to flood
warning system design and operation have been sought through the creation
of this guide. The authors were members of the team that developed the
guide.

Developing Effective Flood Warning Systems
Modern technology has led to substantial increases in data and forecasting
reliability and, in some cases, to warning lead time. However, although very
important, such changes are relatively easy to implement and do not by
themselves improve flood warning systems. Thus, the ultimate goals must be
improving safety for those at risk and reducing flood losses.
Achieving the necessary changes may pose both conceptual and practical
challenges for the organizations involved. Conceptually, organizations need
to broaden their perspective and see their contributions in terms of the overall
objective rather than their component of it-to shift toward benchmarking by
performance of the total system, rather than its component parts. This "total
system" includes those at risk, and, in order to be effective, must incorporate
the processes of review and learning. Practically, operational interaction
between the various organizations needs to become "seamless."
The Guide contains the following definition (p. 5):
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A total flood warning system integrates flood prediction, the assessment of
likely flood effects, the dissemination of warning information, the response of
agencies and the public in the threatened community, and review and
improvement. These components must operate together for sound flood
warning performance to be achieved.

Critical to the total system is how the various components function together
to serve the system: "to empower individuals and communities to respond
appropriately to a threat in order to reduce the risk of death, injury, property
loss and damage" (Bureau of Meteorology and Australian Emergency
Management Institute, 1993). Critical concepts include: integration,
cooperation, shared responsibility, and thinking broadly about problems. In
practical terms these translate into, for example, the inclusion of all relevant
organizations, integration with floodplain management activities and
emergency management activities, ownership by all organizations involved,
and cooperative work with others to improve operation.

Substance and Process
Guidelines or manuals of practice for emergency management abound.
They are easy enough to produce, but are of little value unless enthusiastically adopted and used by both planning and operational staff. Thus, success
in substantially improving flood warning systems requires more than a sound
document, although the document-the substance of the guidelines-is very
important. Although it is also relatively easy to construct in a technical sense,
it is much more difficult to ensure that the guidelines capture the detailed
requirements of those expected to implement them, giving the document its
essential credibility and legitimacy. The production of guidelines cannot be
seen as the end of the process either; the institutions involved need to create
a learning environment for continuing evolution and improvement.
We suggest four components to lasting change in flood warnings:
1) the institutional context must recognize the need for continuous change
and accommodate it;
2) the process used to develop the guidelines, to ensure ownership;
3) the document containing the guidelines; and
4) the process to ensure acceptance and continuing development.
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The Process
The formal process leading to the final document took over three years,
but this is definitely not the end point. Embedding, that is, ensuring that
change is permanent and improvement continues, may take another few
years. The first steps below describe the development of a national consensus
that a document was necessary to guide change in flood warning system
design and operation. Then, once writing began, the challenge changed to
keeping the key players involved.
In April 1990, the three mainland states of eastern Australia experienced
extensive, severe flooding. In particular, the unsuccessful struggle to prevent
flooding in the remote town of Nyngan (population 2,500), and its wholesale
evacuation by helicopter after its levees were breached, were major media
and political events. Much of the blame was placed on inadequate warnings,
and even though far from a flash flood, what happened in Nyngan helped put
warnings on top of the post-flood action agenda.
Emergency Management Australia (EMA), the Australian equivalent to
the U.S. 's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), took the first
formal step in the process by convening a national conference to consider
what could be learned from the 1990 floods. The 50 participants at this
meeting represented the state and territory FWCCs and members of the
broader flood warning community, including media and research interests.
Participants identified flood warnings as an area in need of detailed examination, and the 1991 workshop on flood warnings followed. This workshop
called for the production of some "best practice" guidelines. Following the
call, the workshop working group (or steering committee) was directed to
produce a report of the meeting, along with some normative material. The
results were circulated for comment among workshop participants, and it
became clear that something different was required.
This feedback led to the decision to produce a handbook or manual on the
best flood warning practices. A subgroup of the original working party took
on this task; they were given some resources for meetings by AEMI
(Australian Emergency Management Institute, the training alm of EMA) and
retained the backing of the participants at the 1991 workshop. Although the
establishment of a stable team to guide the process, collate material, and draft
the guidelines was informal and evolutionary, it enabled completion of the
task and ensured broader ownership than would be possible with one
individual. The "team" informally represented the Bureau of Meteorology, the
state emergency services, Emergency Management Australia, and research
interests. The practitioners were senior people with the unambiguous backing
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of their organizations, and the group composition provided a good balance
between experience and stakeholders as well as practitioner interests and
critical outside evaluations.
Document production was a long iterative process among members of the
writing group and their personal networks; between them and (some of) the
original workshop participants, and a loose reference group of people in the
broader warning and emergency management profession. All this helped
maintain wider group interest and commitment, kept the FWCCs involved,
and helped direct the style toward the guidelines' audience-practitioners,
including volunteer state emergency service (SES) staff, police, and local
government officials.
Once a draft of the document was produced, we also circulated it to a few
nonspecialists for comment on writing style and level. They felt that sections
were difficult for a nonspecialist to comprehend and included other comments
on contents and structure. Consequently, we tried to make the text more userfriendly and easier to read, and inserted summaries of the key points in each
chapter. These are in question and answer format and enable the Guide to be
examined in full at a summary level.
Eventually, after further detailed review by our informal extended
reference group, we felt the document was complete. It was sent formally to
all FWCCs to seek their endorsement, and the draft document was endorsed
by all FWCCs and by EMA. However, we did not stop there, but continued
to seek high level endorsement from the relevant organizations. In addition,
although we had worked with a reasonably wide range of people throughout
the long process of document preparation, most "rank and file" members of
state and territory emergency planning and response organizations were
largely unaware of the process. The next stage, therefore, was to have the
material accepted by operational staff, who are critical in delivering warnings
at the community level.

The Document
Flood Warning: An Australian Guide
The aim underlying the call of the 1991 flood warning workshop for
national guidelines was to develop a clearer understanding of the flood
warning task among practitioners by defining best practice in the field and
indicating how it can be approached in different environments (see Table 1).
A crucial part of this understanding is the concept of a "total flood warning
system" into which the myriad tasks carried out (usually) by a number of
organizations must be incorporated. Another important notion is that

146

EFFECTIVE FLOOD WARNING SYSTEMS IN AUSTRALIA

practitioners need to plan their approach beforehand (Chapters 7 and 8) in
order to apply the most appropriate warning strategies for their own area
given the nature of their particular flood hazard (e.g., speed of onset and area
of potential inundation) and the nature of the community (demographics, in
the broad sense).
Planning and maintaining the system are time consuming tasks. That said,
general principles must also be inculcated. For example, warnings should add
value to (i.e., be more than merely) height predictions, give advice consonant
with the nature of the threat and its likely impacts, communicate in ways that
can be understood, and use appropriate "layers" of dissemination techniques.
While many of these elements involve investments of time and money, a
substantial number are nontechnical and inexpensive to implement; for
example the identification of tasks and procedures.
Many of these matters, if not all, involve ongoing activities characterized
by liaison with communities at risk and other organizations in the flood
warning system. Self criticism and reflection are also required to ensure that
performance is evaluated honestly-a prerequisite to instituting effective
change.

Table 1. Guide Contents: Chapter Titles and Selected
Subheadings
1) The place and purpose of effective flood warning
2) The total flood warning system (including public education and
extreme events)
3) Flood prediction (including user requirements and "informal"
prediction systems)
4) The interpretation of flood predictions (including adding meaning and
information requirements)
5) The design of warning messages (including understanding the flood,
the communities, and message design)
6) The communication of flood warnings (including types of warnings
and dissemination, and the informal "system")
7) System review and improvement
8) Conclusions
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Embedding the Ideas
Production of the Guide and its widespread acceptance by senior
management are important factors in full implementation. By themselves,
though, they do not necessarily mean that the Guide will find its way into
practice, or that the necessary changes will become permanent features of
flood warning practice. It is just as important that operational staff support the
Guide and implement it.
EMA made resources available to hold workshops around Australia
(except for the states of Tasmania and Victoria) to explain and discuss the
Guide. These half-day workshops involved the Bureau, police, state
emergency service staff, volunteers, and so on. Workshops walked participants through the Guide, and small group exercises helped participants
examine the local context.
Although the seed has been sown, more workshops are needed, and that
will be the job of the FWCC/SES in each state. In New South Wales the
Guide has been "workshopped" at SES conferences around the state. The
state's 18 emergency management divisions are discussing flood exercises
and routinely spend a day defining the warning task and reiterating the
principles, goals, and methods.
Post-flood debriefing should also occur in order to break the old warning
mindsets: that warnings are only about "postboxing the Bureau's flood height
predictions," and that all that is needed is general information provided over
local radio stations. Debriefings should also be used to encourage SES
staff-who are volunteers-to focus on using and building up "flood intelligence cards" (which identify the local consequences of flooding at various
heights), appropriate dissemination modes, layered warnings, and so on as set
out in the Guide.
Institutional Change: High Level Support For The Guide

A recent evaluation showed that flood-related agencies welcomed the work
of the FWCCs (Bureau of Meteorology, 1995) and generally agreed th3:t the
committees have encouraged a greater level of cooperation between the
various flood warning-related agencies. The FWCCs have provided a new
forum and achieved more than simply advising the Bureau about its
investments. In essence, the committees helped build an understanding of the
multi-agency role of flood warning and educated personnel about their roles
in the warning process.
Nevertheless, the review suggested that the committees' terms of
reference be broadened to "cover the performance of all aspects of flood
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warning procedures" (BoM, 1995: v). This change has been accepted by the
Bureau of Meteorology and takes the FWCCs well beyond the role of merely
buttressing the predictive process-which is what the Bureau originally set
them up to do. Following this review, the director general of EMA has
reached agreement with the director of the Bureau of Meteorology that the
new role of the FWCCs should include encouraging the notion of "best
practice" and monitoring progress toward higher quality flood warnings,
using Flood Warnings: An Australian Guide as the basis.

Conclusions
Putting effective flood warning systems in place in Australia is a matter
of evolutionary institutional change, creating the right context for rapid or
substantial changes following severe flooding. The institutional context
enables opportunities to be taken, and importantly allows for "embedding"
and permanent change. The changes necessary for effective flood warning
systems cannot be seen as single events-they require ongoing constant
attention; hence, the need for the right institutional framework. Of course,
this framework itself must be flexible and adaptive to changing circumstances
and ever ready to take advantage of opportunities. The development of
learning organizations and a supportive institutional environment is (or at
least should be) provided by the FWCCs. The training arm of EMA, AEMI,
should help to provide the learning environment and act as a key mediator
between research/best practice and ordinary practice.
The Australian guidelines had their impetus in serious flooding, but the
necessary institutional environment was already in place. The key factor in
developing the Guide with a high degree of ownership by those in the flood
warning business was the use of a long iterative process that was as inclusive
as possible. Once the Guide was developed and endorsed by the peak flood
warning body in each jurisdiction, the FWCCs, attention turned to how to
ensure the process continued. In this the FWCCs were the key. Support from
the highest levelled to a change in the mandate of the committees (which was
occurring anyway) and to them taking on the task of encouraging and
monitoring the implementation of the Guide. The document containing the
Guide is now universally and correctly seen as only part of the broader
picture of achieving change.
How would we characterise the factors underlying what, so far at least,
appears to be a successful process? It is difficult to argue that anyone factor
is more significant than others, but we can identify a number of important
elements. The process was open and transparent; we tried to be inclusive and
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proactive about encouraging input and comments from a wide diversity of
perspectives. The writing "team" had credibility among the Australian flood
warning industry and brought a mixture of writing skills, expertise, relevant
networks (for example, one member of the team was a member of all state
FWCCs and a senior member of the national flood prediction agency), critical
perspectives, and independence. The fact that the team members were senior
people in their fields and had the unambiguous backing of their agency heads
.
meant that they could provide leadership and give the task priority.
However, these factors are mostly under the control of those guiding
document production. The organizations in the flood warning process must
support the activity and need to be seeking, or at least open to, change and
improvement. This is much more of a challenge than it sounds, as the sort of
change required may involve fundamental changes to the organizational
culture and priorities: in particular to move from technical factors to consider
community expectations. Similarly, the organizations must be open to active
participation and acceptance of ownership of the process and product-and
interested in its continuation.
In view of the three years it took to prepare the guidelines, an obvious
question is whether they could be prepared in less time. There is no doubt
that they could have been. But even if the writing group always gave the task
top priority, in an interactive inclusive process the pace is inevitably dictated
by others who will see it as a lower priority than dealing with immediate
problems. Rushing may result in half-hearted input and therefore low
commitment by these individuals and their organisations. It is likely that
proper planning involving the relevant stakeholders is an inherently slow
process. Thoroughness is vital, and planning must be slow and involve
continuous reinforcement and repetition to effect change at the practitioner
level. Another way of viewing planning time is to see it as a permanent
unceasing commitment. It would be possible to draw up a set of guidelines
by having an intensive meeting for several days, but this would not allow the
necessary time for reflection, and to ensure resilience in the face of constantly
changing institutional and political priorities.
What does need to be said here is that instituting change at a level of the
local practitioner is difficult given that flooding is relatively rare at the grass
roots. The natural tendency is for people to do the basic minimum that they
remember from long ago, and it takes a sensitive form of intervention for
additional or innovative practices to be introduced. Note too that most of the
operational flood-response work in Australia is done by volunteers or people
who don't breathe the flood game every day of their working lives.
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Abstract
In this paper the main characteristics and damages and some rainfall and
flow data are presented for the localities that have been most affected by flash
floods in Mexico. Some conclusions are derived.

Introduction
Flash floods mostly occur in the northwestern part of Mexico. This region
is characterized as semiarid. Streams flow intermittently, with long periods
without any discharge; the area has scarce vegetation and its catchments are
relatively small, with steep slopes, an erosion-susceptible surface, and high
elevations. In this zone, intense floods of rather short duration have taken
lives and caused economic losses. Flash floods occur due to cold fronts,
cyclones, and sometimes to meteorological phenomena that are difficult to
predict.
In semiarid regions, towns and cities are usually founded upon the flood
plain. If there is not enough water-carrying capacity in rivers, damage can
increase. For this reason, it is understandable why disastrous events occur in
these regions, as in Los Cabos, State of Baja California Sur in November
1993, where a flash flood caused $63 million in damage, or in 1976 when EI
Cajoncito Stream flooded the city of La Paz, in the same state, causing the
largest number of deaths by floods ever registered in the history of Mexico.
This paper describes in some detail several of the most important flash
flood events in Mexico that have caused considerable damage. Some
conclusions are presented.
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Important Flash Flood Events
Floods in La Paz, BCS, in September 1976

The city of La Paz, capital of the state of Baja California Sur, is
periodically subjected to floods due to the overflowing of EI Cajoncito and
EI Piojillo streams. In order to divert EI Cajoncito flow into EI Piojillo
stream, some protection works were constructed, encouraging human
settlements along a stretch of EI Cajoncito. On September 30, 1976,
Hurricane Liza generated heavy rains that caused the collapse of a 6-meterhigh dike that acted as a small dam and was used to protect the urban area
inside the dry riverbed. With its collapse, a big flood occurred downstream
and caused the greatest number of deaths ever recorded due to floods in
Mexico.
The city of La Paz is surrounded by the La Laguna Sierra in the southern
part, with elevations of 1,250 meters. Near the city, there is a group of seven
low hills.
When cyclones occur, the steep slopes of EI Cajoncito and EI Piojillo
streams turn the streams into a wild torrent of water and, therefore, the high
speed current causes an intense particle transport mostly originated by strong
weathering processes of the rock (granite) of the La Laguna Sierra. Most of
the material in suspension is deposited along the banks in the city because
here the EI Cajoncito river bed slope diminishes.
The rainfall recorded at EI Cajoncito climatological station on September
30 was 180 mm. The rain caused a flow rate of 950 m3/s with an approximate
duration of 7.5 hours. These data were calculated by indirect methods
because at that time there were no hydrometeorological stations near or in the
basin.
On September 30, 1976, Liza's destructive effects were felt in the city in
the afternoon (3:30 p.m. approximately), with winds reaching 150 lcm/h,
tearing trees, posts, and billboards and leaving the city with no electricity or
drinking water (El Heraldo newspaper, October 4, 1976). At approximately
7:30 p.m., the strong current and the large volume of water carried by EI
Cajoncito stream caused the collapse of a dike. The rupture released a water
avalanche of almost 2 meters in height over four poor neighborhoods, where
most of the houses were built out of wood and cardboard.
The wave carried away people, vehicles, houses, and trees and buried
them under large volumes of sand almost two meters deep. A stretch of 2.3
x 5 lcm, in which almost 2,000 persons lived, was converted again into the
natural river channel (El Heraldo newspaper, October 6, 1976).
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Even though the official death toll was about 600, it is possible that more
than 1,000 people were killed. Material damages reached $3 million as of
1976, and between 10,000 and 12,000 people were left homeless (Avante
newspaper, La Paz, BCS, October 7, 1976).

Floods in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, in September 1988
From September 14 to 17,1988, Mexico was battered by Gilbert-one of
the strongest hurricanes in its history. It first struck the northern part of the
Yucatan Peninsula, then moved through the Gulf of Mexico, and finally
reached the coast of the state of Tamaulipas, where it began to weaken as it
moved inland. The total duration of hurricane Gilbert was five days.
Most of the accumulated rainfall caused by Hurricane Gilbert was
concentrated in the northeastern region. Over the city of Monterrey and its
surrounding area, there were heavy rains reaching over 200 mm during
September 15 and 16. The maximum rainfall recorded was 370 mm. The
major impact occurred early in the morning of September 17, when Gilbert
struck the Sierra Madre Occidental with hurricane wind velocities over 150
km/h (Absalon, 1989). Heavy floods were generated in the main rivers that
cross the states of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. The maximum
recorded flows in some affected currents are indicated in Table 1 (Rosengaus,
1989).
Table 1. Maximum Flows Recorded In Some Affected Currents
RIVER

STATION

AREA
(km2)

Santa Catarina

Puente Zaragoza

1333

1900

178

San Juan

Tepehuajes

3594

5880

2302

Pesqueria

Los Herrera

20023

900

1317

Potosi

Cabezones

1166

6900

1128

GILBERT FLOW HISTORIC
(m3/s)
FLOW
(m3/s)

Heavy rainfall and floods generated by Gilbert in rivers and streams cost
human losses; destruction of houses, roads, fords, dams, irrigating channels,
and public utilities. Among the most affected zones, the metropolitan area of
Monterrey, which is located in the surroundings of the channel that carries
the Santa Catarina River to its confluence with the San Juan River. The day
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of the event, this river-almost always dry and lifeless-recorded a flood of
2,000

m3/s .

Along the Santa Catarina River and in some other rivers mentioned in
Table 1, there are frequent and extensive irregular human settlements. The
phenomenon destroyed more than 10,000 houses of these makeshift
structures. The street works that run along both banks of the Santa Catarina
River were partly destroyed, and some vehicles and four passenger buses
were swept away by the strong current and buried under several meters of
mud. The roads that were near the overflowing rivers were covered by mud
almost 1.5 m deep. In the state of Nuevo Leon, damage was assessed at
$85.8 million as of 1988.
It is hard to define the death toll, due to several factors: the explosive
proliferation of human settlements of marginal classes (particularly families
with many children); the lack of information about the number of people
traveling in cars and buses along the Santa Catarina River; the number of
people trapped by the current; and the number of people who were able to
escape. It is estimated that about 200 people died.
Most of the deaths were the result of imprudence, because victims tried
to cross the Santa Catarina River in Monterrey using fords that cross the
riverbed; approximately 80 % of the death toll is attributed to these attempts.
This is a dramatic example of what the lack of a disaster culture represents,
among the people and authorities of low level, which, in this instance, make
decisions that can be a matter of life or death.
Floods in Los Cabos, RCS, in November 1993
During November 3, 4, and 5, 1993, unusual storms of extraordinary
intensity occurred in the highlands near San Jose del Cabo and Cabo San
Lucas in the State of Baja California Sur, catching its 50,000 inhabitants
unaware. The storms caused three deaths (Excelsior newspaper, November
5, 1993), affected 10,000 people (most of them in San Jose del Cabo), caused
damage of more than $63.4 million as of 1993 and the partial or total
interruption of daily activities. Table 2 shows a summary of the reported
damage.
It is estimated that the storm brought 632 mm of rain in 24 hours. This is
three times higher than the mean annual rainfall and twice the highest rainfall
recorded (317 mm in 1941). The meteorological origin of the heavy rains that
affected Los Cabos region in November 1993 is uncertain because the rain
was not caused by a hurricane nor a cold front, but rather by a disorganized
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Table 2. Damage Caused in San Jose del Cabo and Cabo San
Lucas (Los Cabos Region)
AFFECTED STRUCTURES

DAMAGE CAUSED

Communication Facilities

One third of the Airport-Cabo San
Lucas road was destroyed

Houses

About eight neighborhoods in San
Jose del Cabo and Cabo San
Lucas were buried in sand. Walls
of several houses collapsed.

Businesses

Buried in sand.

Public Services

50,000 inhabitants of Los Cabos
were left with no drinking water,
communication by land or air,
electricity, telephone, and wastewater treatment systems. Streets
were washed away.

Infrastructure

Two bridges collapsed. 40 stretches of water mains broke. Operations were interrupted at Cabo San
Lucas International Airport. Collapse of tourist activities. Ports
were closed, several vessels sank.

Agriculture

Economic losses were about $1.6
million as of 1993.

disturbance of low pressure combined with a winter system. Also, the storm
had a very local presence and was short lived.
On the other hand, the water flow carried away large volumes of sand that
formed between 1.5 and 2 meters of deposits. The flood buried cars and
properties that had been constructed at the banks and on the bed of the rivers.
As a result of seafront tourist development in Baja California Sur and the
presence of considerable high mountain chains near the sea, most of the
population centers are located on floodplains and, in many cases, on
riverbeds, with no protection against floods. Considering the interference of
road infrastructure with water drainage; the lack of a minimum sewage
infrastructure for pluvial waters in the localities; poor urban growth planning,
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and the presence of irregular settlements and more permanent neighborhoods
on the beds and banks of the rivers, events like the one of November 1993
are likely to happen.

Floods in Tijuana, Be, in January 1993
Between January 6 and 7 of 1993, there was a 100 mm rainfall in the city
of Tijuana, state of Baja California, in less than four hours, causing more
than 20 deaths and substantial damage and leaving more than 10,000 people
homeless. Due to this storm, the city, with a little more than a million
inhabitants, was totally paralyzed on January 7 and part of the following day
(Excelsior newspaper, January 11, 1993).
The heaviest precipitation occurred on the 6th and 7th; however, there
were uninterrupted rains during the next 14 days that surpassed the maximum
levels of pluvial precipitation over the last 30 years. This situation caused
chaos in Tijuana. Due to the major storm of January 6 and related floods, 32
neighborhoods were affected. Rains occurred due to a polar front that caused
damage mainly in Tecate, Mexicali, and Ensenada, and particularly in
Tijuana. The Tijuana and Tecate rivers, as well as the Alamar, El Carrizo,
and Matanuco streams overflowed, covering everything in their path with
mud.
Damage in Tijuana were estimated to be near $31.7 million as of 1993.
The flooding caused interruptions in drinking water and electricity supplies;
subsidence of the ground as much as six meters in four locations in the city
(due to saturated soils), as well as landslides on hillsides. Several houses and
walls collapsed because of soil softening, and in several places water and mud
accumulated inside houses, stores, and on streets. Roads and bridges also
failed and collapsed.
This natural disaster could have caused less damages and loss of life. The
damage increased because Tijuana lacks proper urban infrastructure, as well
as adequate land use planning for urban growth. Most of the people affected
by the storm that hit Tijuana lived on the slopes of hills, canyons, and
gulches, brooks; and even on riverbeds. About 10,000 families "live" in
wood, cardboard, and sometimes in adobe houses on the soil floor. These
zones were initially irregular settlements that belong to Tijuana's riverbed.
Later on, state properties on hills and rivers were regularized without
considering the possibility of landslides or floods. Here, inhabitants do not
have access to regular community services (e.g., electricity, sewage,
pavement, law enforcement, and security services).
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As of January 17 (after more than one week of rains), official reports
indicated that there were more than 25 deaths, 10,000 homeless, dozens of
injured people, collapsed houses and walls, neighborhoods and towns with no
communication, floods, and chaos.
This case is a clear example of the lack of experience regarding disaster
management and disaster culture among the population and authorities, which
is reflected on the urban infrastructure and mainly occurs in provincial cities
where the federal budget is small and, therefore, limits the planning of urban
development and the construction of an adequate infrastructure to withstand
these phenomena.

Conclusions
Flash floods occur in some regions of the Mexican countryside. When
they happen in semiarid zones, they can cause severe damage as well as
human and material losses.
Damage can increase due to the irregular growth of cities and localities
that leads poor people to settle in high-risk zones, with no control by
authorities. When authorities finally become aware of such settlements, these
communities have already been converted into real neighborhoods that have
to be regularized, with no preventive measures. Another important aspect is
the ignorance of people and authorities about the hazards to which they are
exposed. Similarly, sometimes poverty is so pervasive that people do not
leave their homes, even though they are aware of the danger-they have no
other place to go.
On the other hand, hydraulic works built to protect against floods
sometimes are not adequately designed, because the regulations for construction of bridges, fords, levees, etc., do not consider the required features for
this type of extraordinary event.
For these reasons, it is necessary:
• To regulate community development, with expert identification of
hazard zones and creation of land use maps associated with
different return periods.
• To compel people not to settle in floodplains.
• To build adequate infrastructure, for example, sewage and water.
• To construct dams in order to retain loose soil, washed by the
flood waters, to prevent it from reaching downstream where the
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majority of settlements are located. In La Paz, the Buena Mujer
Dam (upstream from the city) was built for this purpose.
• To implement continuous campaigns to improve hazard awareness
and develop a disaster culture among citizens and authorities. It is
important that people are aware of potential hazards.
• To develop a building code in semiarid zones, in basins with steep
slopes, small areas, and heavy rainfall in order to design better
hydraulic works and other structures that, if poorly designed, can
interfere with water flows (bridges, embankments, culverts, fords,
drains, etc.). Maintenance is basic for an adequate performance of
the hydraulic structures, especially when an extraordinary meteorological event occurs.
• To collect the largest number of studies in Mexico related to this
topic.
•

Given the nature of the phenomenon, it is difficult to forecast it
well in advance, so it is convenient to have good warning and
instrumentation systems, and an adequate design of the hydraulic
works. For this purpose, Mexico started in 1993 the modernization
of the rainfall measuring equipment and in general, of the National
Meteorological System (SMN), in order improve forecasting and
prediction of hydrometcorological phenomena.
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Abstract
The EI Nino flooding of the Moche River Valley in Northern Peru
between 500 and 700 A.D. contributed to the collapse of the great Moche
empire. Intense flooding devastated the capitol of Moche and stripped away
the urban landscape and agricultural fields. When the capital city was moved
from Cerro Blanco to Pampa Grande, the new capital also experienced flood
problems.
Later, when the area was occupied by the Sican people, flooding
continued to destroy urban and agricultural development, with their capital
at Batfm Grande.
Cooperation between archeologists and paleohydrologists for the study of
ancient civilizations and their demise is useful in better understanding the
long-term impacts of climate and flooding on modern civilizations.

Introduction
In the northern coastal region of Peru, the Moche empire rose to its height
of state-craft and power by about 500 A.D. Political consolidation had been
completed over a coastal area extending 600 Ian in length, and the Moche
empire grew to prominence and power. The Moche are most well known to
modern people by their exquisite ceramic pottery, which is today sought by
the world's great museums. The basis for the Moche culture developed over
a long period of time. Civilization, as measured by the use of pottery,
commenced in northern Peru about 1800 B. C., which was also the time of the
spread of intensive farming. Then, by 1200 B.C. the largest architectural
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monument in the western hemisphere was built at Sechin; it was the U-shaped
ceremonial center of Sechin Alto.
Irrigation of land to grow food gave rise to centralization of power
through corporate agriculture, which meant food surplus could be created to
free portions of the population for building monuments and staffing armies.
At the same time, control and distribution of food production and its
surpluses provided power to those who held the reins.
The Moche capital was at Cerro Blanco, with two enormous temples of
adobe called Huaca de la Luna and Huaca del Sol, around which were
magnificent buildings with grand courts, low platforms, many residences, and
workshops. The temples, the city, and the production of fine ceramics and
artwork were the manifestation of one of the New World's finest early
civilizations with a well organized social system. The Achilles tendon of the
Moche capital was its reliance upon and proximity to the Moche River. The
capital and the irrigation canals and fields were in the floodplain and
susceptible to the ravages of floods.
Significant EI Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) flooding occurred in the
th
6 century. The flooding devastated the Moche empire because the allimportant irrigation works were destroyed in addition to the damage to the
capital city. The great civilization had intensively developed in the floodplain
of the River Moche without adequate consideration of the ENSO phenomenon
and its ability to cause periods of extreme regional precipitation.

EI Nino Southern Oscillation
Changes in ocean currents and sea surface temperatures (SST) in the
eastern equatorial Pacific were first noted and named by Peruvian fishermen
in the 1890s. They called this phenomenon "EI Nino" because it usually
occurred during the Christmas season.
The EI Nino event is linked to a large-scale atmospheric pressure
fluctuation that is measured at Darwin, Australia, in the western Pacific and
at Tahiti in the central Pacific. This atmospheric phenomenon was named the
Southern Oscillation by Walker (1923) and is now termed the Southern
Oscillation Index (SOl). A positive value (phase) of SOl (standard index
pressure anomalies at Tahiti minus Darwin) causes cooler SSTs to occur in
the eastern equatorial Pacific and is termed La Nina. Conversely, the negative
phase of SOl results in warm SSTs occurring in the eastern equatorial Pacific
and is termed El Nino. The EI Nino and SOl together have been termed
ENSO events (Diaz et al., 1992).
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It has been documented that the two phases of SOl cause climatic
anomalies throughout the world. Climatologists have stated that the ENSO
phenomena are the second most important influence on climate in the world
after the four seasons. The EI Nino phase of ENSO causes flooding in the
Peruvian Andes, while the La Nina phase of ENSO causes drought.
The excessive precipitation in the Peruvian Andes associated with the EI
Nino phase of ENSO results in greater than normal floods pouring out of the
coastal canyons into the alluvial valleys downstream from the canyons. The
floods would carry with them great quantities of silt, sand, gravel, and rocks.
The climatological record of great droughts and periods of floods has been
inscribed into the great glaciers and ice caps of the Andes. One such ice cap
is called Quellccaya.

Paleoclimatic Evidence of Climatic Variability
The Quelccaya ice cap is located in the Cordillera Oriental mountain
range of southern Peru approximately 200 Ian northwest of Lake Titicaca.
Scientists from the Byrd Polar Research Center at Ohio State University
drilled and analyzed ice cores from the Quelccaya ice cap during the 1980s.
Their work resulted in a climatological record dating from 470 A.D. to 1984
A.D. (Thompson and Mosley- Thompson, 1989).
The annual accumulation of ice recorded in the ice core can be used to
determine the relative annual precipitation for the region, and consequently
both drought and flood patterns. Ice core data indicate time periods of
deviations from the mean. A specific review was made of one major
deviation, the post-WOO A.D. period, when a definite climatic shift to a
lower precipitation persisted for several centuries. A statistical analysis of the
ice core data was performed to determine if the post-WOO A.D. climatic shift
was statistically significant. Using a t-test, the annual ice accumulation was
found to have a statistically significant change at around 1000 A.D. (Ortloff
and Kolata, 1993).
The severity of a drought is determined by the cross product of its
duration and its magnitude. The average value of the precipitation anomaly
determines the magnitude of the drought. The duration of the drought is the
time length of the precipitation anomaly (Dracup et aI., 1980a and b). Using
these definitions, an extremely dry year is not over-emphasized if the
following years return to normal.
The data obtained from the ice cores included isotopic 180 data as well
as the annual ice accumulation data. The isotopic 180 measurements are
valuable in that they enable researchers to infer prevailing temperature data.
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Isotopic 180 measurements from the Quelccaya ice cap indicate a rise in mean
annual temperature of between 0.5 0 and l°C beginning around 1000 A.D.
and persisting until at least 1400 A.D. (Ortloff and Kolata, 1993). The rise
in temperature, corresponding with the decrease in precipitation, indicates
that there was indeed a climatic shift during this period.
A somewhat similar evaluation technique can be used to estimate periods
of excessive precipitation. For example, EI Nino episodes occurred in A.D.
511-12, 546, 576, 600, 610, 612, 650, 681, and with the same type of
frequency in later centuries (Mosley, 1991). These floods were bad enough,
but a three decade long drought happened between 562-594 A.D., with
precipitation 30 % below normal. A marked increase in atmospheric dust in
the ice core samples was noted by Thompson, indicating blowing soil from
parched lands due to lack of vegetation (Mosley, 1991).
The long-term climatological record from the Quellcaya ice cap provides
evidence of precipitation events in the 6th and 7th centuries that were unkind
to the Moche empire because of their intensive use of alluvial floodplains for
their city as well as their corporate agricultural development.

The Moche Demise
High precIpItation events are etched in the ice caps and glaciers,
however, did flooding actually occur in the Moche River Valley as a result
of these events? The answer lies in the archaeological ruins and the floodplain
deposits of the northern Peru coastal areas. These areas have been studied by
leading scientists looking for the archaeological and anthropological records.
The alluvial deposits have been analyzed by geologists. By bringing together
the work and efforts of numerous disciplines, the circle from the physical
scientist for the ice cap data and the meteorology to the cultural scientists and
geologists for the evidence on and in the ground has been closed; the cause
and effect has been established.
The capital of the Moche empire at Huaca del Sol and Huaca de la Luna
represented Moche Phase IV. It was heavily damaged by one of the early
Quelccaya recorded EI Nino events, when flood water stripped away urban
landscape and irrigation systems and then deposited several meters of
sediment (Mosley, 1991). Archaeologists have identified the stripping,
damage, and sedimentation deposits independent of the ice core data; it was
the ice core information that closed the loop with regional precipitation data
and estimated dates with a plus or minus accuracy of 20 years.
The Moche capital was repaired with heightened platforms. Then,
excavations show sand dunes encroached on the capital either before or after
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the 31-year drought. However, the Moche Phase IV Period ended with the
abandonment of the capital city.
Phase V of the Moche empire started with the construction of a new
capital at a place called Pampa Grande in the Lambayeque River valley,
about 50 kIn from the sea. However, EI Nino flooding occurred at the new
capital. Finally, the Moche empire came to an end, and Pampa Grande was
abandoned and its inhabitants moved away. Archaeological excavation in
Section D of Pampa Grande show over one meter of silty sand-flood deposits
that completely buried structures. The flood that caused the deposit occurred
close to the time of abandonment between 650 and 700 AD (Craig and
Shimada, 1986). A new Sican culture emerged in the Pampa Grande
Lambayeque region, along with a new capital and political center known as
Batan Grande in the Rio La Leche valley. Thus, the Moche empire met its
demise in the 7ili century with the best evidence pointing towards climaticinduced extreme flooding that weakened the ability to govern through
environmental stress (Mosley, 1991). Afterwards, the people of the area
tended to adopt the styles of the Huari empire.
The new Sican capital at Batan Grande was precariously close to the
mouth of the Rio La Leche, probably so as to exercise control over the
irrigation diversion head works. This development declined with much of the
area being abandoned by about 1050 A.D. Field studies by Craig (1986)
showed a massive 2.5-3.0 m of Quaternary alluvium in the stratagraphic
columns at Batan Grande that he concluded had been caused by a single
slack-water sedimentary event that overwhelmed the inhabitants of the area;
the sedimentary event occurring during a pre 1000 A.D. flood.

Summary
The demise of the Moche empire at about 700 A.D. was likely caused by
environmental stress in the form of great floods aggravated by periods of
drought.
The work of archaeologists and geologists have identified flooding
sediment deposits and water damage to structures at the Moche capital cities
at Cerro Bianco and Pampa Grande. On the other hand, glaciologists have
cored ice caps to identify precipitation events that provide a degree of
correlation to extreme precipitation years that would have caused floods.
Research by meteorologists into the ENSO phenomena help provide the
scientific basis for evaluating the cause and effect between the ice cap data,
field evidence of great floods, and abandonment of the cities.
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Much can be learned about ancient empires by interdisciplinary efforts
and pooling of scientific knowledge. Knowing more about ancient civilizations and their problems can help modern societies to anticipate and cope with
environmental extremes and resultant stresses.
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PALEOHYDROLOGIC BOUNDS AND
THE FREQUENCY OF EXTREME FLOODS
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Abstract
An expeditious way to evaluate the probability of large floods for the
safety of critical structures is to identify and assign ages to geomorphic
surfaces adjacent to a stream that serve as limits for the paleostage of large
floods over thousands of years. These paleo stage limits can then be put into
a step-backwater model to calculate the maximum discharge that would not
significantly inundate, and therefore significantly modify, a particular
geomorphic surface. This maximum discharge, together with the age of the
surface, forms a conservative limiting bound on flood discharge through time
that is input for flood-frequency analysis. These bounds are not actual floods,
but instead are limits on flood magnitude over a measured time interval. In
this way, these bounds represent stages and discharges that have not been
exceeded since the geomorphic surface stabilized.
For dam safety, the critical issue is not the accurate estimation of a
complete record of floods well within the operating capacity of the structure,
but rather the frequency of floods that could challenge the operating capacity.
The key issues are the accuracy of the frequency estimate of such large floods
and the probability that the operational capacity of the dam will not be
exceeded. Floods near the magnitude of the paleohydrologic bounds are
direct indicators of the frequency of large floods that might compromise dam
safety.
Examples from paleoflood studies conducted for Causey Dam on the
South Fork Ogden River, Utah, and Bradbury Dam on the Santa Ynez River,
California, illustrate the utility of paleohydrologic bounds in flood frequency
analysis. In both cases, flood frequency analysis based on the record of
annual peak discharge estimates and extrapolation to the Probable Maximum
Flood (PM F) leads to substantial overestimates of the frequency of large
floods and to the conclusion that dam overtopping may be likely. In fact, in
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both cases with the inclusion of paleohydrologic bounds in the flood
frequency analysis, floods with a magnitude equivalent to spillway capacity
are extremely low probability events.
For the past several decades the estimated Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) and the calculated Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) have been
used as measures of hydrologic dam safety. However, both the PMP and
PMF are hypothetical maximums and by definition have no associated
probability. This absence of probability limits the utility of these hypothetical
indices for risk -based dam safety decisions. In the western U. S., short
historical and gauge records afford little support for the hypothetical PMF,
and hydrologic indices based on the PMP are thwarted by the numerous
complex and poorly understood assumptions required to turn rainfall into
runoff. Paleohydrologic techniques are a means to directly assess the
probability of extreme floods and test the validity of the PMF and PMP-based
models. The results of paleoflood studies in California, Oregon, Utah, and
Wyoming demonstrate that discharges with calculated annual probabilities of
one in 10, 000 are in the range of 5 % to 25 % of the hypothetical PMF.

Paleohydrologic Bounds
A paleohydrologic bound is a time interval during which a given discharge
has not been exceeded. In stable reaches, stage can be converted to discharge
through hydraulic modeling. Both properties of the paleohydrologic bound,
time and discharge, are independently determined from objective criteria in
the field. This approach is appropriate for hazard assessment because it
improves estimates of the frequency of large floods by using data that directly
describe the largest floods. Although it is not necessary to develop evidence
of specific paleofloods to define paleohydrologic bounds, it can be convement
for illustration.
The objective of studies of flood risk based on paleohydrologic bounds is
to identify and assign ages to geomorphic surfaces adjacent to a stream that
serve as limits for the paleo stage of large floods. These paleostage limits can
then be entered into a step-backwater model to calculate the maximum
discharge that would not significantly inundate, and therefore significantly
modify, a particular geomorphic surface. The depth of significant inundation
is calibrated based on the properties of the particular reach and comparison
with the geomorphic impact of extreme floods (e.g., Baker and Costa, 1987).
This maximum discharge, together with the age of the surface, forms a
conservative bound on peak discharge through time for use in floodfrequency analysis. These bounds are not actual floods, but instead are limits
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on flood magnitude over a measured time interval. In this way, these bounds
represent stages and discharges that have not been exceeded since the
geomorphic surface stabilized.
Paleoflood hydrology includes the study of the geomorphic and stratigraphic record of past floods (e.g., Baker, 1989; Jarrett, 1991). This record
is a direct, long-term measure of the ability of a stream to produce large
floods and may often be at least 10 to 100 times longer than the conventional
record of annual peak discharge estimates. Paleohydrologic techniques offer
a way to lengthen a short-term data record and, therefore, to reduce the
uncertainty in hydrologic analysis (Jarrett, 1991). Obviously, this allows for
a higher degree of assurance when making decisions regarding floods with
long return periods. Paleoflood studies allow a long-term perspective that can
put exceptional annual peak discharge estimates in context and assist in
reconciliation of conflicting historical records.
Most conventional estimates of the frequency of large floods are based on
extrapolation from short records of annual peak discharge estimates,
sometimes with the addition of historic information. Most magnitude
estimates for extreme floods are made by extrapolation of the statistical model
selected for flood-frequency to a given return period or annual probability,
or by hypothetically maximizing rainfall-runoff models. Frequency estimates
for maximized rainfall-runoff models are either arbitrarily assigned or are
based on extrapolating the flood-frequency curve to the calculated discharge.
No matter how many of these short-term records are statistically combined,
they can never accurately characterize the probability of very infrequent
floods because estimates of statistical confidence are directly related to the
length of record. Further, due to short record length, many statistical
distributions may fit the data, but the extrapolation to low probability floods
is highly dependent on the choice of the distribution.
Because each basin is unique, regionalizing or substituting space for time
to compensate for short record length cannot completely substitute for the
accurate characterization of the properties of a specific site or region, and
may result in unwarranted confidence. If the record of annual peak discharge
estimates contains an exceptionally large flood(s), this event(s) is usually
assigned an unrealistically short return period, omitted from the frequency
analysis, or "weighted" in some arbitrary fashion. Thus, any estimate of a
flood with a recurrence greater than several hundred years that is based only
on short-term record of annual peak discharge estimates or even long historic
records of a few hundred years will have a large inherent uncertainty.
Paleoflood hydrology offers a means of verifying return periods that are
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many times longer than the length of the gauge or historic records (Costa·,
1978).
There is a long history of paleoflood hydrology, in a wide variety of
settings throughout the world (Costa, 1986; Patton, 1987; Baker et aI., 1988).
One widely used technique, slackwater studies, uses fine-grained sediment
that accumulates in backwater areas to construct a detailed history of past
floods (e.g., Patton et aI., 1979; Kochel and Baker, 1988). Early studies by
Mansfield (1938) on the Ohio River and Jahns (1947) on the Connecticut
River demonstrate another approach. They recognized that historic floods had
overtopped sites not previously inundated in thousands of years. Lacking
evidence of recent inundation, the age of a geomorphic surface is an
estimator of the minimum return period of a flood that could inundate that
surface (Costa, 1978; O'Connell et aI., 1996).
Incorporation oflong-term paleohydrologic information in flood-frequency
studies does not depend on being able to reconstruct the complete record of
all past floods. Statistical techniques that can incorporate paleohydrologic
bounds are a useful way to take advantage of paleohydrologic information
(Stedinger and Cohn, 1986). In this way, it is not important if floods of a
specified recurrence are not recorded or included in the frequency analysis.
What is important is that limits on flood magnitudes over time intervals can
be identified. Sensitivity analyses show that the addition of only one or two
paleohydrologic bounds that span a range of hundreds to thousands of years
have a significant impact on the shape of the flood-frequency curve (Ostenaa
et aI., 1996a).
The field expression of paleohydrologic bounds, stable geomorphic
surfaces, are floodplains that have been abandoned due to stream incision.
Once abandoned, their surface characteristics change with time. Two of the
most easily recognized changes involve the modification of surface morphology and the development of soil. Through time, slope processes and
weathering mute the expression of surface irregularities related to fluvial
erosion and deposition. Once a surface has stabilized, that is, it is no longer
episodically overtopped, soils form in a predictable sequence (Birkeland,
1984).
Disruptions in soil profiles and geomorphic features, such as eroded
channels, that result from significant inundation by large floods are generally
easily recognized. This is why these former floodplain surfaces are reliable
indicators of flood stage through time. The limits of the surface define a
maximum channel width through which a maximum discharge can be
modeled. The ages associated with the geomorphic surfaces that form bounds
for flood magnitude are almost always minimum ages because of the
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problems related to dating the precise time when a particular surface was
abandoned. The result is an estimate of the maximum discharge during the
minimum time interval since stabilization. These estimates are made even
more conservative because through time, channels may downcut and erode
laterally, resulting in apparently larger cross-sections and discharges.
Therefore, a study goal is to locate stable reaches with the minimum channel
capacity adjacent to geomorphic surfaces that place limits on paleostage
through the reach.

Paleohydrologic Bounds and Flood Frequency:
Two Examples
Examples from paleoflood studies conducted for Causey Dam on the
South Fork Ogden River, Weber County, Utah (Ostenaa et aI., 1996b) and
Bradbury Dam on the Santa Ynez River, Santa Barbara County, California
(Ostenaa et aI., 1996a) illustrate the utility of paleohydrologic bounds for
estimating the frequency of extreme floods. In both cases, conventional floodfrequency analysis based only on the short record of annual peak discharge
estimates with extrapolation to the PMF leads to substantial overestimates of
the frequency of large floods. With the inclusion of paleohydrologic bounds
in the flood frequency analysis, floods with a magnitude equivalent to
spillway capacity are extremely low probability events at both dams.
Causey Dam impounds water in the mountainous upper 210 km 2 of the
South Fork Ogden River basin. The da.m is a 258-meter-Iong, 66-meter-high
earthfill embankment with an ungated spillway capacity of about 214 m3 /s.
The calculated thunderstorm PMF for Causey Dam has a peak discharge of
more than 3,000 m3 /s, with the calculated threshold for dam overtopping of
677 m 3 /s. Based on standard engineering flood frequency analysis (e.g.,
NRC, 1985), a discharge equivalent to the estimated threshold overtopping
discharge has a return period on the order of 2,000 to 30,000 years.
Significant overtopping of Causey Dam could result in dam failure, and dam
failure would result in substantial and unacceptable consequences downstream.
Downstream from Causey Dam, the South Fork Ogden River is
characterized by two groups of Holocene geomorphic surfaces that form
paleohydrologic bounds. Ages for the bounds are based on the geomorphology and stratigraphy of these surfaces and 19 radiocarbon ages. The
discharges associated with these bounds are calculated from step-backwater
modeling in a stable reach 6 kilometers downstream from the dam. The
"Holocene 2" paleohydrologic bound is formed by a group of surfaces that
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have not been significantly overtopped in 2500 years. Based on stepbackwater modeling, a discharge of 115 m3/s would significantly modify this
surface and therefore is the discharge value for the paleohydrologic bound.
The "Holocene 1" paleohydrologic bound is formed by a group of surfaces
that have not been significantly overtopped in the last 400 years. A discharge
of 70 m3/s would modify these surfaces based on step-backwater modeling.
Bradbury Dam is a 1,020-meter-Iong, 85-meter-high embankment that
impounds water in the mountainous upper 670 km2 of the Santa Ynez River
basin. Bradbury Dam has a gated spillway with a capacity of 4,533 m 3/s. The
calculated PMF for Bradbury Dam is 13,060 m3 /s. Based on standard
engineering flood-frequency techniques (e.g., NRC, 1985), the PMF has an
extrapolated return period as frequent as less than 100 years. If the PMF
were possible, this flow would overtop the dam and could result in dam
failure, causing substantial and unacceptable consequences downstream.
Between Bradbury Dam and the town of Lompoc 65 km downstream,
there are two Holocene surfaces that form useful paleohydrologic bounds.
Ages for these bounds are based on the geomorphology and stratigraphy of
these surfaces and 17 radiocarbon ages. The discharges associated with these
bounds result from step-backwater modeling in stable reaches 2 km and 55
km downstream of the dam. The "tl" paleohydrologic bound is formed by
a group of surfaces that have not been significantly overtopped in 2900 years.
Based on step-backwater modeling a discharge of 2,550 m 3 /s would
significantly modify this surface and therefore is the discharge value for the
paleohydrologic bound. The "fp2" paleohydrologic bound is formed by a
group of surfaces that have been significantly overtopped once in the last 700
years. A discharge of 1980 m3/s would modify these surfaces based on stepbackwater modeling. Based on historical information a third bound can be
constructed that spans from 1862 to 1907 at a discharge of 1275 m3 /s.
For flood frequency calculations, the information from the paleohydrologic bounds is combined with the record of annual peak discharge
estimates. The relative amounts of time spanned by the paleohydrologic
bounds and the record of annual peak discharge estimates for both the South
Fork Ogden River and the Santa Ynez River is shown on Figure 1. To
calculate flood-frequency statistics, the maximum likelihood (MLH) method
of Stedinger and Cohn (1986) and Stedinger et al. (1988) is modified and
incorporated into a Bayesian approach (Tarantola, 1987) (O'Connell et al.,
1996). For both the South Fork Ogden River and the Santa Ynez River, the
impact of the paleohydrologic bounds is dramatic. For the South Fork Ogden
River, the analysis indicates that a flow of spillway capacity has a probability
of much less than one in 10,000, with an extrapolated probability of less than
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Figure 1
Comparative time spanned by paleohydrologic bounds and the record of annual peak
discharge estimates for South Fork Ogden River at Causey Dam (A) and Santa Ynez River
at Bradbury Dam (B). For the South Fork Ogden River there are no historic floods near
the paleohydrologic bound. For the Santa Ynez River the 1969 flood exceeds the fP2
paleohydrologic bound. These plots illustrate that paleohydrologic bounds provide
significantly more information about low probability floods than the record of annual peak
discharge estimates.
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Table 1. Mean Annual Probability and Return Period
of Discharges Exceeding the Capacity of
the Bradbury Dam Spillway (4533 m3 /s)
Data Set

Mean Annual Probability

Return Period
(years)

Gauge

5.74 x 10-4

1,740

1.43 x 10-4

7,000

1.57 x 10-7

>6,000,000

Historic

+ Gauge

Paleoflood + Historic
+ Gauge

one in 500,000. This indicates that overtopping of the dam is an extraordinarily unlikely event. For the Santa Ynez River the incremental advantage of
adding more information can be demonstrated by calculating flood-frequency
statistics from various data sets. The addition of paleohydrologic bounds has
the greatest impact on the flood frequency calculations (Table 1). Table 1
illustrates the difference in the conclusion drawn from different sets of data.
Once again, for the Santa Ynez River it shows that a discharge equivalent to
spillway capacity of Bradbury Dam is a very remote event with an extrapolated probability of less than one in 6,000,000.
Paleohydrologic bounds influence flood frequency calculations by
extending the length of record. Inferences about low probability floods based
only on short gauge and historic records (less than 150 years in the western
U.S.) depend on assumptions of the statistical distribution chosen to portray
flood frequency (e. g., 0' Connell et al., 1996). However, these short-term
records contain no information about the long term behavior of floods. In
fact, many gauge and historic records are hampered by trapping a low
probability or long return period event in a short record. This adds significant
bias to flood frequency estimates and in many instances in the western U. S.
leads to an over estimate of flood magnitude for a particular probability or
return period.

Paleohydrologic Bounds and
the Calculated Probable Maximum Flood
The Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) has been used as a standard for
hydrologic analyses in dam safety for several decades (NRC, 1985). As
originally defined, the PMF has no return period. However, this definition
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is not practical for dam safety decisions based on risk. As a practical matter,
the PMF has often been arbitrarily assigned a return period of 10,000 to
1,000,000 years at the upper and lower confidence limits for flood frequency
analysis (e.g., NRC, 1985).
Paleoflood studies are a basis for testing whether the calculated PMF and
the associated extrapolated return period are realistic. Because the fluvial
geomorphology and stratigraphy of floodplains adjacent to streams are
recorders of the most extreme floods, paleoflood records should contain
extreme floods that are a large percentage of the PMF, if such floods are
physically possible. The shorter the estimated return period assigned to the
PMF, the more likely it becomes that such large floods should be included in
paleoflood records that are thousands of years in length. Considering the
number of drainage basins present in an area the size of the western U. S., if
there actually have been floods comparable to the hypothetical PMF, the
numerous multi-thousand-year paleoflood records present along western
streams are likely to record mUltiple PMF-scale floods.
The paleohydrologic bounds from the South Fork Ogden River and the
Santa Ynez River are only a small percentage of the calculated PMF for
Causey and Bradbury Dams. Data from other Reclamation paleoflood studies
in the western u.S. show a similar relationship to calculated PMF estimates
(Table 2). It is clear that in a variety of hydro meteorological settings, the
paleoflood record does not validate floods as extreme as the PMF, nor do the
paleoflood data validate estimates of PMF return period in the range of
10,000 to 1,000,000 years. Rather, the paleoflood data imply a potential
upper limit for flood magnitude that is substantially smaller than implied by
PMF calculations. The data in Table 2 indicate that in the western United
States, peak discharges with an extrapolated return period of 10,000 years
may be as little as 5 % to 25 % of the calculated PMF. These results have
substantial impact when incorporated into dam safety decisions or criteria
based on risk.

Conclusion
The most reliable way to obtain probability estimates of extreme floods,
floods with return periods of thousands of years, is to study the geomorphologic and stratigraphic record of extreme floods. Paleoflood hydrology is an
event-based method for extending the length of the flood record in order to
make realistic estimates of the probability of extreme floods. An expeditious
way to gain paleoflood information is through the use of paleohydrologic
bounds. For guiding hydrologic dam safety decisions, comparable levels of
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Table 2. Calculated Probable Maximum Flood versus
10,OOO-Year Flood Estimated From Paleoflood Studies
Location

Drainage
Basin Area
(km 2)

Estimated
10,000 year
paleoflood,
97.5 percentile, discharge (-

Probable
Maximum
Flood Peak
Discharge

10,000 year
paleoflood
as percentage ofPMF

(m 3/s)

m3/s)

South Fork
Ogden River,
Utah

210

150

3075

5

Santa Ynez
River, CA

1080

2550

l3,060

26

Ochoco
Creek, OR

764

285

4785

6

Crooked
River, OR

6825

1100

7225

15

confidence cannot be obtained from analysis of short-term records of annual
peak discharge estimates and historic information alone. Compared to
conventional frequency analyses, incorporation of paleoflood data provides
high assurance that the spillway capacity of Causey and Bradbury Dams will
not be exceeded even at long return periods. For many streams in the western
U. S., paleoflood information does not validate PMF discharges derived from
rainfall-runoff modeling, nor does it validate the range of PMF frequency
commonly used in hydrologic risk decisions.
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BAYESIAN FLOOD FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
WITH PALEOHYDROLOGIC BOUNDS
FOR LATE HOLOCENE PALEOFLOODS,
SANTA YNEZ RIVER, CALIFORNIA

Daniel R. H. O'Connell, Daniel R. Levish, and
Dean A. Ostenaa
U. S. Bureau of Reclamation
Denver, Colorado

Abstract
Paleohydrologic bounds demonstrate that peak discharges of about 70,000
ft3/s and 90,000 ft3/s had not been exceeded on the Santa Ynez River in 700
years and 2,900 years, respectively. These paleohydrologic bounds are
combined with gage and historic data in a Bayesian approach to estimate
flood-frequency probabilities. The Bayesian analysis uses likelihood functions
that incorporate both parameter and data (discharge and geologic age)
uncertainties. High-speed workstations make it possible to calculate parameter
and peak discharge frequency probabilities using systematic parameter-space
searches and direct numerical integration. Bayesian peak discharge frequency
calculations demonstrate the value of the paleohydrologic bounds for a
hydrologic risk analysis of Bradbury Dam. If only gage and/or historic data
are available, an inescapable conclusion is that a flow exceeding spillway
capacity (160,000 ft3/S) is likely to occur within a lO,OOO-year period.
Adding the paleohydrologic bounds to the Bayesian analysis shows that the
probability of a flow exceeding spillway capacity within a lO,OOO-year period
is less than 1 in 50,000. The Bayesian analysis demonstrates the substantial
statistical gain the paleohydrologic bounds provide, because they put large
historic discharges in their proper, long-term contexts and substantially
reduce the range of possible discharges associated with long return periods.
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Introduction
This paper describes a Bayesian flood frequency analysis that incorporates
paleohydrologic bounds information to assess the frequency and magnitude
of large floods for Bradbury Dam on the Santa Ynez River, Santa Barbara
County, California. This study was conducted as part of a paleoflood study
(Ostenaa et aI., 1996) intended to reduce the range of uncertainty in
extrapolated frequency estimates of extreme floods on the Santa Ynez River
and to provide additional limits, beyond the historical record, for decision-making on hydrologic dam safety issues affecting Bradbury Dam. The
previously calculated Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) with a peak discharge
of 414,000 ft3/S overtops Bradbury Dam (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
USBR) , 1993). A new PMF has a peak discharge of 460,900 ft3/S (USBR,
1995). The estimated recurrence interval for the PMF, between the upper and
lower 90 % confidence limits, based on extrapolation from 41 years of annual
peak discharge records, extends from less than 100 years up to 1 million
years (USBR, 1993). The high uncertainty in the extrapolated return period
of the PMF results in a very large range of justifiable expenditures for
hydrologic dam safety modifications.
Abandoned floodplains or stream terraces that flank the Santa Ynez River
range in age from several hundred to more than tens of thousands of years.
Terrace surfaces are underlain by stream-transported floodplain sediment, and
therefore are quite easily modified by shallow flood inundation. Because these
surfaces are easily modified, they are reliable recorders of maximum flood
stage through time. If ages can be derived for preserved and/or floodmodified surfaces, the surfaces become conservative datums for the
magnitude of large floods. Likewise, the absence of features indicative of
significant inundation is positive evidence of nonexceedence of a specific,
limiting flood stage over the time spanned by the surface.
A paleohydrologic bound is a time interval during which a given discharge
has not been exceeded (Ostenaa et aI., 1996; Levish et aI., 1996). Our
approach focuses on defining nonexceedence bounds of time and discharge
rather than on construction of a detailed record of past floods. This is
accomplished by identifying and assigning ages to geomorphic surfaces that
serve as limits for the paleostage of large floods. These bounds are not actual
floods, but instead are limits on flood magnitude over a measured time
interval and represent stages and discharges that have not been exceeded
since the geomorphic surface stabilized. Through step-backwater modeling,
stage can be converted to discharge, so that in the flood frequency analysis,
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. a bound is set for a time interval during which a specific discharge has not
been exceeded.
This approach is appropriate for hazard assessment because long-term
paleohydrologic information provides powerful bounds for estimates of flood
frequency (Stedinger and Cohn, 1986) and because the data are a direct
description of the likelihood of the largest floods along a stream. Including
long-duration paleohydrologic bounds in flood frequency calculations
significantly reduces predicted peak discharge uncertainties at long return
periods. It is not necessary to develop evidence of specific paleofloods to
define limits for paleostage, although it is often convenient for illustration.
For dam safety, the critical issue is not the accurate estimation of a complete
record of floods well within the operating range of the structure, but rather
the frequency of floods that could challenge the operational capacity of the
structure. The key issues are the accuracy of the frequency estimates of such
large floods and the probability that the operational capacity of the dam will
not be exceeded. Floods near the magnitude of the paleohydrologic bounds
are direct indicators of the likelihood of large floods that might compromise
dam safety.

Method
The primary goals of this statistical analysis are to determine the annual
risk (probability) of a peak discharge exceeding the maximum spillway
capacity of Bradbury Dam and to derive flood frequency statistics. Another
goal is to quantify the value of incorporating historical and paleohydrologic
data into the statistical analysis of flood frequency. A Bayesian methodology
(Tarantola, 1987) and likelihood functions modified from Stedinger and Cohn
(1986) are used to incorporate data and parameter uncertainties. Parameter
and flood frequency likelihoods and probability intervals are calculated
directly by numerical integration. Systematic parameter-space searches
provide the most powerful method to determine flood frequency probabilities,
provided by high-speed workstations. A systematic search of a parameter
space of four or less can be completed without resorting to Monte Carlo
methods of statistical sampling and integration. This approach is used with
annual peak discharge, historical, and paleohydrologic data to develop flood
frequency probabilities, to estimate annual probabilities of a peak discharge
exceeding spillway capacity, and to quantify the statistical value of incorporating historic and paleohydrologic data into the analysis.
Several other methods are traditionally used to develop flood frequency
estimates from discharge records. The weighted-moments technique presented
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in Bulletin 17B (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1981) is often used with
annual peak discharge records, but incorporation of historical and
paleohydrologic data is awkward. Bulletin 17B provides procedures to
calculate flood frequency confidence intervals. However, while it accounts
for uncertainties in mean and variance due to sampling errors, it ignores
errors in skew that can be important (Chowdhury and Stedinger, 1991).
Regional index flood methods pool annual peak discharge estimates from
a region to reduce peak discharge quantile standard errors (Stedinger et al.,
1993; Pitlick, 1994). However, errors are only reduced if the physiographic
features that influence flood characteristics are homogenous over a region and
the hydrometeorologic events are independent. The maximum likelihood
(MLH) method of Stedinger and Cohn (1986) and Stedinger et al. (1988)
provides a formalism to calculate flood frequency probabilities by combining
information from annual peak discharge records, and historical and
paleohydrologic sources that can encompass long time periods. This method
can yield robust "global like" MLH parametric distribution estimates, but the
"local" error analysis assumes the linearized covariance calculated at the
MLH model position accurately describes the "global" model parameter
distribution. The MLH method's "local" error analysis may not produce
realistic uncertainty estimates in some situations and only methods that
evaluate probabilities over a "global" model distribution space can assure
robust uncertainty estimates.
The Bayesian approach used here explicitly acknowledges that the
parameters and data are never perfectly known. Both parameter and data
uncertainties are incorporated into risk and probability interval estimates of
flood frequency. It directly measures how well the data constrain model
parameters. The Bayesian paradigm is a special case of the more general
information theory of Shannon (1948), Tarantola and Valette (1982), and
Tarantola (1987). These approaches quantitatively rank how well particular
models fit data sets. For example, the value of each data point is somewhat
uncertain and the ranking or goodness of fit of each possible frequency
function is proportional to how often the frequency function predicts data
values close to the observed data (high likelihood or "good fit") or predicts
values far from the observed values (low likelihood or "poor fit"). The
Bayesian approach uses a "global" parameter integration grid as outlined
below in a systematic quantitative framework to identify what ranges of
frequency functions are consistent with the data at various probabilities. By
selecting broad probability intervals, conservative evaluations of risk are
obtained.
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Stedinger and Cohn (1986) and Stedinger et al. (1988) developed
. likelihood expressions for combining several data types that are modified here
to incorporate data measurement uncertainties. Integrals are added to their
log-likelihood expressions to include discrete probability density functions
(pdf's) representative of peak discharge and geologic age uncertainties.
Details of the modified likelihood expressions are provided in Ostenaa et al.
(1996). The approach of Stedinger (1983) is used to estimate peak discharge
quantiles and the annual probability of a peak discharge exceeding spillway
capacity.
Developing Bayesian flood frequency statistics is a two-part process. In
the first part, a parameter grid is constructed that spans the nonzero
likelihood portion of parameter space for a particular choice of the frequency
function. The Log Pearson III (LP3) frequency function is used to allow
direct comparison with other methods often used to develop flood frequency
statistics (e.g., Bulletin 17B, U.S. Water Resources Council, 1981). Larger
grids with coarse parameter spacing are used to determine the nonzero
likelihood regions of the parameter space, and then a smaller, finely sampled
parameter grid is used for the final calculations of the conditional posterior
probability density function. Parameter statistics are calculated from this
density function to provide MLH values of the parameters, and numerical
integration is used to provide marginal density functions for individual
parameters or combinations of parameters. In the second part of the analysis,
the posterior distributions of peak discharges for various quantiles and annual
probabilities of a peak discharge exceeding the spillway capacity are
calculated. This approach is ideal for risk-based hypothesis testing because
it provides probability estimates of peak discharges of interest for dam safety
decision making.

Data
Bayesian frequency analyses are performed using three data sets (Ostenaa
et al., 1996). The first data set, paleohydrologic, includes all annual peak
discharge, historic, and paleohydrologic data representing about 2,920 years
of observation. The paleohydrologic data include two bounds, t1 and fp2, that
provide discharge limits of 90,000 and 70,000 ft 3/s, that have not been
exceeded in 2,920 and 700 years, respectively (Table 1). Historic data from
the Lompoc area provide a limit on peak discharge since 1862 relative to the
size of the large flood in 1907. The 57 year peak discharge record includes
an exceptional flood in 1969 (peak of record). A second data set, historic, is
derived by deleting the paleohydrologic data from the complete data set to
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provide 132 years of annual peak discharge and historic data. The third data
set consists of the most recent 57 years of annual peak discharge estimates
from the gauge just downstream from the Bradbury Damsite (1935-1952),
and the adjusted sum of the gauges upstream of Lake Cachuma (1953-1993).
Complete Bayesian frequency analyses are performed for each data set to
evaluate the incremental value of acquiring historic and paleohydrologic data.
The model space for LP3 is discretized on 150x150x150 grids representing 3.375x106 LP3 models for each of the three data sets. The zeta range is
limited to values of exp(zeta) in the range defined by an envelope curve,
114,000 fi3/s (Meyer, 1994), and the PMF, 414,000 fi3/s (USBR, 1993).
Wider ranges of alpha and beta parameters are used to refine the grid to
encompass all relative likelihoods of 10-7 or larger. These parameter ranges
define a uniform boxcar for the parameter prior probabilities. An integration
interval of 20 fi3/s is used to discretize the frequency functions.
The probability distribution parameters for paleohydrologic bounds, time
before 1994 observations (time intervals of paleohydrologic bound nonexceedence), and peak discharges within a range are shown in Tables 1 and
2, respectively. The "End Prob" columns in Tables 1 and 2 are the
likelihoods at the minimum and maximum values relative to the MLH values.
The times in Table 1 are total years prior to 1994. The 1862 historic bound
and 1907 peak discharge estimates are assigned weak central tendencies
(large "End Prob"s) because they are poorly constrained_ Conversely, the tl,
fp2, and 1969 peak discharge estimates have strong central tendencies (small
"End Prob"s), but the triangular distribution still implies a weaker central
tendency (more probabilities at the extremes) than a Gaussian or exponential
distribution.

Results
Starting with the paleohydrologic data set results, the MLH LP3
parameters are identified by searching the parameter grid for the MLH value.
The MLH frequency function (alpha=3.95, beta=-1.0775, zeta = 11.644) is
evaluated for goodness of fit to the observed peak discharge data. The
method of Hirsch and Stedinger (1987) is used to derive the Weibull plotting
positions of the observed data. The Filliben probability-plot correlation test
yields a correlation value of 0.988 indicating that the observed data are
consistent with the MLH LP3 distribution (Vogel and McMartin, 1991). A
total of 107,518 LP3 models have relative likelihoods of 10-7 or greater.
The paleohydrologic MLH flood frequency estimates and 0.95 probability
region limits (lower 2.5 percentile to upper 97.5 percentile) are plotted in

Table 1. Paleohydrologic Bounds, Durations, and Relative Probabilities
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Figure 1 along with the upper 97.5 percentile limit from the historic and
annual peak discharge data set calculations. The upper 97.5 percentile limit
for the historic and annual peak discharge data demonstrate the weak
constraints on long return period discharges afforded by such short time
samples of peak discharge. In contrast, the paleohydrologic bounds
constraints produce a much more contracted upper 97.5 percentile. Note, that
neither the weighted-moment method of Bulletin 17B nor the MLH error
estimation method of Stedinger et al. 's (1988) MAX program would provide
these asymmetric (but more realistic) probability limits. These probability
limits are more realistic because they incorporate the global information about
the model's nonlinear probability distribution instead of local linearized
estimates of model covariance at the MLH model position.
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Figure 1. Flood frequency for the Santa Ynez River at Bradbury Dam. Annual peak
discharges are shown with the horizontal lines for plotting position ranges and vertical lines
for 20 measurement uncertainties. Paleohydrologic bounds are boxes denoting geologic age
and discharge uncertainties. The 0.95 flood-frequency probability region using all data is
shown in grey.
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The substantial difference in the predictions of flood frequency by the
three data sets can be understood in tenns of each data set's plotting position
for the peak discharge of record that occurred in 1969. With paleohydrologic
data, the plotting position of the 1969 discharge is 1,390 years (Table 1); 191
years for the historic data, and 118 years for the annual peak discharge data.
Moving the plotting position of the 1969 discharge to the range of 100-200
years in Figure 1 explains the much wider upper probability limits of the
annual peak discharge and historic data sets relative to the paleohydrologic
data. A much steeper LP3 slope is required to fit the discharges if the 1969
discharge plotting position is less than 200 years. The difference between the
paleohydrologic data predictions of flood frequency and the predictions of the
historic and annual peak discharge data can explained by the inability of
annual peak discharge and historic data to place the largest 1969 discharge in
its proper context (plotting position). The paleohydrologic bounds revealed
that the 1969 flood was a rare event, larger than any flood in the past 700
years.
The mean annual probability (and return period) estimates of a discharge
exceeding spillway capacity from each of the three data sets (paleohydrologic:
1. 57xlO-7 /yr, (6.35xI06 yr), historic: 1.43xlO-4/yr, (7000 yr), and annual
peak discharge: 5.76xl0-4/yr, (1740 yr)) reveal the consequences of not
placing a rare flood (1969) in its proper context. It is clear that given only a
annual peak discharge or historic record, it would be necessary to conclude
that a peak discharge exceeding spillway capacity probably has a return
period of less than 10,000 years and might be as frequent as a 1,000 year
event. However, the paleohydrologic data clearly demonstrate that a peak
discharge exceeding spillway capacity is extremely unlikely (0.004 probability for return periods to be less than 100,000 years).
The paleoflood data clearly provide a sound basis to interpolate flood
frequencies to the range of 1 in 10,000 years. However, extrapolation beyond
the range of the paleoflood data is imprudent because there is no physical
basis to support assuming the LP3 distribution for more rare events and
because data uncertainties and biases make extrapolations highly uncertain
(Kuczera, 1996). Therefore, it is statistically more meaningful to evaluate the
residual risk associated with a peak discharge exceeding spillway capacity
with a 1 in 10,000 year probability or greater (e.g. within the range of actual
observed data) than to focus on extrapolations to mean annual probabilities.
The residual risks is easily calculated by totaling the probabilities associated
with predictions of annual probabilities of discharges exceeding spillway
capacity of 1 in 10,000 or larger. The total probability of a peak discharge
exceeding spillway capacity with an annual probability of 1 in 10,000 or
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larger is less than 1 in 50,000. This represents the residual risk of such an
event in the context of interpolating the available data.

Conclusions
The Bayesian flood-frequency analysis demonstrates that the single most
important factor affecting the statistical conclusions is length of record,
consistent with the results of Frances et al. (1994). Paleohydrologic bounds
can provide direct limits on peak discharge spanning several thousands of
years. Sensitivity analyses of the MLH estimates of peak discharge demonstrate that these estimates are not sensitive to radiocarbon age or discharge
uncertainties, or to potentially "missed" peak discharges (Ostenaa et al.,
1996). The paleohydrologic bounds afford the capability to estimate
peak-discharge frequency in the 1,000- to 10,000-year return period range
(Figures 1 and 2), with substantially smaller uncertainties than extrapolated
estimates from much shorter records of annual peak discharge estimates. This
analysis demonstrates that the annual probability of a flow exceeding the
spillway capacity of Bradbury Dam, 160,000 ft 3/s, is extremely low.
Traditional flood-frequency procedures have focused on "best fitting"
distributions that have infinitesimal total probability as illustrated by the thin
line of the MLH flood-frequency estimate in Figure 1. For risk analyses, we
need to consider the flood-frequency estimates with various total probabilities
that are strongly dependent on data uncertainties and biases. Thus, it is
irrelevant what method is used to construct "best fitting" distributions (MLH,
various moment methods, etc.) because they all produce a deterministic result
that is completely inadequate for probabilistic risk analyses. A complete
probabilistic integration approach (grid or Monte Carlo), like the Bayesian
analysis presented here, is necessary to produce sufficient flood-frequency
information (probability intervals) for probabilistic risk analyses. The
numerical analyses described here can be calculated in about a day using
inexpensive PC computers and readily-available software. Computational
demands are not an impediment.
Typical products needed for risk analyses are discharges associated with
very rare « 1 in 10,000 year) floods. Traditional approaches have extrapolated beyond the available data, often to the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF)
using an arbitrarily assigned range of annual probabilities. These flood
frequency extrapolations using arbitrary frequency functions are a physically
baseless statistical subterfuge that provides no reliable information. Figure 2
shows that constructions like the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) have no
place on flood-frequency plots. PMF estimates may be useful for design
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Figure 2. Observed flood-frequency data for the Santa Ynez River at
Bradbury Dame as in Figure 1.
considerations, but it is inappropriate to assign annual probabilities to the
PMF, particularly by extrapolation beyond the available data. Instead, it is
necessary to develop a physical understanding of flood processes to quantify
discharge-frequency behavior for extremely rare events. Statistics only have
significance if there is physical understanding and no amount of mathematistry can substitute for physical understanding (Klemes, 1987, Bardsley,
1994).
Bayesian flood-frequency analyses incorporating paleohydrologic bound
information provide information necessary to establish appropriate dam safety
priorities when evaluating an inventory of structures. In contrast, arbitrary
flood-frequency extrapolations can actually compromise risk analyses. For
instance, PMF analyses often suggest that hydrologic deficiencies exist at a
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structure. Using PMF flood-frequency extrapolations in this manner obscures
the actual, shorter term risks and could in fact increase public risk by biasing
the scheduling of modifications for an inventory of structures. Bayesian
flood-frequency analyses with paleohydrologic data spanning thousands of
years provides a consistent basis for risk based decision making. This
information should be coupled with realistic rainfall-runoff modeling using
three-dimensional digital elevations models and modern finite-element
computational techniques for fluid flow that include nonlinear behavior
(Zienkiewicz and Taylor, 1991) to further quantify the hazards associated
with very rare precipitation events.
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PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF
STATISTICAL PROBABILITY
AS A TOOL FOR PREDICTION OF
EXTREME EVENT FLOODS
Gregory G. Hammer
Colorado Division of Water Resources
Dam Safety Branch

The Colorado Rules and Regulations for Dam Construction and Dam
Safety allow for the determination of the 100-year flood as the peak flow
recorded over a 100-year period on a stream having a gauged record of at
least 100 years (Colorado Office of the State Engineer, 1988). The statistical
definition is that a 100-year flood has a 1 % probability of occurrence in any
given year. In the book of Genesis, the Bible suggests that the 100-year flood
occurs after raining for 40 days and nights. (The rain began 100 years after
Noah was told to build an Ark.) None of these criteria is absolutely
definitive, and, consequently, great latitude is allowed in the development of
the predicted magnitude of such an event. To the public, this event is useful
to describe the rarity or frequency of occurrence of an extreme event. To the
technical community, however, its use is to identify a level of risk that is
designed into projects subject to the effects of floods.
The occurrence of the Big Thompson Canyon flood in 1976 served to
dramatically underscore the concept of a 100-year flood. As Colorado
approached its centennial anniversary of statehood, this event presented real
and tangible evidence of severe floods. Hardly anyone had imagined that a
flood of 30,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) would sweep out of the canyon,
yet it did, and with little warning. Nor can anyone imagine today that it could
have been worse. Since its occurrence, this storm has been labeled as
anything from a 100-year up to a 1O,000-year flood.
The probability of frequency, however, is not what really matters. The
real issue is that the storm did occur, and, having occurred once, it will occur
again. The important question, then, is: How much worse could it have been?
As engineers, we seek to design our structures to be safe enough that no
loss of life or property damage results from conditions that deviate from those
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that occur routinely. We create adequate safety factors for such a purpose.
Where conditions can be widely variable or design data is limited, we tend
to apply statistical methods to allow us some understanding of the risk of our
design choices or decisions, such as in the science of hydrology. Using
limited data, we project the results to an extreme that seems to be suitably
risk free.
In the past, the accepted event was commonly referred to as a 10,000-year
flood, a concept that seemed so remote that its occurrence was not conceivable. This has been replaced by the present use of the Probable Maximum
Flood (PMF). While somewhat dependent still upon statistical probabilities,
the PMF has its roots in predictable reality, and is thus better suited to
limiting risks through the design of dam spillways and other flood control
measures.
Reducing risks increases costs, however, and these costs have themselves
become as much a dilemma as the predicted magnitude of extreme floods.
Unfortunately, significant cost reductions are not always achievable in the
construction process, but rather have been accomplished by allowing
conservative designs that accept higher degrees of risk. While this seems
conceptually worthwhile, who should be responsible for assuming such risks,
and who would suffer if such a design is exceeded? Seldom do such designs
consider the feelings or perspective of those who are placed at risk, but rather
weigh only the financial impacts to the developer or owner.
Shortly after being asked to participate in this symposium, a discussion
followed about my perceptions of recent studies in paleohydrology. This
discipline gained wider exposure after the Big Thompson flood and was
further reinforced by the Lawn Lake Dam failure in 1982. Here were two
examples of dramatically high flows, on the order of 30,000 cfs and 20,000
cfs respectively, with clearly observed channel effects. Similar channel
evidence was lacking in other areas, particularly in the higher mountain
regions. In dam design, the paleohydrologic concept of the 10,OOO-year flood
is associated with the elapsed time since the last ice age. In light of the
previous concept of the 10,OOO-year flood, some questioned how meteorologists and engineers could predict floods with high flow rates despite no
apparent physical evidence to support such occurrences. I share those
concerns, but am not yet ready to accept the simple premise that, because a
flood has not yet occurred, it will never occur.
Recent studies have examined this condition at higher elevations, and have
presented evidence that floods as large as the Big Thompson event have no
physical basis. Under the auspices of the dam safety program, the Colorado
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state engineer has commissioned a study that should address some of these
concerns.
I once read that the only thing humans learn from history is that humans
learn nothing from history. Having grown up in Williamsburg, Virginia,
history is a major interest of mine. When I first learned about the recent
discussion of paleohydrology, I recognized a process that was practiced in the
past. Prior to 1900, engineers designed spillways using the identified high
water mark for the stream in question (National Research Council, 1985).
Often, engineers would make the spillway somewhat larger than the previous
"flood of record" to improve safety. Over time, however, many of these
dams washed out as floods exceeded the capacity of these spillways. This was
sufficiently common that overtopping is the single greatest cause of failure of
embankment dams.
In the publication Dam Incidents, USA (ASCE/USCOLD, 1976) it is
noted that no dam constructed after 1925 has failed due to overtopping.] The
subsequent version, Lesson from Dam Incidents, USA-II (ASCE/USCOLD,
1988), supports this finding. During this period a transition was occurring in
the design of spillways: designs began to be based upon predicted precipitation rather that probability of streamflow. By 1940, meteorological effects
were the primary consideration in the development of design storms. As
better observational and computation techniques developed, an improved
understanding of weather patterns resulted in the Probable Maximum
Precipitation (PMP) being more widely accepted. The Hydrometeorological
Reports (HMR) (U.S. Department of Commerce) published by the National
Weather Service provide this data. A consequent effect has been less
emphasis upon the probabilistic return period for floods, except to inform the
public of the relative magnitude of an event.
I see this trend of moving away from probability as a good direction.
Although the concept of the 100-year flood seems a good standard of
magnitude for small or low hazard dams, it can create a false sense of
security in the general public. It is easily misinterpreted, causing the public
to believe that after the occurrence of a l00-year flood, it will be another 100
years before its recurrence. Thus, what should be stressed-and emphatically

1. Since USCOLD does not inventory dams less than 50 feet in height, this statement
does not therefore apply to smaller dams that have been constructed with less
engineering analysis. Many small dams are designed to route a 1oo-year return flood,
and have been overtopped even when designed after 1925.
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so-is that if the flood happens once, it most certainly can happen again at
any time, and possibly even tomorrow.
In light of a historical perspective of this problem, a couple of stories
seem in order. I once worked on a dam in Oklahoma, where it seems that the
major storms occur over Memorial Day weekend. I was assigned to design
several rim embankments to handle a new PMF, developed in the early
1980s. Over a several year period in the 1970s, the project had experienced
three "floods of record." The first was identified as a 100-year event. When
the second occurred a couple of years later, it became a 20-year event. When
a third storm occurred, the statistical return period was further reduced. The
project is now 50 years old, and I am not aware of any such events having
occurred again. In this case, the assignment of a statistical return period had
no legitimate application other than to give the public and the news media a
measure of the severity of the storm and its probability of returning in the
near future.
In another case, a story was related to me about a flood-control project in
the Phoenix area. As construction began, the local river master ridiculed the
designers for building such a large structure. During his 30 years, there had
never been a flood of the magnitude predicted by the engineers; yet, while
still under construction, a flood larger than the design flow washed out the
project. As the subsequent redesign was nearing completion, another event
occurred, again larger than the designers had predicted. Assuming the third
time is a charm, the design was redone and I presume has been built. While
I cannot vouch for any accuracy, the purpose of relating this story to me
initially, and here as well, is that when we think we know where the edge of
the "envelope" of extreme events is, Mother Nature has a habit of pushing it
a bit farther.
Lastly, the house I grew up in is located some 40 feet above a small
stream that runs through the woods behind the house. In the 35 years that my
family has lived there, on only a few occasions had the stream gone out of its
banks. But one evening a large storm that produced 13 inches of rain
overnight raised the stream level to the back door steps!
It has been common in recent years to hear stories of floods that have
dramatically exceeded the previously recognized record floods. Within the
perspective of paleohydrology, should it be presumed that if an event hasn't
occurred in 10,000 years, then it is not likely to occur? Further, should we
preclude the occurrence of a greater magnitude event than may be supported
by the geologic record?
The basic concept of such a long period is in itself curious. Some 10,000
years ago the earth was wrapped within the ice age. The hydrologic cycle as
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we understand it was distorted to allow for the creation of ice. As the
predictions of global warming hang over our heads, and ice caps recede,
clearly the conditions of the past no longer prevail. Assuming that the cycle
is balanced and nothing is lost to outside influences, it follows then that the
former volumes of ice are now available to the atmosphere as moisture. It
should not seem surprising then that stream gages continue to record floods
of increasing magnitude. It seems to follow also that the premise of basing
designs on past history is not appropriate when natural and physical processes
suggest greater effects.
Consider the Cherry Creek, Colorado, flood of May 30 and 31,1935. At
the location of the storm center, where 24 inches of rain was recorded over
a 24-hour period, the 100-year event based on NOAA Atlas (Miller, 1973)
data would be approximately 3.5 inches. Projecting the statistical storm data
(Figure 1) for more frequent return storms toward the observed 24 inches
suggests that the 1935 event has a return period of 1018 years. This would
well exceed any paleontological record of 10,000 years. Comparing this event
with data from the Plum Creek event of June 1965 shows that the town of
Agate received 8 inches of rain during both events. Again, the 100-year
return storm precipitation index shows a value of 3.5 inches. Clearly an 8inch rain is well in excess of the "lOO-year storm," but two such events
occurred over a 30-year period.
Similar data were generated for the Big Thompson storm (Figure 2),
where the center produced 12 inches of rain over four hours. In this example,
the event would have a return period of almost 20,000 years. Further analysis
shows that this event closely approximates the predicted probable maximum
precipitation (PMP) at the storm center. In neither of these examples has it
been proven that a larger event is not possible, and evidence suggests in fact
that a larger storm may be probable.
Without ignoring the geologic record then, how can we resolve the
apparent difference between the predicted results of large precipitation events
against the lack of physical evidence for flood flows of that magnitude? Two
possible explanations exist, and both are conceivably simple. The first may
be that no storms of such great magnitude as a PMF have yet to occur over
most basins, The second may be due to the perspective of the data available.
The meteorologist is predicting the volume of rain that is possible given
conceivable extreme conditions. The paleohydrology study on the other hand
is useful for determining the magnitude of historic extreme flows recorded in
the geologic record. The former is input to a computer model, the later is the
output. What occurs in between the two seems then to be our source of
concern. If the former explanation is the cause, then our only course of action
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is to watch and be ready when the event does occur. If the latter is true, then
resolving the parameters that generate the observed runoff with the predicted
precipitation will give better insight into predicting flood events.
As the Colorado State Engineer's Office has embarked upon a program
of reviewing the spillways in the Colorado, our developed procedures for
hydrologic modeling occasionally suggest basin parameters that do not seem
correct. The common tool for hydrologic analysis is the HEC-1 program
developed by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. We have data for moderate
storms that have occurred over well-instrumented basins. In these cases good
rainfall depth-duration data and good stream flow data have been available for
the affected stream. Using the optimization procedures, the program can
develop the infiltration parameters for the basin for various methodologies.
In some cases the calculated parameters are significantly different than what
might be routinely selected. It is also not uncommon to encounter dams with
spillways so small that the structure might be expected to overtop in a thick
fog; yet, the dams are over 50 years old and this has not happened. Certainly
over the last 50 years significant precipitation events have occurred, and they
have occurred without generating a flood that affected these dams. Consequently, further research into infiltration and runoff parameters is needed.
No clear answer is available when predicting the magnitude and severity
of floods. Large floods can and do occur, and despite predictions that may
seem inordinately excessive, we continue to be awed by the magnitude of
storms that have occurred. As long as human lives remain at risk from our
choices, however, our predictions must be sufficiently conservative to lessen
the risk. And, as history suggests, we should learn to expect large floods and
prepare for them.
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